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ABSTRACT 
The following thesis explores the notion of truth as developed in the work of Martin 
Heidegger and Walter Benjamin. Contrary to the position adopted by maiiy 
commentators, who seek to drive a wedge between Heidegger's unorthodox 
phenomenology and the resolutely non -phenomenological Benjamin, I shall want to 
show how both begin with a rigorously Husserlian conception of truth as an intuition 
of essence in order, finally, to deviate from it. 
I arge that, for neither one, can truth be merely one problem or issue taken up 
by a thinking secure in itself. Rather, from its most classical determination in, for 
example, the Metaphysics as ýTTLCTTý1171 Tý13 (iXTIBEICL3, the way in which truth has been 
determined has itself determined the very project of philosophy. Yet whilst the 
trajectory of both Heidegger and Benjamin's work can thus be determined in large 
measure by the question of truth, both are also concerned to re-orient that question in 
a direction that renders problematic Aristotle's implicit connection of truth to 
knowledge and knowledge to intuition and presence. I argue that their respective 
challenges to the location of truth in the act of knowing -a challenge made each time 
by way of an analytical regression from a propositional understanding of truth 
(Satzwahrheit) to intuitive truth (Anschauungs-wahrheit) to, finally, its more original 
character as disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) - remain thoroughly phenomenological 
before showing how it is in the work of art, and in tragedy in particular, that each one 
finds the resources for a still more radical understanding of truth. Not in the 
cognitivist sense that art makes truth claims about the world, but in the sense that it 
is with the work of art that the historical act of disclosure and world -constitution that 
Benjamin and Heidegger call truth is most emphatically made. 
Only the person who understands the art of existing, only the person %N'ho, in the 
course of action, can treat what is in each case seized upon as wholly singular. 
who at the same time nonetheless realises the finitude of this activity, only such 
a one understands finite existence and can hope to accomplish something by it. 
Heidegger, Metaphysiche Anfangsgründt, der Logik 
Socrates looks death in the face as mortal. Not so the tragic hero who recoils 
from death as from a power that is fmailiar, proper, and inherent to him. Indeed, 
his life unfolds from death, which is not its end but its form. 
Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauserspiels 
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INTRODUCTION 
The following thesis is an attempt to understand the place accorded to the notion of 
art in Heidegger and Benjamin's thinking, and in particular its relation to the notion 
of truth that consitutes the matter that is at issue for that thinking (die Sache des 
Denkens). I shall want to argue that for neither Heidegger nor Benjamin is ai-t, anv 
more than truth, to be understood as an object for thinking, that is, as something 
toward which a thinking already established in itself would be directed in order then 
to register or to further its own concerns; instead, thinking needs to be understood as 
thematising its own relation to art, as also to truth, in such a way as to constitute the 
very project of philosophy as such. 
Such a claim clearly lends itself to a number of misinterpretations. The most 
evident of these - the cognitivist thesis - is that art, turned thus in the direction of 
truth, would be such to make truth statements of a sort, cognitive claims regarding 
the world. One can, it is true, find evidence in support of this thesis throughout 
Heidegger and Benjamin's work. Yet what disqualifies any such claim in advance, 
rending it unworkable, is that for neither Heidegger nor Benjamin is truth to be 
understood in terms of the provision of cognitive understanding. Thus, to Heidegger's 
celebrated suggestion that the 'captious' formulation 'the essence of truth is untruth 
[das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Un-Wahrheit]' is 'to indicate the strangeness of the 
new project of essence, " one could just as much counterpose BemJamin's own 
statement of affairs in the essay 'On the Program of the Coming Philosophy': 'Error 
vii 
can no longer be explained in terms of erring, any more than truth can be in terms of 
correct understanding [rechten Verstand]. 12 
Such, then, is the concern of this thesis: not, in fact, art as such, but triah: 
specifically, the way in which truth comes to be deployed and redeployed in certain 
texts by Heidegger and Benjamin on the basis of an initlal engagement with art. 
Necessarily, therefore, both Heidegger and Benjamin's principle meditations on 
the notion of art - respectively, 'The Origin of the Work of Art, 13 and what Claude 
Imbert calls 'les essais critique du cycle germanique14 - will be shown to announce an 
orientation to the work of art that points beyong the rights and duties of reproduction 
and edification with which art has invariably been saddled by traditional philosophical 
aesthetics. 
Having dealt in broad strokes with these sorts of questions in such a way as to 
lead the concern away from art per se to the determination of truth, I shall turn to a 
priviledged instance in which Heidegger and Benjamin do in fact treat of an art, 
namely tragedy. Again, however, the concerns registered above need to be kept in 
mind. And it ought to come as no surprise, therefore, that Heidegger, as Franýoise 
Proust rightly points out, left no Abhandlung iiber das Wesen der Tragddie. 5 Neither, 
in point of fact, did Benjamin. For both, the treatment of tragedy does not, as I shall 
undertake to show, amount to an interpretation; rather would it be, to borrow terms 
from Heidegger's own remarks on freedom, remarks that we shall have cause to 
consider later on, that tragedy affords both a certain possibility of philosophy, its 
Stätte und Gelegenheit, its site and occasion. 6 
* 
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Dealing respectively with Heidegger and Benjamin, chapters one and two are 
structured around largely identical concerns. I shall want to argue that three notions 
in particular are central to both Heidegger and Benjamin's case with respect to the 
properly fragwiirdig dimension of art: truth, origin, and history. 
Chapter one treats of Heidegger and of 'The Origin of the Work of Art. ' The 
concern here is to explore the issue and orientation anounced by the title of 
Heidegger's essay. The treatment falls into three parts. The guiding thread for the 
first of these are two remarks which, to a large extent, frame the essay as a whole. The 
first is its opening line: 'Origin here means that from which and bY which a matter is 
what it is and as it iS. 17The second, which comes from the concluding praragraphs of 
the essay, takes the form of a question as to whether, 'in our existence, ' we are 
'historically at the origin. 18 My concern here will be to approriate for these remarks 
some of the resources that are released by the examination of origin undertaken in 
Being and Time, principally those released by the account given there of the essential 
duplicity of truth, understood in its more original sense as disclosedness. Turning, 
second, to 'The Work and Truth, ' the central section of the essay itself, I take as the 
guiding thread for this part of my treatment two equally perimetic remarks: the first 
is a statement from the draft version of the essay, Heidegger there declaring art to be 
necessary (notwendig) for the happening of truth; 9 the second comes from the 
Afterword to the essay: 'from the change in the essence of truth, ' we are told, 'arises 
the history of the essence of art. "O If, as I shall want to show, the overriding concern of 
Heidegger's essay is to ponder the essence of art in a manner ill-afforded by such a 
history, then this will entail another and concomitent change in the determination of 
ix 
the essence of truth. Having explored the way in which such a determination is indeed 
broached in Heidegger's text, I turn, finally, to the historical dimension of art - what, 
as a counterpoint to the properly transcendental aspect of Being and Time, Heidegger 
calls world - in order to offer one possible account of how art 'is historical in the sense 
that it grounds history. 'll 
Chapter two begins with style. More accurately, it begins with two brief 
allusions made by Benjamin to the 'concept' of philosophical style. Although self- 
evidently not a concept in the critical sense of the term - and, as I shall want to show, 
Benjamin's reference in both instances is to Kant -I examine how Benjamin employs 
it as such in order to argue the case for philosophy's filial relation to art. Taking his 
distance from the hoped for 'sisterly union' of mathematics and philosophy expressed 
by Kant in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method (a union clearly not intended to be 
consummated, however), 12Benjamin stresses instead that it is in the manner in which 
it comes continually 'to stand anew before the question of presentation [uor der Frage 
der Darstellung zu stehen]' that the mark of philosophy's dealings with truth is to be 
found. 13 It is here, I argue, that Benjamin finds the resources by which philosophy can 
and must thematise its own relation to art, a thematisation nowhere more clearly 
expressed than in his traducing of Kant's expression of family resemblances: 'Everv 
great work, ' he writes in a fragment of 1921, 'has its sibling ... in a philosophical 
sphere. '14 Following an exploration of the philosophical consequences that flow from 
these claims of method, I examine in more detail the 'deformations' in the essence of 
truth broached by Benjamin in the Epistemo- Critical Foreword to the Origin of the 
German Mourning Play. 15 In the final section of the chapter, I turn to the concept of 
x 
origin, 'a thoroughly historical category, ' Benjamin says. Through a careful reading of 
the paragraph of the Foreword in which Benjamin treats of origin. I undertake to show 
how and why he moves, finally, to reintroduce such a category back into art. 
The previous chapters having shown how and why Heidegger and Benjamin 
address their analyses to the issue of art, chapters three and four turn to a 
particularly priviledged instance of this: tragedy. 
Central to the treatment of Heidegger in chapter three is a remark, scarecely 
noted in the literature, from the 'Letter on "Humanism"' of 1946: 'The tragedies of 
Sophocles, providing such a comparison is in any way allowable, shelter the -'Oo, 3 in TI 
their sayings more incipently than do Aristotle's lectures on "ethics". '16 I begin with a 
sustained account of the context of this remark and of its implications for the 
determination of man made by Heidegger in that text. 1 turn, next, to the suggestive 
analyses of Frangoise Dastur and, having explored her suggestion that it is in tragedy 
that 'one finds an inaugural representation of the fundamentally mortal condition of 
man, '17 as well as her ensuing claim that it is tragedy that paves the way for 
philosophy (qui prepare Favenement de la philosophie), 18 I turn to the issue of death 
and its relation to tragedy in Heidegger's work. Finally, I address Heidegger's 
celebrated commentaries on the choral ode from Sophocles' Antigone in order to 
reexamine, in light of the foregoing analyses, his claims regarding the inceptive sense 
of T*3 that resonates in Sophocles' tragedies. I shall want to show how these tragedies 
are seen by Heidegger to be 'decisive' in opening up a 'concealed directive' for the way 
in which he undertakes to broach the question concerning man. 19 
xi 
The concerns of chapter four are rather more straightforward. I begins %vitli a 1ý 
lengthy discussion of a remark from Benjamin's long essay of 1920 on Goethe's 
Elective Affinities regarding the resolute Indifferenz of myth with respect to truth: 
'authentic art, authentic philosophy - as distinct from their inauthentic stage, the 
theurgic - begin in Greece with the departure of myth [Ausgang der Mythos], since 
neither one is any more nor any less based upon truth than the other. '20 On the bcaslis 
of this remark, I undertake to further the arguments of chapter two regarding the 
specific character that is to be accorded to truth, before turning to the principle 
concern of the chapter, Benjamin's account of tragedy. So far as Benjamin is 
concerned, tragedy needs to be understood as the inauguration and enactment of 
what, following Reiner SchUrmann, I term an 'epochal principle. ' I arge that, in the 
'decisive, Greek confrontation' with myth that he sees enacted and accomplished by 
Attic tragedy, a new epoch (Epoche) is posited (gesetzt). 21 This epoch, I suggest, is 
precisely that named in the remarks cited above as the Ausgangspunkt of myth. Yet if 
such does prove to be the case, then does it not follow that tragedy constitutes also the 
originary inscription of truth? Its precondition? Through a careful account of the 
notions of freedom and language in Benjamin's text, I pursue the implications of this 
claim in the direction of man. 
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1 GA 65: 351. 
GS 11 1: 167; SW 1: 107. 
3 If the most sustained and celebrated version of this text to have come from Heidegger's t, 
pen is the lectures presented in 1935 in Frankfurt under the title 'Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes, ' this version is itself worked up from origins that lie squarely in prevIOUs 
years. The earliest of these is a short, schematic draft of 1934, an authorised transcript of 
which appeared only recently, along with Heidegger's own marginal comments, as Toin 
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' in Heidegger Studies 5 (1989), 5-22. More important, 
however, is a lecture, also entitled Tom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, ' delivered in 
Freiburg on 13 November of the same year to the Kunstwissenschaftliche GeselIschaft as 
the key-note lecture to a colloquium entitled 'Die Oberwindung der Asthetik in der Frage 
nach dem Kunst. ' Sharing the same divisions as the Frankfurt lectures and covering 
much of the same ground in often largely identical terms, this text is the 'first version' of' 
the later lectures referred to by Heidegger in his supplementary remarks to Holzwege 
(GA 5: 344). This lecture, which was delivered unchanged in January of the following 
year at the University of Zurich, was then revised for the series of lectures given in 
Frankfurt in November and December of 1936 under the title 'Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes. ' With the addition of an Afterword, written 'in large part later' (GA 5: 37-5), 
these lectures form the basis of the text published in 1950 in Holzwege as 'Der Ursprung 
des Kunstwerkes. ' With the further addition of an appendix written in 1956, they were 
reprined a decade later as Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960), and 
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1. TRUTH 
Der Wahrheit ist der Tod der Intention. 
Benjamin, Ursprung des dcutscheii Kwistiverhes 
CHAPTER ONE 
rpL I , he Leap 'nto the World: Heidegger and the Origin of Truth 
The riddling character Of d[XýOEM comes closer to us, yet at 
the same time so does the danger than we might 
hypostasise it into a fantastical world essence 1 
Heidegger closes 'The Origin of the Work of Art' of 1936 not with a summary 
statement of results or with an indication in the direction of further research, but 
with a question. 'In our existence, 'he asks, 'are we historically at the origin [sbid wir 
in unserem Dasein geschichlich am Ursprung]? l2 
Neither the formulation of the question nor its context leave any room for 
doubt that the decision being called for is, like all historical decisions, an 'essential' 
one. 3 As such, it refers less to the voluntary selection of one set of distinct possibilities 
over another, what Heidegger sometimes likes to call choice (Waho, than to what 
Being and Time will have already identified by the term resoluteness or resolute 
openness (Entschlossenheit), namely 'the disclosive projection and determination of 
what is factually possible at the time. 14 Indeed, Heidegger himself hints at just such a 
referral a few pages before this, describing the mode of knowing the work that he 
calls preservation (Bewahrung) as a being-resolved (Entschiedensein). 5 And although 
the connection is not made explicit here by Heidegger, one could pursue this referral 
still further, in the other direction, as it were, and point to the way in which it was in 
the notion of resoluteness that Being and Time was to 'have arrived at that truth of 
1 
Dasein that is most originary'16 that is, to the way in which the phenomenon of 
resoluteness was to have 'brought us before the originary truth of existence. 's 
Such is, to my mind, the connection in which the concluding remarks of 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' need to be read, a connection in which the decision as to 
whether we are, in unserem Dasein, historically at the origin takes on the character 
of possibilisation, of what releases possibilities for existence. Seen in such a 
connection, moreover, what is at issue in the decision being called for by Heidegger is 
Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being, which, as something thrown, can project 
itself only upon the definite factical possibilities released by that decision. It is in the 
decision alone, therefore, that Dasein can be made 'open for the monumental 
possibilities of human existence [Existenz]' by 'coming back resolutely to itself, ' a 
movement back that Heidegger does not hesitate to refer to 'the historicality of 
Dasein. 18 Important to dispel, however, is any suggestion that, drawn back to itself, 
Dasein is thus severed from any relation to a world. Quoting again from Being and 
Time: 
Resoluteness, as authentic being-a-self, does not detach Dasein from its world, 
nor does it isolate it as a free floating I. How could it - when resolve, as 
authentic disclosedness, is nothing other than authentically being-in-the- 
world? 9 
One could say, then, that with the decision it is a matter of deciding upon a world, of 
disclosing it and making it possible. And if it is in the decision that the 'there' of Dasein 
is made transparent to it then it also follows that, referring this time to the 
draft of 
2 
the essay on art, the decision as to 'our historical Dasein [geschichtlichen Daseinl' is 
itself 'already the decisive leap [der entscheidende Sprung] into the nearness of the 
ori&. '10 
In'The Origin of the Work of Art' itself, however, Heidegger refuses to make 
these sorts of connections explicit. Situating his remarks instead on the level of a 
6 precursory and so indispensable preparation' for any such response, he follows the 
question with an attempt to clarify it within the context of the concerns of the essay 
as a whole. This clarification takes the form of two further questions, in which the 
'either-or' and its 'decision' are made strikingly clear: 
Do we know, that is, do we give heed to, the essence of the origin [das Wesen 
des Ursprunges]? Or do we, in our relation to art, still only make appeal to an 
educated acquaintance with the past? ll 
With such questions what comes to be decided upon (entscheidet sich) is the very 
status of art, its position as 'an origin in our historical existence, ' as something 
'historical in the essential sense that it grounds history, ' or as a mere 'appendix, ' a 
bland and routine 'semblance of culture. 112 But just how is this to be decided on? By 
what right? By what authority? 13 
In order to make sense of this either-or and so give, at the very least, some 
indication as to its decision, Heidegger has need, therefore, of a point of reference or 
9a sign, ' something upon which the decision can be based. And he 
finds one, wholly 
unmistakable and infallible (untrdgliches), he says, named in two 
lines from 
Hblderlin: 
3 
Hard it is 
For that which dwells near the origin to abandon its place. II 
Whilst it is not difficult to detect echoes of this sign in the various questions being 
raised here by Heidegger (To we know ... the essence of the originT 'Are we 
historically at the originT etc. ), it is nonetheless at this point that one of the verv real 
difficulties of his text emerges. 
Consider for a moment this reference to the notion of the sign. 'A sign [ebi 
Zeichen], ' as Heidegger suggests elsewhere, 'can point to [zeigen] many and varied 
things. 115 So much so, in fact, that it will always be vulnerable to aberration and may 
even 'become inaccessible [unzugdng1ich]. 116Might not such be the case here? For no 
matter how 'infallible' Heidegger adjudges this sign to be, quite how it is to be 
deciphered remains entirely open to question. 17 JUStwhat does it signal as regards 
the either-or and its decision? A resounding yes to our dwelling historically at the 
origin? A resolute no? Or, perhaps more likely given the remarks of the draft, no 
decision either way, merely a hint in the direction of 'giving heed to the essence of the 
origin'9 The text itself affords few real clues in this regard. What is does afford, 
however, is at least one indication that the difficulty here has less to do with some 
failure of reading that might one day be remedied than with the very ground of the 
decision as such. 'Every decision, ' Heidegger declares in the central section of the 
lectures, 'is based on something unmastered [ein Nichbewd1tigtes], something 
concealed [Verborgenes], something confusing, otherwise it would not be a decisioii. ' 18 
He calls this unmasterable, concealed ground earth (die Erde) and, in so doing, refers 
4 
the decision to that governing expanse he calls world (die Welt). Quoting again from 
the central section of the lectures: 'Wherever those utterly essential decisions of our 
history are made ... there world worlds [da weltet die Weltl. '19 
I will come back to these locutions and their significance in due course. For the 
moment, let us merely draw attention to the way in which this referral of the decision 
to the notion of world is, before any reading of 'The Origin of the Work of Art' itself, 
already implied in Heidegger's insistence that the lines from Hblderlin be read as a 
6 sign. 120 
In the examination of the phenomenon of reference and the facultas signatrix 
provided in Being and Time, Heidegger had looked back to Husserl's analysis of 
indication (Anzeichen) in the first of the Logical Inuestigations in order to excavate 
the original meaning of the sign as a phenomenon of uncovering (entdecken). 21 What 
does the sign uncover? It uncovers, Heidegger says, that into which one is thrown, 
that in which one's concern abides (wobei ... sich aufhdlt), the sort of involvement 
one has with something, allowing thus 'what is ready-to-hand to be encountered, ' 
allowing thus 'its context to become accessible in such a way that our concernful 
dealings take on and secure an orientation. 122The sign is described accordingly as 'an 
explicit and easily manipulable way' in which Dasein 'uncovers' in circumspective 
concern the world into which it is thrown. It is a way of constituting a context, a 
system of involvements or references, in short, a world, against which things can 
show themselves. Through the sign, Heidegger concludes, the 'uncovered region 
[entdeckte Gegend]' of a world is'held explicitly open [hält ... ausdräcklich offen]. 
'2: 3 
Yet if, as seems entirely legitimate to assume, therefore, the sign being evoked 
at the close of 'The Origin of the Work of Art' is, much like the pathmarks, storm 
5 
warnings, signs of mourning'and the like'instanced in Being and Time, one in which 
the referential totality of a world might come to be disclosed, then no less legitimate is 
the assumption that this sign, like another of Heidegger's examples, a work of art this 
time, the boundary stone (Grenzstein) gazed upon by the goddess in the votive motif 
known as 'The Mourning Athena, ' is one by which something is 'gathered into its 
propriety [in sein Eigenes versammelt]' in order from there 'to emerge into 
presence. 124 
Whatever Heidegger actually intends with the 'unmistakable' sign named in 
these lines from H61derlin, therefore, the implication seems to be that with them, a 
world might come to be disclosed and held together. The claim seems to be that with 
this sign, a world might come to be decided upon. In the essay on art no less than in 
Being and Time, it would seem to be a matter of what Jean-Luc Nancy has termed la 
mondaneite de la decision, ' a decision through which nothing other than le monde 
25 meme de 1'existence' would come to be disclosed. 
These are the sorts of claims that I shall want to explore in this chapter. Before 
moving on to do so, it is important to note that however urgent the question of this 
( either-or' and its 'decision' might appear now to Heidegger, however urgent the need 
now to decipher the historical sign 'named' in H61derlin's lines, the contemporary 
follower of his path of thinking might well have been forgiven for making the 
assumption that art was indeed no more than an 'appendix' to the rather more 
pressing concerns of fundamental ontology. In Being and Time, for instance, there 
would seem to be precious little scope for making such decisions, Heidegger focussing 
his phenomenological energies on Dasein as the site of the decision over 'le monde 
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meme de 1'existence, ' and it has not passed unnoticed in the literature that 'art ... was 
virtua y excluded' from that work. 26 
Of course, we do not want for entirely coherent reasons as to why this might 
be the case. Consider just two such reasons. Concerned, zundchst und zumeist, with 
the everyday comportments and dealings of Dasein, Being and Time can have no 
place for art since art, presumably by definition, belongs to the order of the 
extraordinary. Or, in a somewhat more considered version of the same point: art 
remains truant from Being and Time because it is 'unthinkable on the basis of the 
categories of that work. 127 As something encountered within the world, the work of 
art would be unthinkable as an available piece of equipment or a handy tool, as a 
being objectively present to Dasein, as the brute matter of a purely subsisting thing; 
and unthinkable, too, as Dasein, possessed neither of care, nor resoluteness, nor 
being-toward- death. 
These look like persuasive arguments. But what, then, are we to conclude 
from Heidegger's rather curmudgeonly insistence that just as 'we [wir] enjoy 
ourselves and have fun the way one [man] enjoys oneself, ' so too 'we read, see, and 
judge literature and art the way one sees and judgeS1? 28 It is important to note that 
the context of this remark situates art on the side of Dasein's existentiell fallenness 
and not on the side of its being alongside other beings. In other words, art is being 
evoked as an instance of inauthenticity and not one of everydayness. In this 
description, which betokens thus nothing so much as the eclipse of Dasein in its 
distraction and its falling away from an authentic concern with the world, has not the 
historical decision urged upon us at the close of 'The Origin of the Work of Art' 
already been taken? Instanced as a mere curio, has not art been situated firmlý' 
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alongside other inauthentic distractions? Does not the status of Dasein's 'relation to 
artý as a 'routine appearance of culture' seem already to be assured? Indeed. And 
what, also, are we to conclude from Heidegger's fear, confessed at the vei, y outset of 
Division Two, that the attempt to provide an existential projection of Dasein's 
authentic being-toward- death might well turn out to be no more than em 
phantastisches Unterfangen at best and, at worst, eine nur dichtende, willkürliche 
U- 
ixunstruktion? 29 Indeed, it might appear that he had himself only aggravated the 
situation just a few pages before this by drawing an unequivocal distinction between 
conviction about something (about a particular being) and 'arbitrary fictions or mere 
"views" about it. 130 As a mode of what he calls certainty (Gewij3heit), which, as the 
explicit appropriation of what has already been disclosed or uncovered (Erchlossenen 
b. z. w. Entdeckten), has itself already been brought into line with the redetermination 
of truth undertaken just a few sections earlier, 31 conviction, we are told, is 'grounded 
in truth or belongs to it equiprimordially' and refers accordingly to a certain mode of 
disclosedness in which 'Dasein allows the testimony of the uncovered (true) thing 
itself alone to determine its being toward it understandingly, ' to a certain way in 
which Dasein is truthful (in der Wahrheit 
iSt). 32 Is it not, Heidegger suggests with an 
opprobrium that readily explains the worries of a few pages later, precisely such a 
determination with respect to truth that is lacking in all arbitrary fiction (willkiirliche 
Erdichtung)? 
A broadly similar picture emerges on consideration of the lecture courses 
which immediately follow the publication of Being and Time. Certainly, we do no%v 
find Heidegger making rather more allusions to art and to particular works of art: to 
the redoubtable wall of Rilke's Malta Laudrids Brigge in the last of the Marburg 
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courses; 33 to Novalis' reflections on 'homesickness' and to the dubious 'privilege of the 
poets' in the 1929-30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of MetaphYsIcs. 34 to 
Rilke again, this time to a remark on the tribulations of Tame, ' at the end of the 
following year's lectures devoted to Hegel's Phenomenology. 35 What is more, 
Heidegger now appears to hint at resources and depths in art for which the official 
line followed in Being and Time did not seem to allow. In The Basic Problet7is of 
Phenomenology, for example, Rilke's description of the scarred and shattered walls of 
a long-abandoned house is adduced as a disclosure of the fact that Dasein, as that 
being which always understands itself in terms of its existence, 'is its world, ' a world 
that first makes it possible 'to uncover [entdecken] an equipmental contexttire as 
intraworldly and to dwell in it [sich bei ihm aufzuhalten]. 136The being-in-the-world 
which 'leaps toward us' in Rilke's description is not, Heidegger declares, something 
'imagined [hineingedichtet] but, on the contrary .... is possible only as an 
interpretation and elucidation of what actually is [was ... "wirklich" iSt]. 137 And he will 
go even so far as to draw general conclusions from this, extending to poetry the status 
of the 'first' disclosure of a world, evoking it as 'the elemental articulation [Zum - Wort- 
kommen], that is, the becoming- uncovered [Entdecktwerden], of existence as being-in- 
the-world. 138 Indeed, it might in retrospect be said that these sorts of conclusions are 
in fact presaged in Being and Time where, in an extremely reserved passage geared 
toward expanding the ongoing discussion of language, Heidegger had raised the 
possibility that 'the communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, that 
is, the disclosing of existence [das Erschlie, 6en von Existenz], might well become the 
proper aim of "poetic" discourse ["dichtenden" Rede]. 139 
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Clearly suggestive of subsequent developments, and in particular of that 
development that I shall want to consider here, remarks such as these are 
nonetheless decidedly reserved, 40 however, and remain, without exception. altogether 
marginal and illustrative to Heidegger's more immediate concerns. 
Yet from the moment that Heidegger does undertake to treat of art as a 
concern in its own right, he affords it a strangely decisive status in his work, doing so, 
moreover, with respect to the way in which he formulates the topologIcal or historical 
unfoldings of the truth of being. Quoting again from the concluding remarks of 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art': 'in its essence art is an origin, an outstanding way in which 
truth comes to be [Wahrheit seiend], i. e. becomes historical [geschichtlich wird]. '41 
Indeed, one might go so far as to wonder whether this 'decision' concerning art is not, 
at times, strained to the point where we are forced to reckon with the possibility that 
art has become for Heidegger the sole preserve for the truthful disclosure of beings. 
Whether it might not be possible to read the following remark from the draft of 1935, 
'On the Origin of the Work of Art, ' as actually being much closer to the underlying 
intention of Heidegger's discourse than the subsequent program of revisions to which 
these words submit: 'the work, i. e. art, is necessary [notwendig ist] for the happening 
oftruth. 142 Thus , in a marginal note 
keyed to this line of the draft: 'Art, one origin of 
truth. The basic manner of its becoming. 143Then in the Freiburg lecture: 'art is, as the 
setting-into-work of truth, only one way in which truth happens. 114 And, finally, in the 
celebrated assessment of the Frankfurt lectures themselves: 'How does truth happen? 
We answer: it happens in a few essential ways .... 
One essential way, in which truth 
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establishes itself in the beings it has opened up, Is truth setting Itself (In) to (the) 
work. 145 
If, on the evidence of such revisions, the absolute privilege which had initially 
accrued to art is never entirely erased, neither here nor anywhere else in Heideggers 
thinking'46 then it might appear that it is, at the very least, tempered somewhat, 
Heidegger moving from a position in which art is said to be the a priori condition for 
the happening of truth, to its being 'one origin, ' 'one way' in which truth happens, 
albeit a grundsdtzlich one, to, finally, the presentation of the work of art as merely 
one of the 'few essential ways' in which truth happens. 
Yet might not the suspicion remain as to whether art is, in point of fact, ever 
presented as merely one essential way in which truth happens, one essential way in 
which beings are disclosed? Might one not suspect, in other words, that art is actually 
presented as the way in which truth happens? But if such did prove to be the case, 
then would it not be entirely likely that what Heidegger calls art would, under such a 
burden, be twisted out of all recognition? If art is indeed the way, and not simply one 
way, in which truth happens, would this not mean that the issue of Heidegger's 
discourse is not really art but something else entirely? Perhaps we can get closer to 
the question by asking: Of what does the essay claim to speak? Certainly not of art. 
Nor, even, of the work of art. It claims to speak, rather, of the origin of the work of 
art. 
In this chapter I shall want to concentrate on a close reading of the themes 
surrounding Heidegger's reflection on the origin of the work of art, focussing 
principally on the draft and the Freiburg lecture of 1935 and the Frankfurt lectures of 
the following year, in order to see how the reflection as a whole unfolds and to 
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explore in some detail the apparently unsanctioned thesis that it is in art that truth 
happens. To the extent that these three texts cover largely the same ground and do 
so, moreover, in largely the same terms, I shall not undertake to examine each in 
turn. Nor, except in one or two exceptional instances, will I be drawn on the specific - 
often decisive - differences between them. 47Rather will my concern be to focus on 
certain moments when Heidegger undertakes most emphatically to twist art iii 
another direction; that is to say, in a direction other than art. I shall want to deal with 
three such moments. The first and most expansive of these refers to the notion of 
origin, most extensively as it is employed in Being and Time, and onIN, then as it 
comes to govern the later essays. The second moment refers to the way in which 
Heidegger undertakes to reorient the notion of art in the direction of truth, 
specifically, in the direction of that deformation in the concept of truth already 
underway in the lecture 'On the Essence of Truth. 148The third moment, and the one 
with which virtually all the claims advanced by Heidegger with respect to art come to 
be gathered together, refers to what we might properly call the historical moment of 
Heidegger's text, and which he himself calls world. 49 
I 
Over and above the matter of art, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' treats also - indeed, 
quite possibly more so - of origin. Yet whereas the former, as I have suggested, 
denotes a set of concerns that is almost entirely new for Heidegger, the latter had 
long named die Sache des Denkens. 
12 
Instructive in this regard is a letter of May 1919. Reflecting there on the 
'concentrated, fundamental, and concrete' character of his work in terms of certain 
'basic problems of phenomenological methodology, ' Heidegger writes accordingly of its t, - 
'disengagement from the residue of acquired standpoints' and of its 'ever new forays, 
into true origins. '50 The remark points clearly enough to the the themes and positions 
that had first been broached in The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of 
Worldview, Heidegger's lecture course of the previous semester, and that will be 
developed at greater length in the upcoming winter semester course Basic Probleiiis 
of Phenomenology. What is equally clear, however, is that there is little to choose on 
this point between the work of the young Privatdozent and that of his more illustrious 
tutor, on whose Logos article of 1911 the remarks of this letter unmistakably draw. 
'Philosophy, ' Husserl had written toward the end of that work, at a point 
where the guiding determination of rigour had already been established, 'is in its 
essence a science of true beginnings [wahren Anffingen], of origins, ' before adding: 
'the science concerning what is radical must be radical in procedure and from every 
point of view. 151 Not only are phenomenology's 'critical reflections' and 'profound 
considerations of method' to constitute philosophy as rigorous science, 52 therefore; 
they are also to constitute it as radical science, as science that is directed toward the 
root or origin of things. Further, Husserl is quick to draw the connection between this 
radical concern with origins and the watchword of phenomenology as a whole, the 
demand that 'the impulse of research ... proceed not 
from philosophies but from 
things [von den Sachen], ' re-emphasising the point with the following counsel: 'Yet 
one must never abandon the radical lack of prejudice [radikale Vorurteilslosigkeitj 
and identify such things with empirical facts [empirischen Tatsachen], so remaining 
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blind to ideas which are to such a great extent given in immediate intuition. '. 53 The 
radicality of phenomenology is such as to require that one avoid identifying the things 
themselves with things of fact, to avoid the impasse of empiricism that continually 
threatens to derail its transcendental step back to the level of constitution as such. 
The demand that the impulse of research proceed von den Sachen is clearly very 
different, therefore, from a call to the passivity or indolence of a thinking that would 
purport to be merely descriptive. 54 The phenomenological attitude requires not only 
an attention to the character of reticence by which thinking would seek to allow such 
things to present themselves, but also the laborious process of an engagement, what 
Heidegger calls a supervisory demonstration (kontrollierende Aussweisung), " that 
would undertake to invoke or to draw out the things themselves. From which it 
follows that there is need not only for a reflection on method, but also for there to be 
a problem of method: the methodological reflection is charged with bringing into the 
practice of phenomenology the reflexive determination that asks what would be 
required of a thinking that would attend genuinely to the things themselves. Above 
all (vor allem), Husserl concludes, such reflection 'ought not to rest until it has 
secured its own absolutely clear beginnings. 156 
One could say, then, that for Husserl, therefore, as for Heidegger, it is only in 
the interrogation of such beginnings - its own - that the status of phenomenology as 
rigorous science comes to be secured. For Heidegger, as for Husserl, the most 
basic 
problem of phenomenology is phenomenology itself (sie selbst 
ffir sich selbst): 
the kernel of philosophy's problem lies in itself - it is itself the problem. 
The 
cardinal question concerns the essence, the concept of philosophy. 
Its theme is 
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formulated thus: The Idea of philosophy ..., and more accurately: The Idea of 
philosophy as original science. 57 
Now if this interrogation of phenomenological origins marks the point of closest 
proximity between Heidegger and Husserl, it will nonetheless come also to mark a 
point of fundamental difference. This is not to say that the self- description given in 
Heidegger's letter is not entirely borne out by the analyses of the contemporaneous 
lecture courses. It is. And, just as in certain celebrated notes to Being atid Time, 
Heidegger is scrupulous in placing such analyses under the aegis of his tutor, readily 
acknowledging the degree to which he is 'constantly learning in company with 
Husserl. 158 Equally, Heidegger follows Husserl in his outspoken opposition to the 
notion of worldview, identifying the claim that 'worldview is the task of philosophy' 
as the very catastrophe of philosophy itself. 19 And it is in Husserl's work, moreover, 
that Heidegger finds the possibility of a point of departure for his own inquiries that 
allows him to sidestep the prevailing neo-Kantian attempt to route philosophy 
through the Faktum of the existing sciences, whose sense it would thereby elucidate. 
This point of departure, what Heidegger variously terms the primary leap (Ur- 
sprung) or originating domain (Ursprungsgebiet) of thinking, is the concrete 
immediacy of lived experience brought into play by Husserl as the 'principle of all 
principles, ' the principle from which all others are to draw their legitimacy: 
the principle ... that every originally given 
intuition Ueder originar gebende 
Anschauung] is an authoritative source of [Rechtsquellel of knowledge, that 
everything originally offered to us (in the flesh, as it were) in "Intuition" 
is to 
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be accepted simply as what is presented as being, but also only within the limits 
in which it there presents itse 
If. 60 
Now whilst he will dispute Husserl's insistence upon the principle qua Pritizip, 
Heidegger nonetheless sees in the non-theoretical character of intuition a gennuine 
advance into the Urhabitus of rigoruous phenomenology. So far as Heidegger is 
concerned, then, intuition names 'the primary intention of true living [die 
Urintention des wahrhaften Lebens iiberhaupt], ' that is, 'the primary attitude of lived 
experience and of life as such [die Urhaltung des Erlebens und Leben als solchen]. ', -, 
And it is in this intention or attitude alone, therefore, that phenomenology is to find 
its concrete or factical. point of departure. Not, to be sure, in its theoretical 
construction, but as the phenomenological disclosure of the sphere of immediate 
experience (phdnomenologische Erschliel3ung der Erlebenissphdre), the 
experienceable as such (Erlebbares dberhaupt) . 
62 The origin or originating domain for 
Heidegger's phenomenology is the problem of life, therefore. 63 
Now it is at precisely this point, in the course of clarifying the focus and more 
concrete problem of his own investigations - not simply factical life, he says, but on a 
more basic level, life in its original leap (Ur-sprung) into the factic - that Heidegger 
takes his definitive leave from Husserl. Absolved of all relations to the theoretical 
sciences, the issue of philosophy is the disclosure of the original sphere (Ursphdre) of 
lived experience prior to its deformation and concealment by the theoretical attitude. 
Hence, if philosophy has not yet become rigorous or originary science (strenge 
Wissenschaft, Urwissenschaft), if it is not yet a science at all, as Husserl had declared 
in 1911, if it has not yet found its way into the Ursprungsgebeit of life but remains 
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bedevilled by the competing claims of objectification and abstraction, then the fault 
lies not, as Husserl had surmised, with the dictates of naturalism alone, but with what 
Heidegger terms more expansively 'the general rule [Genera lherrschaft] of the 
theoretical .... the primacy of the theoretical as such. '64The question remalns ent'rely 
open, furthermore, as to whether Husserl himself is not merely complicit in such rule 
but is, in point of fact, its prime mover. It is in precisely this connection that 
Heidegger's most emphatic declaration of independence needs to be read: 
Phenomenology defines its ownmost thematic matter contrary to [gegen] its 
ownmost principle, not from out of the things themselves but out of a 
traditional preview of it ..., one whose sense 
[Sinn] serves to deny the 
originary leap [urspriinglichen Sprung] into the beings that are thematically 
intended. As regards the basic task of determining its ownmost field, 
phenomenology is thus unphenomenological. 65 
From as early as 1919, therefore, Heidegger was to have found himself addressing 
thus what a much later self-interpretation (1964) will identify as the problem of 
'what 
remains unthought in the appeal "to the things themselves", '66 doing so 
by way of an 
ever more radical appeal to the notion of origin. In the words of Reiner 
Scharmann: 
'The whole of Heidegger's work can be read as an inquiry into origin 
[une recherche 
167 
d'origine], ' therefore, the word 'recurring at each stage of his itinerary. , And it is 
around this word alone, moreover, that, quoting this time from 
Theodore Kisiel, 'the 
various problems of his phenomenology proliferate. 168 
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Being and Time, for instance, is unequivocal in this regard. There Heidegger 
makes a substantial recherche d'origine, and does so moreover in several distinct 
senses of the term. 69The most straightforward of these, and the one with which the 
book begins, is the sense in which it finds its issue and point of departure in an 
anticipatory retrieval of what Heidegger takes to be the basic or inceptive 
(anffinglicher) issue for thinking: the question about being. Such is not, he declares, 
just any question but 'the question of all questions' and the one which impelled the 
earliest philosophical researches in the work of Plato and Aristotle. He opens the book 
accordingly, not only directing attention toward the question about being as the 
matter that will be at issue for it, but also referring back to those inaugural 
researches by way of a citation from Plato's Sophist: 
For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the 
expression being. We, however, who once thought we understood it have now 
become perplexed. 70 
The emphasis that Heidegger will want to place on the interrogative character of 
these remarks ('... the question of what we really mean by the word "being" 'the 
meaning of this question etc. ) is enough to indicate that the concern here is going 
to be less blandly pedagogic than the declamatory tone of the opening remarks might 
otherwise suggest. Indeed, it amounts to something of a declaration of intent, one 
engaged in seeing off any suggestion that the aim of the treatise might 
be to provide a 
definitive answer to this question. This is, moreover, one of the principle reasons why 
Heidegger goes out of his way to caution against the application to 
fundamental 
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ontology of any principle of method drawn from the positive sciences. For whilst such 
sciences a ways can legitimately direct themselves toward the collation of results and 
the establishment of secure standpoints, 71 fundamental ontology enjoys no such 
luxury. To the extent that it has always to 'face up to the possibility of the disclosure 
of a more originary universal horizon from which to draw an answer to the question, ' 
it ought rather to 'guard against any overestimation of its results. 172 In marked 
contrast to the positive scientist, therefore, whose principle of method will always 
encourage the analogical determination and establishments of a priori rules, the 
fundamental ontologist does not find; he seeks. Hence: the goal of the treatise is less 
to provide appropriate answers, than to work out the question about being itself and 
to do so concretely. 
As he had done more expansively in the 1924 lecture course devoted to the 
Sophist and again in the course of the following semester History of the Concept of 
Time, Heidegger credits Plato with having given the clearest indication yet of the 
I inceptive vitality' of this 'expressly interrogative experience. 173 Now, however, the 
point is more emphatically made: Perplexity about the meaning of being is regarded 
now as the very move to metaphysics. It is the point at which one ceases to 'tell stories 
about beings, ' that is, the point at which one no longer 'determines beings as beings by 
tracing them back in their provenance to some other beings, as if being had the 
character of a possible being, ' and begins to pose the question about being. 74 It is this 
movement, this originary mood of perplexity and wonderment, that Being and Time 
sets out to recapture (wider-holen). The 1935 lecture course Introduction to 
Metaphysics is most explicit in this regard: 
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To ask: how does it stand with being? means nothing less than to recapture the 
inception [Anfang] of our historical- spiritual Dasein, in order to change it into 
another inception. This is possible [Solches ist m6glich]. 75 
No less than its possibility, however, does Heidegger want to stress the iiecessity of 
this sort of repetition (Widerholung). Raising anew the question about being is not 
merely a desiderata for thinking, something that one might or might not choose to do, 
but a demand, one rendered entirely fitting by the fact that the question has 'today 
fallen into forgottenness. ' With the result, so Heidegger charges, that 'what was once 
wrested from the phenomena with the utmost effort of thinking' and which, 'as 
something concealed [als Verborgenes], first unsettled and continued to unsettle 
176 Somuch so, indeed, that any ancient philosophers, has become now self-evident. 
attempt even to raise the question about being will raise also the almost inevitable 
charge of a fundamental error of method (methodischen Werfehlung). Once 
measured against the utterances of the Eleatic Stranger, therefore, it is clear that the 
question of being does not only lack an answer; the self-evidence which is now taken 
to characterise this question attests, rather, to the fact that the question is itself 
obscure (dunkel) and without direction (richtungslos). It is not because the question 
lacks an answer but because the question is itself lacking that it is necessary to 
return to its first stirrings. And yet, it is not as if the concealment of the question can 
be dissociated from that beginning. On the contrary, the very presuppositions that 
precipitate the "fall" of the question into forgottenness and concealment are 
themselves rooted in its first articulations 'in ancient ontology itself. "" From the verv 
beginning, the question has been raised in such a way as to plant within it the seeds, 
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of its concealment. Mere repetition is out of the question, therefore. For merelv to 
repeat the beginning in unquestioning fashion would be also to repeat and thus 
extend the history of its concealment. What is required is a repetition which, by 
attending to and exposing the roots of concealment embedded within the very soil of I 
metaphysics, would broach another, more originary beginning. It is for this reason 
alone, moreover, that this it is not this first beginning (der griechischen Ansdtze) that 
is described by Heidegger in terms of origin. The issue here is not, as Paola Marrati- 
Guenoun suggests, 'the repetition ... of the origin, ' a repetition which would require 
accordingly a 'return to the originary sources [aux sources originaires] of 
metaphysics. 178 Rather, origin in this sense refers to the historical 'today' in its tension 
between the possibilities and necessities released by the question. Quoting again the 
passage from Introduction to Metaphysics: 
An inception is not re-captured ... if one reduces it to something prior and now 
known and simply to be imitated, but only if the inception is incepted again 
more originarily [urspriinglicher widerangefangen], with A the strangeness, 
obscurity, insecurity, which carry a true inception. 79 
Over and above this, however, there is another, more fundamental sense in which 
Being and Time treats of origin. This second sense refers in large part to a problem 
concerning the structure of questioning established by the first. The problem is this: 
Just how is the question about being to be raised? If being is what is to be asked 
about, das Gefragte, what is it that is to be questioned, das Befragte? Where is the 
analysis to find its means of access (Zugang) to being as something worthy of 
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questioning? Heidegger answers: 'Insofar as being constitutes what is asked about, 
and being means [besagt] the being of beings, then beings turn out to be what is to be 
questioned. '80 In what appears to be an entirely retrograde step, working out the 
question of the meaning of being is to take the form of a questioning of beings. But 
which beings? From which beings ought the disclosure of being to take its point of 
departure (Ausgang)? From which beings should it be possible to read off (ableseii) 
the meaning of being? Will any being suffice? Or should some particular beIng be 
privileged? Heidegger's initial response to these sorts of questions is famously oblique 
and takes the form not of an answer, but of a further exploration of the formal 
structure of the question about being itself Glossing his earlier assertion that every 
inquiry is a seeking (ein Suchen), something guided in advance by what is being 
sought (das Gesuchte), he turns to the way in which the explicit question about being 
can then be said to arise as a question. It does so, he suggests, from a certain 
preunderstanding of being, from an understanding that is described variously as 
indeterminate (unbestimmt) and unoriented, 81 vague and ordinary, 82 familiar 
(bekannt) and therefore somehow pregiven (und sonach irgendwie vorgegeben). 8, " 
Heidegger calls this understanding a fact (ein Faktum), observing: 
out of it grows the explicit question concerning the meaning of being and the 
tendency toward its concept. We do not know what being means. But when we 
ask "What is 'being"? " we already hold ourselves within an understanding of 
the "is, " without being able to fix conceptually what the "is" signifies. ý-' 
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The question about being arises as an explicit question or issue for thinking only to 
the extent that it is somehow given in advance of its being posed as such; that is, only 
to the extent that its possibility is preunderstood, albeit in an indeterminate manner. 
It is in this connection, then, that the question about being can be said to be 'nothing 
other than the radicalisation of an essential tendency of being [luesenhafteiz 
Seinstendenz] that belongs to Dasein itself, the preontological understanding of 
being. 185 
It should be noted, however, that this need not mean, as Derrida's influential 
account has it, that 'the point of departure in the existential analytic is legitimated 
proximally and only [d'abord et seulemenfl' from an 'apparently absolute and long 
unquestioned privilege of Fragen. 186 The case being made here by Derrida is a 
relatively straightforward one. The methodological strtategy that secures Dasein as 
the exemplary being for raising the question about being is based, he alleges, on 'the 
experience of the question, the possibility of Fragen alone. 187 From which it follows 
that the whole of fundamental ontology is placed thus under the aegis of what 
Heidegger calls the questioning comportment of Dasein to itself. And since one 
cannot, therefore, 'question this inscription in the structure of the Fragen from which 
Dasein will have received, along with its privilege, its first, minimal, and most secure 
determination' without also confirming it 'a priori and in a circular manner, ' that is, 
without giving up on its determination 'as a question or a problem, ' one might, so 
Derrida suspects, 'turn it against what Heidegger himself says. '88Specifically, it seems, 
against the following counsel from §9 of Being and Time: 'No matter how provisional 
the analysis may be, it always requires the securing of the correct point of 
departure 
[des rechten Ansatzes]. '89 
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Now on Derrida's own terms the point is well taken and is certainly enough to 
justify his suspicions of an illegitimacy as regards le point de d6part for the question 
about being. Equally, however, might one not wonder whether the careful attention 
paid by Derrida to the spirit of Heidegger's text does not lead him to neglect its letter? 
Might one not wonder whether matters are not in fact so straightforward as he 
suggests? Heidegger certainly holds that the analysis is to find its point of departure, 
its Ausgang, as well as its appropriate means of access to being, its Zugaizg, in Dasein's 
questioning comportment toward its own being. What he does not hold is that this 
comportment is to be placed accordingly at the outset, the Ansatz, of that analysis. 90 
Point of departure and outset are not, the best efforts of Derrida's commentary and 
translation notwithstanding, identical. Whilst the former refers to the manner in 
which the question about being is given in advance of its being thematically posed, 
that is, to Dasein's Seinsverhdltnis toward its own Seinsverfassung, the latter is 
rather different and refers instead to what the lecture course of the following year 
will call Dasein's 'extreme existentiell commitment [Einsatzl. '91 As is said in the closing 
remarks of the initial Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being: 
The existential analytic ... 
is ultimately existentially, that is, ontically rooted. 
Only if the questioning of philosophical research is itself seized upon in an 
existentiell manner as a possibility of the being of each existing Dasein does it 
become at all possible to disclose the existentiality of existence and so to gain a 
sufficiently grounded ontological problematic as such. 92 
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Hence, in addition to the existential sense, there is another, even more fundamental 
sense in which Being and Time treats of and thematises the notion of origin. Here, 
too, moreover, it is Dasein that occupies the place of that origin. Not, however, in the 
sense of its privileged position as regards the formal determination of the structure of 
questioning, but in the sense of its movement or leap into that structure as such. 
Consider the remarks with which Heidegger concludes the statement of 
method to Being and Time: 
However easy the formal delimitation of the ontological problematic from ontic 
researches may be, the development and above all the outset [Anseitz] of an 
existential analytic of Dasein is not without difficulties. In this task there lies a 
settled desideratum, one that has long disturbed philosophy which has, in turn, 
continually failed to meet it: the working out of the idea of a "natural concept 
of the world. 1193 
Clearly Heidegger intends to throw considerable weight behind the charge being 
levelled here. Indeed, a decade earlier and the same opprobrium had lead him to 
declare 'the leap into another world, or more accurately, for the first time into the 
world as such, ' to be 'the methodological crossroads' on which 'the very life or death of 
philosophy will be decided. 194Yet however rar-reaching the effects of philosophy's 
failure to measure up to the world may thus be, the concern here is not, as the 
expository first part of §43 will demonstrate, to redress what Kant famously took to 
be 'a scandal of philosophy and human reason in general, ' to wit, the fact that 'the 
existence of things outside us ... should have to 
be taken merely on faith. 'ý1,5 In the 
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sections of Being and Time given over to working out the concept of the world. 
Heidegger pays close attention to the remarks of the Refutation of Idealism appended 
to the second edition of the Critique. Not, however, in order to correct the basic 
inadequacy of the ontological proof furnished by Kant for the existence of the 
external world. 96 The worry here is less that Kant's thesis falls to resolve the problem 
to which it is addressed, than that it introduces a further 'perversion' of the problem 
itself. For so far as there is license to talk here of scandal, it is granted less by the fact 
that sufficient proof for the existence of the world has not yet been given, than by the 
fact that such proofs 'are expected and repeatedly attempted. 197 Heidegger elaborates: 
the demand for a proof of the existence of things outside of me (aul3er inir) rests oii a 
Tactically accurate' but 'ontologically inadequate' connection with what is in me (iii 
mir), on 
a positing of something independently and "outside" of which a "world" is to be 
proven as present-to- hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that 
the kind of being of the being which asks for and provides proofs is 
underdetermined ... CorrectlY understood, Dasein defies [widersetzt sich] such 
proofs because in its being it is in each case already Ue schon ist] what 
subsequent proofs deem necessary first to demonstrate for it. 98 
Although the most immediate point of reference for these remarks is the analysis of 
the connection of world to Dasein (§18) established on the basis of the claim that 
Dasein's way of being is such as always to comport itself toward those beings that it is 
itself not - to Dasein, recall, 'being in a world belongs essentially [das 
dem Dasom 
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zugehdrt ... wesenhaft: Sein in einer Welt]'99 - the point here reaches back equally to 
Heidegger's earliest investigations into the origins of factical life. In the closing 
remarks of The Idea of Philosophy, for instance, he had insisted upon the worldliness 
of the experienced experience (Welthaftigkeit des erlebten Erlebens) that was to have 
provided that course with its central focus. 100 Equally in the course of the following 
semester, where the various tendencies of factical life are shown to 'crystallise' 
around me in the form of the world(s) in which I exist. World, in other words, is not 
something added to life; rather, factical life and life in a world presuppose one 
another: 
factical life lives in a world of its own [seiner eigenen Welt lebt]; tendencies 
emerge from out of a factical lifeworld and disclose themselves in and for such 
a world. This is for factical life itself "a Faktum that is always again 
99 10 1 
encounterable [ein 'immer wieder antreffenbares Faktum']. 
In Being and Time, however, the mode of expression is rather different. It is the fact 
that Dasein is in each case already a world, the fact that Dasein is, the fact that 
Dasein exists, that is deemed sufficient proof of the nullity of all attempts to prove the 
existence of the world as such. Once this is granted, then it Will be clear why 'the 
question of whether there is a world as such and whether its being can be proven, is a 
meaningless one [ist als Frage ... ohne 
Sinn] if it is posed by Dasein, ' as Heidegger 
puts it, before removing the caveat: 'and who else would doSO? 1102Reiner Schilrmann: 
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The originary origin ... in Being and Time ... is the opening, projected by us, in 
which things are insofar as they appear to the being that we are .... The 
originary as project is finite in the sense that it manifests beings against a 
horizon of beings that are not manifest .... This has some consequences for the 
understanding of truth. 103 
Heidegger's analysis of such consequences comes in the section (§44) of the work 
entitled 'Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth. ' The title itself already broaches a decisive 
indication in respect of the analysis, naming as it does less a sequence than a certain 
spread or a unity of possibilities. What is required of the analysis, in other words, is 
to show that Dasein means disclosedness; disclosedness means truth, etc.. 
From the outset, a particular orientation to truth is very much in evidence. 
Heidegger begins by identifying the three theses that are constitutive of the 
traditional concept of truth (der traditionelle Wahrheitsbegriffi: 
1. The place [Ort] of truth is assertion Oudgement). 2. The essence of truth lies 
in the correspondence [Ubereinstimmung] of the judgement with its object. 3. 
Aristotle, the father of logic, assigned truth to the judgement as its originary 
place [urspriinglichen Ort] and also set in motion the definition of truth as 
correspondence. 
104 
The analysis is thus to orient itself to the tradition and so to the waý, in which the 
concept of truth has been handed down (dber-liefern) by that tradition-, it is to 
investigate the provenance (Herkunft) of the traditional concept of truth in order to 
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set out the positive possibilities secured by it. The analysis, in other words, is a 
de(con)structive one. 
Equally, however, the analysis is to be phenomenological in the sense, first of 
all, determined in the §7 of the Introduction. That determination prescribes that the 
analysis proceed with reference to the way things (Sachen) show themselves as 
themselves; that is, it must be an analysis that attends to the way in which such 
things show themselves as phenomena, that lets 'that which shows itself be seen from 
itself as it shows itself from itself. "O' Here, therefore, the analysis must be one that 
attends to the way in which truth comes to show itself as truth and that undertakes 
to describe what, which such a self-showing, truth shows itself to be. 
As in the 1925-6 lecture course Logic: the Question Concerning Truth, the 
central question that will have to be addressed by the analysis is the one with which 
Kant had sought to expose the vanity of the logicians' art, driving them thus into a 
corner: What is truth? 106 In the earlier analyses, the centrality of this question was 
itself assured by the need to respond to another question, the question of 'whether 
the very idea of truth is not itself a phantom [ein Phantom]. 1107 In Being and Time, 
however, this other question is left wholly out of account. The concern now is less to 
exorcise the spectre of scepticism than to clarify both the ontological meaning (Sinn) 
of saying there is truth (es Wahrheit gibt) and so the necessity with which which truth 
finds itself presupposed (voraussetsen). Such is, Heidegger adds in a marginal note, 
'the real place to begin the leap into Dasein. 1108 
§44 begins by resuming the most classical expression of truth. The formulation 
Heidegger employs is that of Kant: 'The nominal explanation of truth, namely that it 
is the agreement of knowledge with its object, is here granted and presupposed. '1119 In 
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order to broach the properly phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of truth, 
Heidegger responds to Kant's understanding of appearance as the locus of truth bv 
clarifying the mode of being that belongs to knowing as such. He asks: 'When does 
truth become phenomenally explicit in knowing itselfT He answers: 'It does so when 
knowing demonstrates itself as true. '110 Truth shows itself as truth b. v wa. v of 
demonstration. What is required, then, is an analysis of demonstration, since it is 
precisely in the phenomenal context of demonstration that truth shows itself as truth. 
The analysis begins with the situation in which a person, his back to the wall. 
makes the assertion: 'The picture on the wall is hanging askew. ' The demonstration 
occurs, that is to say, the truth of the assertion becomes manifest as true, when the 
person turns around and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. The 
analysis is phenomenological in the strictest sense, in the sense prescribed by the 
considerations of intentional fulfillment explored in the Logical Investigations. In the 
intentional fulfillment in which the intuited ('the picture on the wall is hanging 
askew') comes to coincide with what is meant or intended (that the picture is hanging 
askew on the wall), what comes to be demonstrated is the truth of what was meant. 
This intentional fulfillment is, for Husserl, truth in its most basic sense: 'the complete 
agreement of the intended and the given as such. "'' The question now must be: how 
does truth show itself in such a demonstration? How is truth manifest? What is the 
most originary sense in which the assertion can be said to be true? Heidegger 
answers: 
To say that an assertion is true signifies that it uncovers the being in itself It 
asserts, it points out, it lets the being be seen ... in its uncoveredness. 
The 
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being-true (truth) of the asseertion must be understood as being-uncovered 
[entdeckend-sein]. 1 12 
The truth of the assertion consists in saying the being itself as the being comes to 
show itself, in its uncovering of that being. 
Now, however, Heidegger asks: what is it that secures the possibility for the 
being to be uncovered thus? What conditions must be met in order that the being can 
be uncovered? Answering these questions requires Heidegger to take a step back, as 
it were. It requires a move from the phenomenon of truth as agreement or as being- 
uncovered, to another phenomenon that can also be called truth, although in a more 
originary sense. What is this more originary sense? Heidegger answers, drawing 
together all of the analyses advanced thus far in the book: 
Being-true as being-uncovered is in turn ontologically possible only on the 
basis of being-in-the -world. This latter phenomenon, which we know as a 
fundamental constitution of Dasein, is the ground for the originary 
phenomenon of truth ... Only with Dasein's 
disclosedness is the most originary 
phenomenon of truth attained ... 
Insofar as Dasein is essentially its 
disclosedness, and, as disclosed, discloses and discovers, it is essentially "true. " 
Dasein is "in truth. ", 13 
The indication broached by the title of this section is clear, therefore: the imity of 
possibilities named by the terms Dasein, disclosedness, and truth now situated 
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explicitly as an existentiale, can thus be said to hold. It is Dasein that 's the site of the 
most originary phenomenon of truth. 
And yet, according to Heidegger's own summary expression of the full 
existential meaing of the principle that Dasein is 'in' truth: 'To the constitution of 
Dasein's being belongs falling. ', 14 In the way that it is proximally and for the most 
part, Dasein is dispersed. Ensnared by the anonymity of the they (das Man), Dasein is 
lost in its world (an seine Welt verloren). As such, falling is nothing other than a 
counter- movement to disclosedness. It is a tendency toward covering up and toward 
concealment. And it is because Dasein is essentially falling that Heidegger can now 
say that the constitution of its being is such that it is in "untruth. " 
The disclosedness of Dasein is thus not the straightfoward opening of a region 
in which beings can show themselves. To it belongs an essential opposition, what 
Heidegger will later call a strife or conflict. Beings as a whole do not, in Heidegger's 
significant locution, show themselves from themselves (sich von ihm selbst zeigt); 
rather, they look like ... (sieht so aus wie ... ). Disclosedness takes on thus the form of 
a struggle as beings fall away from Dasein's disclosedness into disguise and 
concealment; truth, uncoveredness, is something that must first be wrested (erst 
abgerungen) from beings; beings are two be ripped (entrissen) into concealment. 
Dasein's disclosedness becomes, variously, a robbery (ein Raub) or a defence against 
illusion and distortion. Truth, described in terms of the compass of Dasein's 
disclosedness, is thus marked by the conflict between opening and closing, between 
disclosure and concealment. 
Yet what of this compass? Is it assured? For it is perhaps here that the first 
indications of a difficulty, precisely that difficulty whose radicalisation and extension 
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will constitute the basic development or dislocation in Heidegger's thinking after 
Being and Time, can be seen to emerge. 
At the very end of the analysis of truth, and so at the very end of the 
preparatory analysis of Dasein, Heidegger undertakes again to clarify the neces-; It%' 
with which we must presuppose that there is truth. This time, however, the accent is 
significantly different. Recall: We presuppose that there is truth because, as Dasein, 
as the being whose existence is constituted by its disclosedness, we are in each case 
already in truth. Recall further, however: It is not we as Dasein who presuppose truth 
but truth that 'makes it ontologically possible that we can be in such a way as to 
presuppose something. ' If, following the positive part of Being and Time gathered 
around §44, the site (Ort) upon which truth comes to show itself as truth is no longer 
to be thought as the demonstration of an assertion, then the problem arises of 
precisely where truth can be said to take place. Whilst truth is still connected to the 
understanding, still not essentially removed from Dasein, this presents no real 
difficulty. So long as truth is essentially appropriate to Dasein (wesenhaften 
dasensmdffigen), so long as world is essentially Dasein related (wesenhaft 
daseinsbezogen), the site of disclosedness is relatively assured. 
As the remark cited above perhaps suggests, however - the remark according 
to which it is truth that generates the ontological possibility of Dasein's 
preunderstanding of being - there are signs that in Being and Time Heldegger has 
begun already to loosen the bonds that tie truth to understanding. If Being and Time 
does undertakes to sustain the connection of truth to Dasein, there are sighs that it 
has begun also the development that will mean that truth can no longer be regarded 
as correlative to anything like a faculty or ability (Verm6gen) of man. Yet were truth 
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not to be found within such a connection, then where would it be found? If truth ivere 
no longer to be anything that might legitimately be ascribed to man, either in terms of 
a particular facultY (the understanding) or as an act of projective disclosure, then 
where would it happen? Where, indeed, could it happen? What could be the site of 
truth? The difficulty here is such that one would be forgiven for addressing to truth a 
question more explicitly begged by Heidegger's rather less celebrated account of the 
concept of freedom: What is freedom if it can no longer be thought as a property or 
attribute of man but as something more originary than man? What does it mean to 
say that man is not in fact free but himself merely a possibility of freedom, its Stdtte 
und Gelegenheit, its site and occasion? 115 (It is hardly by chance that I am raising the 
question by way of this analogy. From the attempt of Being and Time to root the will 
phenomenologically in Dasein's existential openness, to the letting-be that allows 
'what is present its presence' scrutinised in the lecture 'On the Essence of Truth, ' 
Heidegger will have insisted repeatedly on the intimate connection of truth to 
freedom, the opening in which man ek-sists. ) 
Such difficulties are familiar enough by now, and I do not mean to suggest that 
Heidegger is unaware of the problems. On the contrary, this is precisely what 
interests him in the lecture courses and essays immediately following the publication 
of Being and Time. Indeed, if certain retrospective comments are to be believed, these 
are even the problems which provide the 'wider context' for his work as a whole, a 
context that he identifies as 'the attempt, undertaken repeatedly since 1930, to shape 
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the questioning of Being and Time in more inceptive fashion [die Fragstellung uon 
Sein und Zeit anffinglischer zu gestalten]. This means to subject the Ansatz of the 
question in Being and Time to immanent critique. '116 If it is the notion of world (and 
its synonyms: the there of Daseln, disclosedness, truth, etc. ) that constitutes the 
Ansatz of the questioning undertaken in Being and Time, then it is little wonder that 
it is precisely this that constitutes die Sache des Denkens for the reflections on the 
notion of origin undertaken by the meditation on the work of art. 
ii 
From its opening words, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' is situated unequivocally by 
Heidegger as a reflection on the notion of origin: 
Origin signifies here that from which and by which a matter is what it is and as 
it is. What something is, as it is, we call its essence. The origin of something is 
the provenance of its essence. The question concerning the origin of the work 
of art will question its essential provenance. 117 
The rhetorical character of these opening lines is quite marked, the 
four statements 
showing an intensification and a progression. Heidegger notes, 
first of all, that origin 
means not a simple starting point or point of departure, 
but that from which (von 
woher) and by way of which (wodurch) a matter is what 
it is and in the way that it is. 
Die Sache here is the work of art. The principle concern of 
Heidegger's text, 
therefore, will be to address that from which and under 
the sway of which the work 
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of art is what it is and as it is. No less, however, do these opening lines situate 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' as a reflection on essence: what something is in the wa-v 
that it is (was etwas ist, wie es ist) is its essence (Wesen). There is, to be sure, no hint 
as yet of the marked displacement in the concept of essence that will come into play 
later on in the text, no suggestion of that movement through which Heidegger will 
want to put into question the very truth of essence, turning from its 'inessential' 
sense to its more 'essential' one. 118 Nevertheless, far from being situated as an 
ancillary concern, the reflection on essence is shown from the outset to be entirely of 
a piece with the reflection on origin. Origin means that from which and by way of 
which a matter is in its essence. With the third line, Heidegger clarifies further still 
this relation of origin to essence. The origin of something is described now as the 
provenance of its essence. 'The Origin of the Work of Art' will Ponder not the work of 
art itself, therefore, but die Herkunft seines Wesens, the provenance of its essence. 
The question of the origin of the work of art, Heidegger concludes, concerns the 
essential provenance (Wesensherkunft) of the work, that from which and by way of 
which it is in the way that it is. 
'Misleading' though Heidegger may have come to adjudge these lines to be'19 - 
a judgement which presumably bears on the undeveloped sense of essence noted 
above, and on the lack of any sustained exploration of the relation of origin to essence 
- they can nonetheless be read as a progressive clarification of the concerns of the 
essay as a whole, shifting attention away from the work of art per se to something 
else entirely, to what Heidegger calls its 'essential provenance. ' As the opening theses 
of the Frankfurt lectures have it: clarifying'the path which leads from the artwork to 
the origin [vom Kunstwerk zum Ursprung] . 
'120 
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In what amounts presumably to an admission of failure as regards the 
exposition carried out by the lectures themselves, Heidegger comes back to these 
points in the Afterword in order to clarify further still the relation of origin to essence. 
'What the word origin means here, ' he notes, 'is thought from out of (ausl the essence 
of truth. 1121 The connection with the positive part of Being and Time gathered around 
§44 is clear. Yet however tempting it may be, it is important that we not try to gain a 
head start here and leap over the entire development carried out by the lectures - 
leaping over that development in order to secure das Wesen der Wahrheit as the 
Wesensherkunft of the work of art, to identify from the outset that 'from out of which' 
origin has been thought with that 'from which' and 'by way of which' the work of art 
emerges - and consider, instead, the remarks which immediately follow this 
clarification. Heidegger says now that 'the truth of which we have been speaking does 
not fall into line with what one normally connects with this name. '122The reference to 
the developments of the earlier work is once again evident. Yet to the extent that the 
notion of origin articulated in the lectures will, by Heidegger's own lights, have been 
thought 'from out of the essence of truth, ' it seems entirely likely also that the origin 
of which the lectures will have been speaking will not fall into line with what one 
normally connects with this name. It seems entirely likely, in other words, that the 
lectures will have put into question not only the essence of truth but also the very 
meaning of origin. Indeed, once origin means, as was stated in the opening lines, that 
from which and by way of which something is in its essence, it could hardly be 
otherwise, granted the proposition with which Heldegger wiH find the most secure 
expression of his attempt to put the essence of truth into question In such a way th. at 
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it no longer falls into line with what one normally connects with this name: the 
essence of truth is the truth of essence. 123 
Following his initial remarks on the notion of origin, Heidegger reopens the 
proceedings with one or two formal considerations. Taking a stance as regards the 
habitual picture (gewdhnlichen Vorstellung) of the work of art, he turns to the most 
usual expression of its origin. Where, he asks, does the work originate, if not with the 
artist? 124 As one whose activities presumably give rise to works of art, the artist would 
be the origin of the work. Yet to the extent that the artist is what he is only by virtue 
of the work, there would seem to be just cause to afford the work an analogous 
position with respect to the artist. Hence: 'The artist is the origin of the work. The 
work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other. 1125Yet however balanced 
this circle of artist and artwork might seem to be, it is in fact, so Heidegger interjects, 
disturbed by a certain eccentricity. Neither the artist nor the work can be the sole 
support of the other; neither one can completely circumscribe the other. Rather, 'in 
themselves and in their interchange, artist and work are by virtue of a third thing 
which is prior to both ..., namely art. '126As such, the 
issue that needs to be broached 
as regards the origin of the work of art turns out, Heidegger concludes, to be that of 
'the essence of art. 1127But can the essence of art be an origin? Can art, 'a word which 
no longer bespeaks anything actual, '128 provide us with a ground from which to 
determine the essential provenance of the work of art? Can art also be called an 
origin? 129 This, as Heidegger observes, seems unlikely; and all the more so when one 
ponders just where it is that art'prevails in an actual way, ' namely in the work of art. 
Art, he declares, 'is present in the art-work [west im Kunst- Werk]. "30 Another circle 
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opens up thereby, one that circles within the first: 'Not only is the main step from 
work to art, as the step from art to work, a circle, but every particular step that we 
attempt circles within this circle. 1131 
Even in what remains a decidedly preliminary stage of the analysis, the 
question concerning the origin of the work of art proves thus to be a distinctl.,, - 
unsettling one. One, Heidegger confesses, which appears to entail nothing so much as 
ein VerstpI3 gegen die Logik, 132 of what Being and Time will, in a context almost 
identical, have laconically entitled its 'most elementary rules. 1133 Needless to say, the 
analogy with the position set out in the earlier work is far-reaching. In each case the 
circle is taken to be what affords the possibility of beginning, whether that beginning 
be that of a full-fledged philosophical seeking that takes its guiding thread from what 
is sought, or the factical existence of Dasein guided in advance by its understanding. 
In neither case, moreover, does the circle disqualify the analysis 'a priori from the 
realm of rigorous knowledge. 1134 In neither case is the circle one 'in which a random 
kind of knowledge moveS. 1135 Rather is it, Heidegger avers, one in which is 'hidden a 
positive possibility of the most originary kind of knowing, 1136 broaching thus once 
again the possibility that the question of knowing might itself be raised a nouveaux 
frais, as it were. 
No less than is the case with the hermeneutic circles of Being and Time - the 
need for the matter that is at issue for thinking to already have come into view for 
that thinking, the coincidence of the questioner and with what is to be questioned, 
etc. 1,37 - is the circle that circumscribes art one which we 
have to follow. Indeed, to the 
extent that thinking itself is no less crafty (ein Handwerk ist) than art, entering into 
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the path of this circle is even the strength or celebration of thinking (das Fest des 
Denkens). 
In the Afterword to the lectures on art Heidegger will be more fortheorning 
with respect to the violation of logic fostered by attention to such origins. Once again, 
moreover, he is so in a way which suggests yet further analogy with the position set 
out in Being and Time. 'The preceding remarks, ' he writes now, 'are concerned with 
the riddle of art, the riddle that art itself is [das Rdtsel, das die Kunst selbst ist]. There 
is no pretension to solve the riddle. The task is to seeit. 1138 
III 
Each version of Heidegger's text - the draft, the Freiburg lecture, and the Frankfurt 
lectures - falls into three distinct phrases. The first phase comprises in each case the 
attempt to highlight the work-being of the work of art and so, in view of the 
referential horizon within which the work of art is always located and relocated, the 
phenomenological difficulty of bringing this to light. Each of the three texts begins 
accordingly, thematising the attempt to gain access to the particular work character of 
the work fo art (Werksein des Werkes). The draft is most emphatic in this regard: 'So 
long as we do not take hold of the work in its work being, the question of the origin of 
the work of art remains devoid of any adequately secure foundation. '139 The initial 
move of each text is to orient itself thus toward the work of art. 
The second phase of the investigation is addressed to the matter of origin. 
Moving beyond the provisional sense of origin that will have been employed in the 
first phase - art as the ground which renders the work of art 
both possible and 
necessary - the second phase asks: Might not the work 
itself be thought as an origin? 
Might not the work of art, as something that has been brought forth, be thought as 
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bringing something forth? Heidegger suggests as much: the work of art is what lets 
truth be brought forth into manifestness. Art, he declares, is a beconzi7ig a7id a 
happening of truth (ein Werden und Geschehen der Wahrheit). 140 
In the third and most expansive phase of the analyses, Heidegger pursues his 
suspicions as to the work of art as a becoming and happening of truth. The concern of 
this phase is to justify the claims of the previous one. Its task is to restore to the work 
of art what Heidegger terms its authentic connections (Beziige) by offering a response 
to the following question: 'What is truth such that it can happen or even must happen 
as art? How is it that there is art? '141 
Let me leave to one side the initial phase of the analysis, in which Heidegger 
considers the work being of the work by way, first of all, of its character as a thing, its 
Dinghafte, and, secondly, in its relation to equipment, das Zeug, and turn directly to 
the question posed by the second phase, that of art as a happening of truth. In the 
analyses of 1936 Heidegger draws the first phase of the analysis to a close by turning, 
for the first time in those analyses, to an actual work of art: van Gogh's painting of a 
pair of shoes. 142 He does so, he says, merely in order to illustrate a point concerning 
the equipmental substratum which underpins the traditional concepts of a thing, 
merely in order to see what is at stake with respect to a particular piece of equipment. 
Yet in turning to this 'example, ' in having brought ourselves before the painting, in 
describing the equipment as it is presented there, something else also happens. We 
discover, Heidegger declares, the equipmental quality of the work. The artwork 
allows us to know what the shoes, as equipment, are in truth. Yet in this way it is not I 
only the equipmental being of the shoes that is discovered. In bringing ourselve-s 
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before the painting, says Heidegger, we learn, 'unwittingly, in passing so to speak 
[unversehens, gleichsam beiher], ' something about the artwork: 
In the nearness of the work we were suddenly somewhere other than where 
we normally tend to be .... The artwork gives us to know what the shoes are in 
truth .... Van Gogh's painting is the disclosure [die Erdffnung] of what the 
equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth. This being emerges into the 
unconcealment of its being [dieses Seiende tritt in die Unverborgenheit seines 
Seins heraus] .... If a 
disclosure of being happens in the work, disclosing what 
and how that being is, there is a happening of truth at work [ein Geschehen 
der Wahrheit am Werk]. In the work of art, the truth of beings has set itself 
(in) to (the) work [hat sich ... in Werk gesetzt]. 143 
As Heidegger acknowledges a little further on, these lines contain what is, at this 
point, a purely provisional assertion, one that he is not yet in a position to argue for. 
Nevertheless, he follows the claim that in the work of art truth has set itself (in) to 
(the) work not with any attempt to justify it, but by clarifying it in relation to the 
particular concerns of the investigation as a whole. In what do these concerns consist'? 
What is to be die Sache des Denkens? Heidegger outlines it in the form of two 
questions: 
What truth is happening in the work [welche Wahrheit gescheiht im 
Werk]? 
Can truth as such happen and so be historical [kann Wahrheit iiberhaiipt 
geschehen und so gechichtlich sein1? l-" 
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It is important to note that however contrived the path followed by the Frankfurt 
lectures up to this point, a path along which the relation of art to truth was brought to 
light in a preliminary way ('unwittingly, in passing so to speak'), these questiotis are 
not posed out of nowhere. Indeed, in a gesture that will have far-reaching 
consequences, Heidegger is at pains to drawn out the initially rather unlikelv 
connection between his own referral of the work of art to the concept of truth , ind 
the duties of reproduction and imitation with which it has invariably been saddled by 
traditional philosophical aesthetics. Initially, he does so ironically. Is it possible, he 
asks, that the claim that in the work of art truth has set itself (in) to (the) work is no 
more than a restatement of the view that art is an imitation or depiction of something 
actual? Of the view, 'happily now overcome, ' that art has 'more to do with the 
beautiful ... than with truth? '145 Heidegger, needless to say, demurs, although 
perhaps not for the reasons one might think. Content for the moment to stay with 
this line of inquiry, he pursues the claim for art as a reproduction of some object or 
other. Such a claim, he points out, is only fostered on there being some sort of 
correspondence or accord (Ubereinstimmung) between the work and what is 
reproduced in it. The shoes in van Gogh's painting, for instance will need to have at 
least some accord with or correspondence to a pair of shoes. Yet, had not such 
accordance been already identified as what is most ordinarily taken to determine 
truth? Is it not precisely such correspondence which underlies the determination of 
truth as O[IOLWULg and later as adequatio? Although the remarks here remain 
decidedly preparatory to the discussion of truth which will orchestrate the third part 
of the text, the implication already seems to be that Heidegger will want to read 
d 
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rebours, so that it is the specific character that is to be granted to truth that effectivelv 
governs the determination of art. However provisional the formulation may be, 
Heidegger's remarks seem already to anticipate what will not be stated outright until 
the Afterword to the text: 'from the change in the essence of truth arises the historv 
of the essence of Western art. 1146 If the ostensible concern of Heidegger's essay is to 
ponder the essential character of art in a fashion ill-afforded by such a history, this 
will entail per definitio another and concomitant change in the determination of the 
essence of truth. 
In order to clarify the point somewhat, one ought to recall precisely what is at 
stake in this appeal to the essence of truth. According to the argument advanced iii 
the interpretation of 1936, in which the point is explored most extensively, 
truth means the essence of the true. We think this essence by recalling the 
word of the Greeks. The worddXýOE LCI means unconcealment of beings. But is 
this really a determination of the essence of truth? 147 
As was the case in the opening remarks of the text, the immediate concern of these 
lines is shown to enjoy a relation to what appears initially to be an ancillary issue. 
Truth means the 'essence' of the true. 
Heidegger understands 'essence' in this context in two ways. First, in what he 
terms an 'inessential' way (das unwesentliche Wesen) where essence is taken to 
describe the generic and universal concept that holds indifferently 
for a number of 
different things. Other analyses, principally those of The Basic Problems of 
Metaphysics, leave no doubt that the reference here is to the primitive elements or 
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essentialia of the old ontology. To the extent that such general ontology treats by 
rights only of 'things unecstatically to hand [vorhanden] "148 of founded presence, the 
point of Heidegger's nomination is well-taken. Equally, however, essence is taken iii a 
more essential sense (das wesentliche Wesen). Essence in this sense, Wesetz in its 
verbal sense as the essential unfolding and coming to presence (wesen) of something. 
describes accordingly the manner in which something unfolds and comes to presence 
as what it is in the way that it is. As Heidegger points out, however, it would be a 
gross error to see this second sense of essence as somehow indifferent to the first. 
Quite the contrary, in fact. Essence in its more essential sense underlies essence in 
the first sense. Only if this is the case can it describe 'the true essence of a thing ..., 
the truth of the given being, 
ý149 
the happening by which alone the ens can attain its 
essentia. 
As the silent shift in emphasis readily suggests - the shift from the question 
concerning the essence of truth to that concerning the truth of essence - the ensuing 
pages of 'The Origin of the Work of Art' will afford something of a restatement of the 
position argued for in the lecture 'On the Essence of Truth. ' Reading with the earlier 
lecture: 
The question of the essence of truth finds its answer in the propositimi: the 
essence of truth is the truth of essence [das Wesen der Wahrheit ist dcr 
Wahrheit des Wesens]"o 
As in §44 of Being and Time, the inquiries of 'On the Essence of Truth' and 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' begin with reference to the traditional concept of truth, 
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Heidegger marking again its exployment as propositional correctness, as the 
accordance or correspondence (Ubereinstimmung) of a statement with the actual 
state of affairs. Once again, moreover, Heidegger does not proceed then to air a "new 
cocnept of truth with which to replace the traditional one, but to treat the latter as 
genuinely worthy of questioning (fragw6rdig). What, he asks, is meant by 
accordance? How can one thing, a statement or proposition, say, correspond or accord 
with another, such as the actual state of affairs? 
Whereas the response of 'On the Essence of Truth' was to reach back to the 
sixth of Husserl's Logical Investigations in order to show how the possibility of 
accordance has to be thought in terms of what Husserl had termed a directive 
comportment (Verhalten) of one thing to another, the possibility of accordance is now 
described more explicitly in terms of the general problem of unconcealment: 
With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could not even 
presuppose that something to which we can correctly comport ourselves [uiis 
richten] is already manifest [offenbar] unless the unconcealment of beings had 
already placed us in that illuminated realm [Gelichtete] in which all beings 
stand for us and from which all beings withdraw. 151 
Whereas, in the analyses of Being and Time, it was Aristotle and Kant who bore the 
brunt of Heidegger's attempt to broach this more originary phenomenon of trith, this 
time it is Descartes who is scorned for thinking that an an open commitment to les 
regles certaines et faciles'of a inathesis universalis could lead him to have done with 
la ruse funeste' of a Diophantus-152 For however much the application of such rules 
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might allow one to attain the level of 'la connaissance vraie, ' this, so Heidegger 
observes, affords merely 'another variation of the determination of truth as 
correctness. ' 153 In a manner that bears analogy with the analyses of Being and Titne, 
then, it is a matter of seeing unconcealment as what more essentiallY underlies and 
not what replaces the habitual concept of truth. It is in this notion of unconcealment, 
'clarified, 'the lecture says, by 'recollection' of the Greek dXýOELa, that Heidegger most 
readily discerns the possibility of interrogating the more originary essence of truth 
which sustains the scholastic apparatus of essentia and veritas. For sure, if such a 
retrospective analysis is to stand, it will have to show willing and attend to an 
essential ambiguity in the concept of truth, recovering, on the one hand, the originary 
phenomenon of truth, whilst demonstrating, on the other, the manner in which the 
habitual concept of truth originates. In a way that also serves to rebut certain stock 
criticisms of the aletheic turn of transcendental phenomenology as no more than a 
product of an instinctive taste for the Hellenic, 154Heidegger gives immediate notice 
that such a 'recollection' or 'reminder' can in no way signal a 'revival' or 'renewal' of 
Greek thinking. 
The shift in the determination of the essence of truth is in no way extrinsic to 
that thinking. In a way that anticipates obliquely the remaining part of the discussion 
this shift is implied even to be a necessary one: 
the hidden history of Greek philosophy lies from its beginning in the fact that 
it must shift its knowledge [ihr Wissen ... verlegen mu/3] and Its saVing more 
and more into discussion of a derivative essence of truth ... Unconcealment is, 
for thinking, the most concealed thing in Greek Dasein. 155 
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The aim of the interpretation, therefore, is to arrive at a position from which the 
unconcealment of beings expressed by the word dXýOELa can be seen less as a 'flight' 
into 'literal translation' than as a reminder of what, 'unexperlenced and unthought, ' 
underlies the familiar and so worn out' determination of truth as correctne,, -, s. The 
decidedly 'unfamiliar' task of the inquiry is to afford the more authentic 
understanding of the essence of truth that wifl be required in order to answer the 
question 4 What truth is happening in the work? "56 
It may well follow from this that truth happens as unconcealment although 
not, Heidegger cautions, in any straightfowardly unopposed sense. 'The Origin of the 
Work of Art' now gathers together all the requirements that must be met in order for 
beings to stand in unconcealment. It is noted: beyond (6ber ... hinaus) beings, before 
(vor) them, something happens (geschieht). 'In the midst of beings as a whole an open 
place comes to presence. There is a clearing. 1157 It is this clearing alone that grants 
open access (Durchgang) to things. In this clearing alone are things unconcealed iii 
varying degrees. And yet, Heidegger cautions, within this clearing, indeed only (nur) 
within it, a being can also be concealed. Noting this 'curious opposition of presencing, ' 
he infers: 'each being, encountered and encountering .... at the same time always 
withholds itself in a concealment. 1158 Unconcealment is no mere unopposed 
happening but one that is continually traversed by a more potent force of 
concealment. Why more potent? Heidegger does not say here, as he will in the essay 
'On the Essence of Truth, ' that this potency is one that accrues to age: 'the 
concealment of beings, ' he writes there, 'is older [dIter] than every openness of this or 
that being. '159 In the essay on art this potency stems from the fact that the 
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concealment that is at issue here is twofold, from the fact that the concealment that 
belongs to being is for the most part itself concealed: 
We believe ourselves to be at home in the immediate sphere of beings. Beings 
are familiar, reliable, ordinary [geheuer]. And yet the clearing is pervaded by a 
constant concealing in the double form of refusal and dissembling. At bottom, 
the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extra-ordinary [un-geheuer]., - 
All of which has, needless to say, some far-reaching consequences for the 
determination of truth: 
the open realm in the midst of beings ... is never a rigid stage [] with a 
permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings is played out ... 
The 
unconcealment of beings is never an existent state [ein vorhandener Zustatid] 
161 but a happening [Geschehnis]. 
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IV 
Having secured the grounds at least for answering the first of his guiding questions 
('can truth as such happen and so be historical? '), Heidegger has now to provide a 
response to the second: 'what truth is happening in the work" The strategy he 
employs in order to do so is identical in each version of the text. Glossing his earlier 
assertion that art is a happening of truth, he turns to an altogether different sort of' 
work of art, one chosen, he says, quite deliberately (mit Absicht). Casting another 
sort of look toward art, Heidegger takes this time as his leading example a work of art 
entirely removed from the order of representation (darstellenden Kunst). The 
example is that of a Greek temple. 162 
What kind of truth is it that can happen in a temple? Presumably no kind of 
truth which could be thought in terms of correspondence or accord. For with what 
could the temple accord? To what could it correspond? The reasons behind 
Heidegger's deliberation in choosing such an example are immediately apparent, 
therefore. To the extent that it depicts or portrays (bildet ... ab) precisely nothing, no 
already existing form or meaning, but merely stands there (steht da) on the rocky 
ground, enclosing (unschliesst) or holding back (einbeh&. 1t) the figure of the god, "ý'3 
the temple disqualifies in advance any instinctive appeal to the 'habitual' concept of art 
governed by the equally 'habitual' concept of truth. If truth does indeed happen in a 
work of of art this sort, it will have to be of a different order altogether. Presumably 
of the order of unconcealment and disclosure. Yet how does truth as the 
unconcealment of beings happen in a work of this sort? What does the temple 
disclose? Answering these questions requires that Heidegger introduce the two terms 
that will quickly become central to his case: world and earth. 
161 
50 
To begin with Heidegger names world. It is the temple, he says, that 
for the first time fits together [fiigtl and at the same time gathers [saintizelt) 
around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, 
disaster and blessing, victory and defeat, endurance and decline, acquire the 
shape of destiny for the essence of man. The prevailing expanse of these open 
relations is the world of this historical people. 165 
What is immediately striking about Heidegger's remarks up to and including this point 
is the extent to which they begin to draw the temple - and so, by extension, the work 
of art - away from its specifically sensible character, its character as an object or as a 
thing. Such was presumably implicit in the discussion of equipment that had 
motivated the first of the Frankfurt lectures, and that had been introduced briefly in 
the opening minutes of the Freiburg text in order to distinguish the notion of origin 
from that of cause (Ursache), and in the closing pages of the same text in order to 
distinguish the considerations voiced there from the curious undoing (merkwiirdigen 
Verhdngnis) that dictates the referral of the work of art to the fabricated thing or 
piece of equipment (eines angefertigen Dinges d. h. eines Zeugwerkes). 166 
Nevertheless, these remarks make do make explicit what goes largely assumed in the 
later text: to the extent that equipment is, in the first place, assimilated ontologically 
to a world in the sense that world is established as the focus for the determination of 
its being, the work of art is not equipmental, it is not das Zeug. So what is the work of 
art? What sort of being is it? Vorhanden? Zuhanden? Daseinsindssig? None of these? 
The world is characterised here as 'holding [hdltl open the open region of a world. "", 
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To this extent, one term under which it might legitimately be addressed is that of the 
sign in the sense, first of all, determined for it in the analyses of Being and Tinie 
where, it will be recalled, the sign was said to 'hold explicitly open [hdIt 
ausdriicklich offen]' the 'discovered region' of a world. 168 Equally, however, in the 
sense determined for the sign in the lectures of 1951, later published as Wliat is 
Called Thinking? in which the sign will be identified as a site of gatherin,,.,,,, 
Versammlung. Quoting from yet another lecture text, this time the course of 1942, 
which treats of Hblderlin: 
what historical man holds [hdlt] concerning art is governed by the manner in 
which historical man is himself held [gehalten] and sustained by the essence of 
art. Yet the way in which art spans the being- in- the -world of historical man, 
the way in which it lights up the world for him and lights up man himself ..., all 
this receives its law and structural articulation from the way in which the 
world as a whole is opened up to man. 
169 
The description of the temple continues, Heidegger remarking further the manner in 
which the work of art opens up the manifestness of beings as a whole in the world: 
The temple in its standing there gives to things for the first time their look 
[Gesicht] and to man his outlook [Aussicht] upon himself. This view [Siclit) 
remains open as long as the work is a work, as long as the god has not fled 
from it. The same holds for the linguistic work [Sprachwerk]. In tragedy 
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nothing is staged or displayed theatrically, but the battle of the new gods 
against the old is fought. 170 
What is immediately striking about these remarks is their introduction of time into the 
consideration of the work of art. The work of art has a time. One, indeed, that would 
appear to enjoy at least a passing analogy with the movement of Dasein's own 
originary temporalisation. It is as though in the movement from Dasein as the site of 
disclosedness and worldly ecstasis to the work of art, what has also been transformed 
is the ecstatic character of time that was to have made possible the disclosedness by 
which Dasein was to have been its "there, " by which it was to have been there in the 
world from out of which things could then have shown themselves to it. For 
Heidegger names here something like the death of the work of art. Not, to be sure, in 
the sense determined in the Afterword to the lectures, that sense according to which 
art dies (Kunst stirbt) in its exposure to the element of experience, but in the sense 
that the world of a work of art is held open for a time, 'as long as the god has not fled 
from it. ' The work of art belongs to a particular time and place, namely the specific 
world that it first clears and holds open. Heidegger binds the work of art (its opening 
up of a world, its granting the world a sway) to its world (its worlding and the 
manifestness of beings as a whole). The time that constitutes the work of art as a 
work of art is thus the time of the world that it opens up. One presupposes the other. 
Hence, in a manner that reminds us of Benjamin's exactly contemporaneous, 
reflections, ", it cannot be a manner of visiting the work of art on its original site, nor 
of visiting it in a gallery, as if it were a thing that could come to be viewed. In 
Heidegger's condensed formulation: die Welt der vorhandenen Werke ist zerfallen.; -' 
53 
The work of art, then, is the site or the place - one would even be tempted to 
say the there - that first opens up or inaugurates a world by gathering the different 
paths and relations that first let things be, let things come to presence. It spans or cuts 
through (durchspannt) the world in which man ex'sts. 'With the opemng up of a 
world all things come into their tarrying and hurrying, their remoteness and 
nearness, their broadness and confines. 1173No more than in Being and Time, then, 
can world in this sense refer, as it did for Kant, to the totality of beings that are 
experienced (a transcendental concept of the sum of things as appearances) or to a 
framework that would be imposed upon them (a pure synthetic concept of reason), 
any more than it could refer to a "physical" place that could come to be located by way 
of a map or a globe. World, Heidegger insists, is in no sense an object, nothing that 
could be made present and available to intuition. The opening up of a world, that is, 
the manifestness of beings as a whole, requires a own mode of expression that would 
hold it apart from that which it would determine. Indeed, world so exceeds any 
determination as a being that Heidegger will not say that it is, but that it worlds: Welt 
weltet. 174 
Suffice it to say, the terminology being exploited here by Heidegger would 
have come as no great surprise to those members of the audience who had thought to 
follow the trajectory of his work from its more orthodox phenomenological 
beginnings. The lecture courses of 1919 provide case and point. There Heidegger had 
prevailed upon the language (if in no way the substantive intent) of Marburg neo- 
Kantianism in order to give full expression to the concrete immediacy of what he 
terms das Uinwelterlebnis, the context of meaningful orientation into which factical 
life makes its leap. Taking the phenomenological demand for immediacy one step 
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further, Heidegger had raised the question of what could be said to provide the focus 
of experience within such a context. He asks: What is it that I see9 Objects9 Books 
and desks, for example? 'No, I see something else ... I see the desk in an orientation 
or illumination, against a background ..., the object [Gegenstand] as encumbered with 
a meaning. 1175 It is not objects that are experienced in order then to be interpreted as 
meaning one thing or another. What is experienced, rather, is the background of 
meaning (das Bedeutsame) itself, the experienceable as such (Erlebbares 6berhaupt). 
For this background against which things give themselves directly to be experienced, 
Heidegger proposes the name world. Here, he concludes, 
it is the background of meaning that is primary, for it gives itself immediately, 
without any ponderous detour through an apprehension of things. For one 
living in a surrounding world [Umwelt] ... it is wholly worldlike, it worlds [es 
weltet]. 176 
Reading just a little further on, moreover, and the ensuing section (§ 15) of the same 
lecture text broaches an indication equally decisive in the present context. 
Undertaking now to clarify the living-through (Er-leben) of such experience in terms 
of its character as an event (Ereignis) in contrast with any sense of psychic or physical 
process (Vorgang), Heidegger offers a single illustration of the point. To the 
phenomenon of a rising sun reduced to a mere natural process (blol3en Vorgang in 
der Natur) by the theoretical understanding of the astronomer, he counterposes the 
event of the chorus of Theban Elders in Sophocles' Antigone, in which 'the Joyful 
morning flashes for the first time into view, ' citing, in H61derlin's translation: 
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0 flash of sun, o the most beautiful, that 
On seven doored Thebes 
Has long shone .... 
177 
Further, the the notion of world being developed by 'The Origin of the Work of Art' 
clearly owes much also to the properly transcendental part of Bebig aiid Time 
addressed in some detail above. Now, however, Heidegger extends its scope, 
disregarding the specifically existential character that had been ascribed to it in the 
earlier work, its status as a moment within the whole that Heidegger designates as 
being-in-the-world, itself identified as a designation for the Grundverfassung oder 
Seinsuerfassung des Daseins, as the fundamental constitution of Dasein, the 
constitution of its being. Still retained as the a priori fabric for the appearance of 
beings as a whole, world is now relieved of its thoroughgoing association with Dasein's 
projections and careful dealings. Still retained as a network of relational possibilities, 
as a horizon, world designates now the horizon and possibilities afforded a particular 
historical epoch. 'Only where a world prevails, ' Heidegger had insisted a few months 
before this, 'is there history. '178 In the lectures of 1935, world is die weltende Einheit 
dieser Bezüge; in those of the following year, die waltende Weite der offenen Bezüge: 
the worlding unity of relational complexes, the prevailing expanse of the open 
relational complex, the horizonal network of relations - of laws, customs, beliefs, 
cultures, decisions, etc. - that holds sway for an historical people. 
The description of the temple continues, this time Heidegger namiiig earth: I 
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Standing there, the temple work opens up a world and at the same time sets 
this world back again on the earth which itself only thus comes forth as home 
ground [als der heimatliche Grund] ... The work lets the earth be an earth., -- 
What is the earth? To begin with, the earth appears to denote little more than what 
would be called the materiality (Werkstoff) of the work of art, that from which the 
work of art is fashioned or made. Heidegger contrasts such making with that involved 
in the construction of equipment. When stone or metal is used for making an ax (to 
use the example of 'The Origin of the Work of Art') or a hammer (to use that of Bebig 
and Time), it is used up. Its materiality disappears, as it were, assimilated beyond all 
recognition into the servicability of the ax or the hammer. By contrast, the materiality 
of the earth does not disappear into the work of art. Rather, in the work of art, the 
earth is set forth 'into the openness of the world of that work. ' In the setting forth of 
the work of art from earth, the materiality of the earth 
comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of 
the stone, into the firmness and flexibility of wood, into the hardness and 
lustre of metal, into the light and darkness of colour, into the timbre of sound 
and into the naming power of the word. 180 
The work of art allows the materiality of the earth to appear, to appear as what it is. 
Equally, then, earth denotes what we know as nature: the storm, the lustre and 
gleam of stone, colours, tones, the invisible space of air, all fall under its compass. 
It is 
through the work that such things 'enter into their given shape and come thus to 
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shine forth [kommen so als das zum Vorschein] as what they are. 1181 Now, however, 
Heidegger broaches yet another, more decisive connection, pointing the analysis away 
from what it is that that comes thus to shine forth and toward that emergence and 
coming forth (dieses Herauskommen und Aufgehen) itself. He writes: 'This einerging 
the Greeks early on called ýVGL3. It lightens that upon which and in which man 
grounds his dwelling. This we call the earth. 1182 Note, however, the curious 
conjunctions here: 'the Greeks called this ... ' and then 'we call this Whatever 
historical strategy is intended by these locutions - and the point here is presumably 
analogous to the structure of repetition established in Being and Time - the more 
important point here concerns the way in which the earth does not straightfowardly 
refer to the Greek ýVcrLg, but to its fundamental trait, namely, its self- concealment. It 
is as if the earth denotes, in Michel Haar's insightful phrase, 'the non- metaphysical 
equivalent Of ýVgL! 3, ' that is, ýUGL3 'at the other extreme of history, echoing the 
beginning. ",, No more than was the case with world, then, can the earth in any of 
these senses or in this spread of possible senses refer to the astronomical notion of a 
planet, to some "physical" place that might come to be fixed and measured. Indeed, the 
earth is precisely what most resists all geometrical identification. 
Heidegger takes the example of a stone. What is most evident in a stone is its 
weight, its hardness. Yet what is weight? What is hardness? One tries to take the 
measure of this, to analyse and resolve its elemental materiality in scientific fashion. 
One places the stone on scales, breaks it into fragments and shards in order to peer 
into its inner structure. One reduces it to its component elements in order to calculate 
and express its valencies and formulae. And yet, none of these analytic measures is 
able to penetrate and explore the weight or the hardness of the stone. Manifesting 
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itself, the earth holds itself thus also in reserve, turning back in upon itself. It is, 
Heidegger says, das Hervorkommend-Bergende, that which shelters in coming forth: 
Earth only shows itself when it remains undisclosed and unexplalned. Earth 
brakes every attempt at penetrating it ... only appearing illuminated as itself 
when it is noted and preserved as the essentially undisclosed [die wesenhaft 
Unerschliel3bare], that which withdraws from every disclosure, that is, 
constantly holds itself closed. 184 
Following the exposition of world and earth, Heidegger has now to clarify his claim 
regarding their relation to the work of art and to one another, the claim according to 
which it is the work of art that brings beings as a whole into unconcealment, that 
'brings forth world and earth in their counterplay' in such a way that truth 
happens. 185 
As before, Heidegger first distinguishes this relation in respect of world. The 
work of art belongs to a world, it is set within it. It is only from within the world in 
which it is set that the work of is granted its time and place - in Benjamin's terms, its 
Aura. Yet world is not then to be understood as an already existing openness within 
which the work of art would then come to be disclosed. World is, rather, an event that 
happens - that worlds - in the work of art. It is the work of art that first opens a 
world, that first lets it prevail as the open relational complex within which alone it can 
itself come to stand. Heidegger expresses this reciprocity with the term Aufstellen, 
setting up. The work of art is set up within a world; not, to be sure, in the sense of its 
having been installed (aufgestellt) or placed within a world, notions that Heidegger 
rather equates with the irretrievable and inevitable decline of a world. Set up iiot in 
59 
this sense, then, but in the literal sense of what is also called e-recting (er-richten), 
namely in the sense of 'opening up what is right in the sense of a guiding and 
directive measure, as a way in which what is essential gives directives. ", ý13 The 
difference here is marked: set up within a world, the work of art itself sets up that 
world, opens it and sustains it. The work of art does not simply belong to a world but, 
set up within it, sets up that world. Writes Heidegger, therefore: werksein lzei#t: em 
Welt aufstellen, to be a work means to set up a world. 187 
A structurally synonymous relation obtains between earth and the work of art, 
a relation that is this time expressed with the term Herstellen, production or setting 
forth. The work of art, Heidegger says, is brought forth (hervorgebracht) from the 
earth, that is, from some earthy material like stone, wood, or language, but 
presumably also from those other senses of earth operative in the analysis. The work 
of art is set forth from out of the earth. Yet in being set forth from the earth, the 
work of art is also set back into the earth in such a way as to set forth earth. Set back 
into stone, wood, language, the work of art sets forth the earth in such a way as to 
bring it into the open, allowing it to show itself as stone, wood, language. In the work 
the earth shows itself, comes to appear, precisely as that which conceals itself. Writes 
Heidegger, therefore: die Erde her-stellen heißt: sie ins Offene bringen als das 
Sichverschliel3ende, to set for the earth means: to bring it into the open as that which 
closes itself off.,,, 
The work of art, then, is to be described in terms of these two essential 
connections (Wesenbevige): the setting up of a world and the setting forth of the 
earth. How? How do these traits belong together in the work of art? How, as the 
Frankfurt lectures have it, are these traits to belong together in such a way as to 
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constitute the Insichstehen of the work? Although circumspect, the remarks of 
Freiburg lecture are instructive on this point. World and earth, Heidegger says there, 
are 'related to one another and both are rooted in a third thing. '189What thing? What 
is the connection in which world and earth are related to one another in such a way 
that the setting up of a world and the setting forth of the earth are brought together 
in the unity of the work of art? Heidegger's answer is emphatic. Most of all in the 
draft: 
World is against earth and earth against world. They are in strife [Sie sitid im 
Streit]. Such strife consists in the intimacy of their counterturning belonging 
together [widerwendignen Sichzugehbrens] ... The essence of the work lies in 
the contestation of the strife [Bestreitung des Streits] of setting up and setting 
forth, in which contestation the open intimacy of earth and world struggle 
[erstreitet]. 190 
But also in a marginal note appended to these lines: 
There has to be strife - i. e. there has to be a work ... when world and earth 
are. 191 
And equally in the Freiburg lecture: 
World is against earth and earth against world. They are in strife, and are so 
because they belong together. 192 
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So, too, in the Frankfurt lectures: 
The world grounds itself on the earth, the earth thrusts up through the world. 
Yet the relation of world and earth in no way wastes away into the emptv 
unity of opposed terms unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting 
upon the earth, strives [trachtet] to surmount it. It cannot, as self-opening, 
tolerate anything closed. As sheltering, however, the earth always inclines 
toward drawing the world into itself and keeping it there. The opposition of 
world and earth is a strife. 193 
World, as the open relational complex, and earth, as that which emerges as self- 
closing, belong together in strife. The question that needs now to be asked is: how is 
this strife, this Streit, to be understood? Not, Heidegger cautions, as a mere 
discordance or dispute between two things present-to-hand (vorhanden), but as 
essential strife (wesenhanften Streit) in which each side brings the other into the 
accomplishment of its essence. Both world and earth require the other; each sustains 
and reinforces the other. Earth cannot do away with or 'renounce' the open region of 
a world if it is to appear as such any more than the world worlds only to the extent 
that it is grounded upon 'something decisive. ' There is strife because there is a 
reciprocal danger of absorption; not simply because world and earth seek to encroach 
upon one another (world striving to 'surmount' the earth, the earth striving to 'draw 
the world into itself and keep it there, ' etc. ), but, more fundamentally, because each Is 
dependent upon the other. Quoting this time from the Freiburg lecture: 
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In strife, world and earth move apart from one another frikkeiz ... 
auseinander], but do so only by drawing back properly to one another 
[aufeinander zuriicken]. The open world seeks to transport earth into a 
worldly structure [ein WeItgeffige]; earth draws the world back into itself and 
lead it toward its obscure ground. In this conjunctive disjunction of strife 
[zueinanderstehenden Auseinandertreten des Streits] an open region opens 
itself. We call this the there. It is the illuminated space where, for the first time, 
a being is engaged and appears as such and as evident. This openness of the 
there is the essence of truth. 194 
In the strife of world and earth, an open region is opened. The openness of this open 
region, in which beings can struggle out of concealment into unconcealment, is what 
Heidegger identifies now as the essence of truth. Ought this to be taken as implying, 
however, that the strife of world and earth, as the strife of an open region with one 
that is essentially closed off, describes the opposition that is held within the essence of 
truth? That the wesenhaften Streit of world and earth is itself the Urstrelt of clearing 
and concealing that obtains in the happening of truth? Not at all. 'Earth thrusts 
through the world, world grounds itself on the earth, only to the extent that truth 
happens as the originary strife of clearing and concealment. 1195 The conflict of world 
and earth rests on the more originary conflict of clearing and concealing: 
This openness of the open region, that is, truth, can be what it is, namely this 
openness, only if and so long as it establishes itself in its openness. Hence, 
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there must always be in this openness a being in which the openness takes its 
stand and attains its constancy. In occupying the open, openness holds the 
open open and sustains it. 196 
Or, reading again with the Freiburg lecture: 
While the work sustains the strife between the earthy open world and the 
worldly earth closed upon itself, nothing else is at work within it than the 
happening of an opening of the there - i. e. truth. In the work, a happening of 
truth is set to work. And this putting (in) to (the) work of truth is the essence 
of art. Art, therefore, is a way in which truth happens, the opening of the 
there in the work. 197 
The work of art, then, is the being or the site of presencing in which truth, 
understood in its more originary sense as the tension of clearing and concealing, is 
composed and thus gathered into view; truth is gathered or happens in the work of 
art as the strife of world and earth. It should be noted, however, that Heidegger 
denies that either of these conflictual relations is - or can be - an existent state 
(vorhandene Zustand) that would come then to be disclosed in the work of art. 
Rather, he wants to insist that it is in the work that such conflict comes first to be 
opened. 
truth is not in itself present beforehand, somewhere among the stars, only 
later to descend elsewhere among beings ... Clearing of openness and 
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establishment in the open belong together. They are one and the sanie 
happening of truth. 19s 
The work of art stands as an instigation (Anstiftung) of this strife, naming it M its 
essence. What the work of art contains within itself, its Insichstehen, and so mav also 
disclose is not so much the "essence" of this strife in the sense of that which already is 
T in being (theTo' TL I-I'V ELVaL of what Heidegger calls Greek ontology),, - therefore, but 
the counter-turning b elonging- together of world and earth in its prevailing and 
happening as truth. In the terms introduced earlier in Heidegger's text, the work 
discloses the essence of this strife not in its inessential sense, but in its more essential 
sense as the happening or self-showing and self-concealing of something. Yet this 
strife is disclosed, if it comes at all to be disclosed, not as an already existent state of 
affairs, as something vorhanden, but in an historical or, as Heidegger will also say, 
destinal or epochal manner. And such disclosure happens, if and when it happens, 
200that is, not by way of not by way of an apprehension and confirmation of that strife, 
a calculative intrusiveness, 201 but poetically, in a manner that not merely discloses but 
also instigates and enacts that strife. To say that it instigates the strife of world and 
earth means that the work of art is itself a happening of truth. Remarks Heidegger: 
Art as poetry is founding [Stiftung] in the sense of the instigation [Anstiftung] 
of the strife of truth. Whenever beings as a whole, as beings themselves, 
demand their grounding in opennness, art comes into its historical essence as 
founding. This happened for the first time in the West in Greece. 202 
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Notes 
1 'Hegel and the Greeks' (GA 9: 442). 
GA 5: 66; BW 203. Strikingly, although both the earliest and the final versions of 
Heidegger's text, the draft and the Frankfurt lectures cited here, conclude on what is 
essentially the same question, the intervening Freiburg lecture ends with the discussion 
of Hegel that Heidegger subsequently relegates to the Afterword to the version published 
in Holzwege. In the draft, the question reads as follows: 'Are we or are we not near to 
the essence of art as an origin [das Wesen der Kunst als Ursprung]? And if we are not 
near the origin are we or are we not going to become so ... T (U 22). On the possible 
differences between these questions, see Robert Bernasconi, 'The Greatness of the Work 
of Art' in Heidegger in Question: the Art of Existing (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1993), 99-116 (110-13). For Bernasconi, the difference here is openly political: 'The 
earlier stridency with which Heidegger had challenged the theory that art is an 
(t expression" of the people has now been replaced by a certain Schwermut, or 
melancholy, which matches the isolation that the thinker now experiences in his 
meditation on art. Is it a mistake, ' Bernasconi concludes, 'to hear in this change of mood 
Heidegger's growing awareness of his political isolationT (ibid., 113). To my way of 
thinking: yes. If there is a real difference between the two ways of posing the question, 
and I remain largely unconvinced on this point, might it not more accurately be thought 
in terms of the impoverishment of man on-going in Heidegger's work? On this, see chap. 
3, below. 
GA 5: 35; BW 174. Heidegger's emphasis in these final lines on the decision concerning 
art presumably opens the door to the charge of "decisionism, " a charge often levelled at 
Being and Time. See, for example, the reading of Karl L6with, in which this 'philosophy 
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of resolute existence' is declared to have satisfied all criteria of 'decisionism' in its 
'exhalation of the pathos of decision in the name of pure resolution'. Gesai? zniellc 
Abhandlungen (Stuttgart, 1960), 93-4. For a more expansive treatment, dealing this 
time with Heidegger's early readings of Aristotle, see Beat Sitter, 'Zur Nl6glichkeit 
Dexisionistischer Auslegung von Heideggers Ersten Schriften, ' Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 24 (1970), 516-35. For two useful correctives to this, view, see 
Henri Birault, Heidegger et 1'expgrience de lapens6e (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 519-20, and 
Jean-Luc Nancy, 'La Decision d'existence' in Une Pens6e finie (Paris: Galil6e, 1990), 
107-45, esp. 109 note 1. 
SZ 298. The relation of decision or Entscheidung to resolute openness or Entschlossenheit 
has been drawn out at length by Reiner Schilrmann in Le Principe d'anarchie: Heidegger 
et la question de I'agir (Paris: Seuil, 1982), 291-5, and by Jean-Luc Nancy in 'La 
Decision d'existence, 'op. cit., esp. 107-10,116. Nancy's argument is the more sustained. 
Citing Heidegger's claim here that 'die Entschlossenheit ist ihrem ontologischen Wesen 
nach je die eines jeweiligen faktischen Daseins, ' rendered by Macquarrie and Robinson 
as 'resoluteness, by its ontological essence, is always the resoluteness of some factical 
Dasein at a particular time, ' he translates: Touverture d6cidante / d6cid6e, selon son 
essence ontologique, est ä chaque fois celle d'une Dasein factuel'; 'La D&ision 
d'existence, ' op. cit., 138. 
5 Cf GA 5: 56; BW 193. 
SZ 297. 
SZ 307. 
SZ 396. Heidegger's emphasis. 
SZ 298. Heidegger's emphasis. Cf. GA 24: 408. 
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10 U 22. 
11 GA 5: 66; BW 203. 
12 GA 5: 66; BW 203. Cf. OA 54. 
13 The questions, in fact, are Heidegger's own, posed some years later with respect to Mai-x 
and the decision, 'made in advance, that man and only man (and nothing else besides) 
is the issue' (VS 132). 
14 'Schwer verläßt / Was nahe dem Ursprung wohnet, den Ort'; Friedrich Hölderlin, 'Die 
Wanderung' in Gesammelte Briefe, eds. Robert Honsell and Hans Jürgen Meinerts 
(Bielefeld: Sigbert Mohn, 1961), 246. 
15 SZ 81. 
16 SZ 81. 
17 As Robert Bernasconi has noted; 'The Greatness of the Work of Art, ' op. cit., 110. 
Although Bernasconi is to be applauded for drawing attention to the significance of this 
citation, his willingness to draw a distinction, presumably "political, " between its use in 
the draft and its use in the Frankfurt text is questionable. See the remarks of note 2, 
above. 
18 GA 5: 42; BW 180. 
19 GA 5: 3 1; BW 170. 
20 Although truant from the Freiburg text, which omits all reference to the 'sign, ' this 
referral is already operative in the draft version of the essay where this same sigi-i clo,; es 
the considerations. Not, however, as 'a test still to be stood' (GA 5: 66; BW 203), but a., 
what Heidegger calls the 'untrodden middle of world and earth' in which 'great decisioii.,; 
Lgro, 8eEntscheidungenl' are held in reserve (U 15). A similar point is made in the 1937-8 
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winter semester lecture course Basic Questions of Philosophy, %viiere Heidegger's 
exhortation is for us to allow Hblderlin 'to be the decisi 101 'on that he is [istj' (GA 45: 127). 
Here too, moreover, it is a matter of a decision which itself 'includes a pre-deciion as to 
our readiness or unreadiness with regard to such decisions' (ibid. ). 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Cf. SZ 77 note I and SZ 76-82. Compare also the remarks of The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology where, in addition to a restatement of Husserl's analý-ses, Heidegger 
retrospectively interprets the remarks cited here in terms of 'their orientation toward 
basic principles' (GA 24: 263). 
SZ 79. 
SZ 108. It is in this sense that Heidegger describes Dasein's supply of signs as preg-iven 
or vorgegeben in concern (ibid. ). 
'Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens' in Distanz tind Nähe: 
Reflexionen und Analysen zurKunst der Gegenwart, eds. Petra Jaeger and Rudolph Lüthe 
(Warzburg: Kbnishausen und Neumann, 1983), 11-22 (13). Compare, also, the TTý po ý of 
the Addendum to 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (GA 5: 71-2; BW 208). As Walter 
Biemel notes in his commentary on Heidegger's late essay, 'this definition of the limit - 
which was by no means thought up by Heidegger and attributed to Athena - is a 
decisive concept in Greek thought'; 'Elucidations on Heidegger's Lecture "The Origin of 
Art and the Destination of Thinking... in Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heldegger, op. cit., 37 0-82 
(372). On the sign as the site of gathering or Versammlung, see also the opening 
remarks of the 1951 lecture course What is Thinking? (VVhD 5-7; 9-11) where, once igain 
on the basis of a line from H61derlin, it is man who is identified as cin Zeichen, one 
which is 'without interpretation [ohne Deutung]' (WhD 6; 10). 'We are, ' conchides 
Heidegger citing Hblderlin's 'Mnemosyne' in a way which looks back to the remarks of 
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the'Letter on "Humanism", ''a sign that is not read' (WhD 14; 18). On the connection of 
limit (Grenze) and 1Týpa; to gathering, see also 'Building Dwelling Thinking' (VA 149, BW 
356). 
25 Nancy, 'La Decision d'existence, ' op. cit., 108. 
26 Michel Haar, Le Chant de la terre: Heidegger et les assises de PHistorie de Phre (Paris: 
I Editions de I'Herne, 1987), 204. More or less the same point is made by Nliguel de 
Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Distopias (London: Routledge, 1998), 86. 
27 Haar, Le Chant de la terre, op. cit., 204. 
28 SZ 126-7. Emphasis mine. The references in Being and Time to art and its cognates can 
be counted on the fingers of one hand. The most expansive of these is the recourse to the 
'alten Fabel' of Cura (SZ 198-9 and 197 note 1) as a'preontological testirnoiiy' of Dasein, 
in the course of which Heidegger wittingly elides the matter of its mythological or poetic 
status. What has gone unnoticed, however, is the small but significant softening of ?I 
position with respect to the presentation of this fable: if one compares the penultimate 
draft of Being and Time, the Marburg lectures of two years earlier, this same fable is 
described as entirely 'naive, ' and the fact of its ability to tell us anything regarding 
Dasein's being-in-the-world regarded as 'quite astonishing' (GA 20: 419). Rather more 
puzzling, however, is Heidegger's evocation of this fable in order to 'make plain that our 
interpretation is no fabrication [keine Erfindung ist] but, as an ontological construction, it 
has a secure basis and has been sketched out beforehand in an elemental way' (SZ 197), 
in other words, his recourse to a fable in order to secure the interpretation against the 
charge of fabrication. In the light of what I shall argue in chapter 3, moreover, it is not 
insignificant that already in Being and Time Heidegger turns to a work of art in order to 
illustrate that 'the perfectio of man, his becoming what one can be in being-free for 
his 
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ownmost possibilities (projection), is one of the "accomplishments" [eine "Lelsluizk] of 
"care... (SZ 199). On the term "accomplishments" as opposed to "accomplishment 
[Vollendungl, ' see chap. 3, below. On the only sustained reference in Being and Time to a 
particular work of art, see Robert Bernasconi, 'Literary Attestation in Philosophy: 
Heidegger's Footnote on Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Ilyich", ' Heidegger in Questioiz, op. 
cit., 76-98. 
29 SZ 260. At the very end of this section, Heidegger is forced to admit that however clear 
the ontological possibility of authentic being-toward- death may be, it remains, 'after all, 
existentielly a fantastical demand [ein phantastische Zumutungf (SZ 266). 
30 SZ 256. 
31 'To be certain of a being means: to hold it as something true [es als wahres flir wahr 
halten]. But truth means the uncoveredness of beings. And all uncoveredness is 
grounded ontologically in originary truth, the disclosedness of Dasein' (SZ 256). 1 will 
come back to this in due course. 
32 SZ 256. Heidegger's emphasis. 
33 Cf. GA 24: 244-7. 
34 Cf. GA 29/30: 7,393. 
35 Cf GA 32: 212. 
36 GA 24: 244. The status of art as a sign seem also to be assured, therefore. 
37 GA 24: 246. 
38 GA 24: 244. Strikingly, Heidegger comes back to Rilke rather later on in the lecture 
course, citing this same description now as an example of Dasein's inauthentic self- 
understanding (cf GA 24: 410). Michel Haar reads the lines from The Basic Problems of 
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Phenomenology as a'discrete entree en scene de la po6sie'; Le Chant de la terre, op. cit., 
204-6. As he notes there: 'the poet makes things be seen in the same way as the 
phenomenologist! ' (ibid., 205). For Haar, however, the critical word in this di, -cus. sioll I. ' 
obzwar, although. Thus regarding Heidegger's claim that 'the poet is able to see this 
original, although unreflected and not theoretically discovered world' (GA 24: 246-7. 
Emphasis mine), he comments that, immediately following the 'affirmation of the izoiz- 
fictive character of art, the commentary hestitates and is cut short' (Le Chant de la terre, 
206). As far as Haar is concerned, therefore, for the Heidegger of The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology art is no more than 'une intuition aveugle' (ibid. ). Whatever the 
considerable merits of Haar's fine book, I remain unconvinced on this point and it would, 
I think, suffice to read the following remarks from Being and Time to confute Haar's 
ensuing remarks: 'By looking at the world theoretically, we have already diinmed it 
down to the uniformity of what is purely present-to -hand' (SZ 138). If the 'world' which 
Rilke allows us to see is indeed'nicht theoretisch erfundene, 'as Heidegger insists, surely 
this renders the description all the more compelling as a document of being- in -the -world'! 
One ought also to note Heidegger's use here of the word 'elementar' - 'a rare word in 
Heidegger, ' as Haar rightly points out (Le Chant de la terre, 205). In the reference to 
Hyginus'fable in Being and Time, this word had been used in order to characterlse the 
existential interpretation of Dasein as care, Heidegger noting there that the 
interpretation, far from being a mere fabrication (Erfindung), is one that has in fact been 
sketched out beforehand 'in an elemental [elementaren] way' (SZ 197). Rather more 
problematic is Ian Lyne's suggestion that the remarks of The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology are intended as 'a phenomenological interpretation of poetry': The 
Temporality of Language, op. cit., 97. Although Lyne is right to emphasise the 
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importance of these lines, he altogether fails to appreciate that the concern here is less 
with an interpretation of poetry than with poetry as interpretation. 
39 SZ 162. 
40 If not, as Michel Haar suggests, ultimately disavowed; cf. Le Chant de la terre, op. cit.. 
206. 
41 GA 5: 66; BW 202. 
42 U 21. 
43 U 22. Heidegger's emphasis. 
44 OA 44. Heidegger's emphasis. 
45 6... eine wesentliche Weise ... ist das Sich-ins-Werk-setzen der Wahrheit' (GA 5: 42,50, 
BW 180p 186. Emphasis mine). 
46 And, as we saw above, it should be recalled that as late as 1967 one finds Heidegger 
speaking of 'Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens. ' 
47 For some largely inconclusive considerations of these differences, see Robert Bernasconi, 
'The Greatness of the Work of Art, ' op. cit.; Emmanuel Martineau, 'Avant-propos de 
1'editeut' (OA 1-8); Jacques Taminaux, 'The Origin of "The Origin of the Work of Art", ' in 
Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heidegger, op. cit., 392-404. 
48 The reference here is to John Sallis' account of this lecture, 'Deformatives: Essentially 
Other than Truth' in Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heidegger, op. cit., 29-46. As I shall want to 
show, it is in the lectures on art that Sallis' central thesis, that there is, 'withm the very 
essence of truth, something essentially other than truth, a divergence from nature within 
nature, true monstrosity' (ibid., 29), finds its most concrete affirmation. 
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49 Following Klaus Held's formidable thesis that 'the world is the actual subject matter of 
phenomenology, ' a thesis Heidegger would in no way dispute, this moment might 
equally be termed the Properly phenomenological moment of Heidegger's text, "File 
Finitude of the World: Phenomenology in Transition from Husserl to Heidegger' in Ethics 
and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Philosophy, eds. Arleen B. Dallery and 
Charles Scott (Albany: SUNY, 1992), 187-98 (187). In the following chapter, I am 
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Phdnomenologie' in Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie, eds. Anne-Marie 
Gethmann -Siefert and Otto Pbggeler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988). 
50 Letter to Elisabeth Blochmann of I May 1919 in Martin Heidegger - Elisabeth 
Blochmann. Briefwechsel 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach am Neckar: 
Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989), 16. 
51 Edmund Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft in Aufsätze und Vorträge 
(1911-1921), Husserliana XXV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 61. This essay is, of 
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of 1925 (GA 20 §13c). 
52 Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, op. cit., 3. 
53 Ibid., 61. Husserl's emphasis. 
54 The following sentences gloss the meditation on phenomenological midwifery pronded by 
the opening paragraphs of John Sallis' 'Image and Phenomenon' in Delimitatioiis., 
Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana Universitv Press, 
1995; second edition), 63-75. 
55 GA 20: 32. 
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... ihre absolut klaren Anfänge'; Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. op. eit., 61. 
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Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (New York: Collier Books -MacMillan, 1962), 83, 
translation modified (cited GA 56/57: 109). 
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Phiinomenologie. 
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68 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and nme, op. cit., 117. 
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later on in the book (SZ 315). By the time of the 'Letter on "Humanism", ' of course, 
Heidegger's principle difficulty with the fundamental ontology of Being and Time is its 
still too 'inappropriate orientation toward "science" and "research... (GA 9: 357; BW 
258-9). 
72 SZ 26. See, too, the opening remarks of the 1937-8 lecture course Basic Questions of 
Philosophy, where philosophy, 'in its incessant questioning, ' is said never 'to yield 
results' and to remain 'always and necessary strange to a thinking preoccupied with 
calculation, use and learning' (GA 45: 4), precisely the same strangeness which will be 
reiterated several years later at the outset of the 'Letter on "Humanism"' (GA 9: 314-15, 
317; BW 218-19,221). Herman Philipse makes a similar point in order to justify his 
thesis of a Heidegger absconditus. For Philipse, reading Heidegger involves inevitably a 
certain 'disappointment, ' one engendered by the fact that, so he claims, 'we cannot 
provide an answer to the question of being at all'; Heidegge7ls Philosophy of Being (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 7. Philipse justifies his claims with references 
to remarks from the dialogue with which Heidegger concludes Gelassenheit of 1959: 'We 
ought to do nothing but wait [Wir sollen nichts tun sondern wartenf (G 35), and to the 
following caution from Introduction to Metaphysics: 'To know how to question means: to 
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know how to wait, even a whole lifetime' (EM 157). It hardl-y needs to be pointed out 
that to wait (warten) can also mean to await, to attend upon a projected future, and 
quite apart from an absence of any critical generosity whatsoever, an abseiice 
characterised by the loaded nomination of Gelassenheit (usually translated as 
releasement, but more properly as composure, calmness, etc. ) as resignation, the 
principle difficulty with Philipse's remarks is that they altogether falls to grasp what 
Heidegger understands by the notion of questioning, which, as a rather more carel'til 
account of Heidegger points out, 'means something quite different from interrogation or 
raising questions with a view to answering them'; de Belstegui, Heidegger and flie 
Political: Distopias, op. cit., 172 note 21. That such a structure is operative in 
Heidegger's work from the start is borne out by the following remark from Theodore 
Kisiel: 'Phenomenology ... seek[s] to determine origins and ultimates, the 
first and last 
things, the underived from which all else is derived, which can only be "shown" or 
it pointed out" but not "proved" ... '; The 
Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, op. cit., 39. 
73 GA 20: 179. In which, moreover, moreover, the Stranger's response to his interlocutors is 
regarded explicitly 'as a question' (ibid. ). The treatment meted out in the previous 
semester's lecture course on Plato's Sophist (GA 19: 446-9) is the more sustained. Of 
the Stranger's response, translated now as follows: 'Because we find ourselves at an 
impasse as regards what You are saying, you will have to explain to us what you mcan 
when you use the word "being", ' Heidegger comments: 'This is the genuinel, v central 
concern of this passage and of the whole dialogue' (GA 19: 446. Heidegger's emphasis). It 
is in the course of this commentary, moreover, that the formal structure of questioning 
which guides Being and Time is first set in place. As Theodore Kisiel rightly remarks: 'a 
PI student who had skipped the semester on the Sophist would have had trouble 
followim, 
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all these tersely made connections'; The Genesis of Heidegger's Being atid Time. op. cit., 
364. 
74 SZ 6. Compare the remarks of Held, 'The Finitude of the World, ' op. cit., 195. 
75 EM 29. Important to note in this context, however, is the fact that Heidegger speak.,.; 
here of Anfang and not of Ursprung. Although the connection between the respective 
positions of Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics is clear, it is also more 
complicated than I am allowing, therefore. On the particular sense of Anfaizg as opposed 
to Ursprung and to Begin, see Schilrmann, Le Principe d'anarchie, op. cit., 145-52, and 
chap. 3, note 28, below. See also the informative note of Werner Marx, Heidegger and the 
Tradition (Evanston: North-western University Press, 1971), 116. 
76 SZ 2. For Heidegger's more considered account of the necessity underlying his own 
'discovery of tradition' (SZ 20), see the remarks of the penultimate draft, History of the 
Concept of Time, which culminate in the following declaration of intent: 'Radicallsed in 
its ownmost possibility, phenomenology is nothing other than the questioning of Plato 
and Aristotle brought back to life: the repetition, the retaking of the beginning of our 
scientific philosophy' (GA 20: 184-5). On the function and implications of the word 'today' 
in these remarks, see Andrew Benjamin, 'Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger 
Showing the Present' in Benjamin and Osbourne (eds. ), Walter Benjamin's PhilosophY. - 
Destruction and Experience, op. cit., 216-50. 
77 SZ 2-3. 
78 Paola Marrati-Guenoun, La Genýse et la trace: Derrida lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 126. 
79 EM 29-30. Strangely enough, Heidegger uses here the word Dunkel, obscurity, precisely 
the term which Being and Time had used in order to characterise our orieiitation todaY 
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to the question about being (SZ 4, cited above). It should be noted, moreover, that 
although I am here following the lead of Introduction to Metaphysics in order to 
formulate matters in terms of the possibility of questioning (what is allowed for b%. the 
tradition) and its necessity (what is dictated by the present situation), the point could 
equally well be made in terms either of retrospection and prospection, or of Andenken 
and Vordenken. For an instance of the former, see Schdrmann, Le Principe danarchic, 
op. cit., 159; for the latter, see Zarader, Heideger et les paroles de rorigine, op. cit., 2 7-3 5, 
and Marrati-Guenoun, La genýse et la trace, op. cit., 126. 
80 SZ 6. Heidegger's emphasis. The demonstration of and justification for this move, made 
in the 1925 lecture course History of the Concept of Time (GA 20: 199-200), is absent 
from the analyses of Being and Time. 
81 GA 20: 193,194. 
82 SZ 5. 
83 GA 24: 457. 
84 SZ 5. Heidegger's emphasis. Compare the reading of Derrida, 'Les Fins de Momme' in 
Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1967). 
85 SZ 15. 
86 Jacques Derrida, De 1'esprit: Heidegger et la question (Paris: Galil6e, 1987), 36,26. 
Compare 'Les fins de Fhomme, ' op. cit., esp. 148-53, Derrida's earliest attempt to 
expose the presuppositions that constrain the point of departure of Being and Time. 
87 'll n'est choisi comme 6tant exemplaire pour la question de 1'6tre que depuls Fexp&ience 
de la question, la possibilite du Fragen, telle qu'elle s'inscrit dans le r6seau du Gefragte, 
F6tre, de I'Erfragte, le sens de Htre, du Befragte der Seinsfrage, A savoir de Fkant que 
nous sommes' (ibid., 36. Derrida's emphasis). 
79 
88 De Vesprit, 37. 
89 SZ 43. Cited here in Derrida's translation: '... elle exige Fassurance d'une point de 
depart juste'; De Vesprit, 37. 
90 The distinction I am drawing here is also argued for by William NkNeill, 'The First 
Principle of Hermenutics' in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest 
Thought, eds. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: SUNY, 1994), 393-408, 
esp. 404-6, and by John SaIllis in the context of a discussion of Heidegger's late es,; ay 
'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking': 'The structure of the question as the 
comportment of Dasein toward itself is no longer ... to serve as the point of departure. 
The Ansatz is earlier .... The question would be deployed only starting from what would 
call it forth, not with an absolute privilege'; 'Flights of Spirit' in Double Truth (Albany: 
SUNY, 1995), 19-35 (32). See, too, the distinction drawn by Reiner Sch&mann between 
le concept de commencement' and Torigine originaire, ' the former denoting a 'familiarity 
with what we nevertheless do not know, ' the latter 'the temporal condition of what is to 
be thought and done .... the horizon opened by our project of 
being' (Le principe 
d'anarchie, op. cit., 160-1,172). Such is not, of course, the only point at which Derrida's 
reading begins to break down. Exemplary in this regard is the famous intervention of 
Frangoise Dastur who, at the Essex colloquium 'Reading Heidegger' at which Derrida 
first presented the arguments of De 1'esprit, drew attention to a passage from the e,; say 
of 1957-8 'The Essence of Language' in which, having suggested that 'every onset of 
every questioning Ueder Ansatz jeder Frage] holds itself within the promise of what is put 
into question, ' Heidegger remarks that 'the proper bearing of thinking [die eigenthChe 
Gebeirde des Denkens] is not questioning but listening to the promise of that which is to 
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come into question' (GA 12: 164. Emphasis mine). For Derrida's somewhat haphazard 
response to this intervention, see De Fesprit, 147-54 note. 
91 GA 26: 176. Heidegger's emphasis. 
92 SZ 13. 
93 SZ 52. Heidegger's emphasis. A marginal note written by Heidegger in his own copy of 
the text and keyed to the word disturbed (beunruhigt) is rather less charitable as 
regards the effects of philosophy's discomfort: 'Hardly! The concept of world is not 
grasped at all' (SZ 441 note 52). It is Klaus Held who has argued most persuasively in 
favour of locating the outset of the analytic in a phenomenology of world openness; see 
'Heidegger und das Prinzip der Phänomenologie, 'op. cit.. 
94 GA 56/57: 63. 
95 Kant, KrV B x1i note. Somewhat needlessly in my view, given the care with which his 
argument is constructed, Heidegger will in §43 make much of the fact that Kant writes 
here of 'das Dasein der Dinge auBer uns' (B x1i), rather than, as presumably he ought, of 
das Vorhandenheit der Dinge auBer uns, remarking that, for Kant, 'the term "Dasein" 
means the being-present-to -hand of consciousness as much as the being -present-to- 
hand of things' (SZ 203). 
96 Something, I think, Kant himself would not deny. The modifications to the argument 
introduced by lengthy footnote to the second edition Preface, from which the foregoing 
quotations are taken, indicates a certain dissatisfaction on his part as to the 'Refutation 
of Idealism' itself. The note is, moreover, only the first of numerous attempts on the part 
of Kant to resolve the difficulty. For other such attempts, see R 5653-4 (Ak XVIII: 
305-13) and R 6312-17 (Ak XVIII: 613-29). Suffice it to say. the evident hostility of 
Being and Time to the Refutation of Idealism does not allow for the elision of Heidegger's 
81 
position and that of, say, logical positivism, for which the spurious character of the 
epistemological problem of the world derives from its resistance to all empirical or 
scientific proofs, itself clearly a variant on the problematic idealism refuted by Kant. For 
such a position, see the researches, contemporaneous with the redaction of Beitig aiid 
Time, of Rudolph Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems "I 
Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
97 SZ 205. Heidegger's emphasis. 
98 SZ 205. Heidegger's emphasis. 
99 SZ 13. 
100 Cf. GA 56/57: 117. 
101 GA 58: 62-3. 
102 SZ 202. Heidegger's emphasis. 
103 Schdrmann, Le Principe d'anarchie, op. cit., 172-3. The final sentence, not present in 
Schiirmann's original essay, comes from Christine-Marie Gros' authorised English 
translation of these remarks, Heideger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 143. 
104 SZ 214. 
105 SZ 34. 
106 KrV A 58; B 82. Cf. GA 21: 19 and SZ 215. 
107 GA 21: 19. 
108 'Hier der eigentliche Ort des einsetzenden Einsprungs in das Dasein' (SZ 444 note). 
109 Kant, KrVA 58; B 82 (cited SZ 215). 
110 SZ 217. Heidegger's emphasis. 
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111 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968) 11 1: 199 
Compare the definition of Emmanuel Levinas: 'Truth is an adequation of thought, a., a 
purely signifying intention, to an object given in intuition, an intuition that cilrasps an 
object that is present in all its concrete reality, "in the flesh ... ;Te Theorýv of Itituitioiz ii, h 
Husserl's Phenomenology, translated by Andr6 Orianne (Evanston: NortliNvesteni 
University Press, 1995), 134-5. 
112 SZ 218. 
113 SZ 220-1. 
114 SZ 221. 
115 GA 31: 135. 
116 SD 61; BW 431. One ought to note, moreover, Jacques Taminaux's recollection of 
Heidegger's Zdhringen suggestion that 'the meditation on the origin of the work of art 
had played a decisive role in the Kehre, the turn that occurred in his thought M the 
thirties'; 'The Origin of "The Origin of the Work of Art... in Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heideýgger, 
op. cit., 392-404 (392). 
117 GA 5: 1; BW 143. 
118 GA 5: ; BW 175-6. 
119 Thus in a marginal note to Heidegger's own copy of the Reclam edition of the essay, 
keyed to the opening words of the text: 'MiBverstdndlich die Rede vom "Ursprung... (GA 
5: 1 note b). Reiner Schdrmann draws similar conclusions, arguing that these opening 
lines characterise the notion of Ursprung by what he deems the 'same duplicitý-' as, the 
Aristotelian notion of dpxý, namely 'commencement and comniandi-nent, ' so 'inte-ratmg ?I 
the Aristotelian schema into a regional phenomenology'; Le pruicipe daizat-chic, op. cit.. 
180 note 3. According to Schiirmann's self-avowed valorisation of Heidegger's later work, 
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'this regional conception of the origin is entirely abandoned by the time of Zur des 
Denkens' (ibid. ). For Aristotle's account of the various V -YE TO L of the notion of dpxý. see 
Metaphysics V 1: 1012b 34-1013a 17. 
120 OA 20. Heidegger's emphasis. 
121 GA 5: 69; BW 205. 
122 GA 5: 69: BW 205. 
123 The reference here is, of course, to the lecture of 1930, 'On the Essence of Truth' (GA 9: 
201; BW 137). 1 will come back to this proposition in the following section. 
124 In the Freiburg lectures, the question was posed in the following way: 'where can a work 
of art have its origin if not in its production by the artist [in der Hervorbriikgung durch 
den Kiinstler]? ' (OA 20). By the following year this has become the sardonic suggestion 
that 'the work of art arises [entspringtj ... 
from out of and through the activity of the 
artist [die Tdtigkeit des Kiinstlers]' (GA 5: 1; BW 143), Heidegger now holding the notion 
of producing or bringing-forth (hervorbringen) in reserve. 
125 GA 5: 1; BW 143. 
126 GA 5: 1; BW 143. Heidegger's emphasis. Cf. U 7; OA 22. 
127 GA 5: 2; BW 144. 
128 GA 5: 2; BW 143. The reference here is presumably to Hegel's declaration that art. 
'considered in its highest determination, ' is 'a thing of the past [ein Vergangetics]'; 
Ästhetik in Werke in zwanzig Bände, eds. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971) XIII: 25. Heidegger cites this remark in the 
Afterword to the Frankfurt text (GA 5: 68; BW 205), as well as in the main body of the 
Freiburg lectures of the previous year (OA 54). 
84 
129 This proposition, surprisingly not cited by Heidegger, comes from Aristotles' enumeration 
of the various senses of the word dpxý. See Metaphysics v 1: 1013a 13-14: dpýal 6j \E-Y(),, -(lt 
KaL ai Týxvm I 
130 GA 5: 2; BW 144. 
131 GA 5: 2,3; BW 144. 
132 GA 5: 2; BW 144. As Denis Schmidt observes: 'This remark must not be taken as an 
excuse for an awkward or misfired beginning to the text but as a comment on the 
character of the beginning as such'; The Ubiquity of the Finite: Hegel, Heidggger, and the 
Entitlements of Philosophy (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988), 102. See Schmidt's 
ensuing consideration of the 'prominent, almost archetypal, role' played by 'the image of 
the circle in antiquity' (ibid., 102-3). 
133 SZ 152. The context is a discussion of hermeneutic circularity, i. e. of the second sei-ise of 
origin discussed above. The Verstofl gegen die Log1k is announced as early as the 
1924/25 winter semester lecture course Plato's Sophist, where one finds the following 
declaration: 'the "logic" of the determination of beings may not be invoked as the 
criterion for the explication of being' (GA 19: 447). See also the remarks of §1 of Being 
and Time: 'the mode of determination of beings which has its justification within limits 
- the "definition" of traditional logic which is itself rooted in ancient ontology - cannot be 
applied to being, ' an assertion reinforced by the claim that 'a riddle lies a priori in evei-ý, 
relation and being toward beings as beings' (SZ 4). Broadly the same point is made in 
the 1929 lecture 'What is Metaphysics? ' where a further declaration concerning origgin 
leads Heidegger to the conclusion herethe idea of "logic" itself dissolves in the whirlpool 
of a more original questioning' (GA 9: 117; BW 105). On the extent of such circLilaritv, ,,, ee 
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again the analyses of Lyne, The Temporality of Language,, op. cit., 61-71, and Schmidt, 
The Ubiquity of the Finite, op. cit., 100-1. 
134 SZ 152. Whilst nonetheless disqualifying it a priori from 'the sphere of scientific knowing' 
(ibid. ). 
135 SZ 153. 
136 SZ 153. 
137 The analogy would also hold for the circle, significantly restated at the outset of the 
lectures on fine art, of Hegel's speculative methodology; cf. Asthetik, Werke XIII: 11. 
138 GA 5: 67; BW 204. One ought to note, however, that the German verb 'sehen' has much 
the same figurative extension as the English 'to see' (Wie siehst du das?, Das darf man 
nicht so sehen, etc. ). Coming back to these 'propositions' some years later, Heidegger 
reinterates nonetheless this absence of pretension; the essay, we are told in the 
Addendum, gives 'no answers. ' Quite the opposite, in fact. What 'gives the illusion' that 
such answers are forthcoming are, Heidegger says, 'directives for questioning (see the 
opening propositions of the Afterword)' (GA 5: 73; BW 211). The analogy with the 
position set out in Being and Time is again clear. For Heidegger's more sustaine(I 
considerations of the notion of riddle, again in the context of a meditation on origin, see 
GA 39: 239-44 and GA 53: 22-3 and 40-1. 
139 U 7. Compare OA 24. 
140 GA 5: 59; BW 196. 
141 GA 5: 44; BW 182. 
142 These same shoes, although absent from both the draft and the Freiburg lecture, also 
crop up, once again as a 'helpful example, ' in the intervening lecture course Introdlictioti 
to Metaphysics (EM 27). 
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143 GA 5: 21; BW 161-2. Robert Bernasconi has drawn attention to what he deems an 
'insufficiently appreciated' distinction between this example and the one that follo%%-.,. 
that of a temple. Bernasconi remarks: 'Whereas the temple opens up a world' in 
historical fashion, 'the painting of th peasant woman's shoes tells us no more than Nvhat 
the peasant woman knows without noticing or reflecting'; The Questio7z of Laiigliage ill 
Heidegger's History of Being, op. cit., 36. To my mind, Bernasconi is too intent on readnig 
Heidegger's description here in terms of the pre -phenomenological encounter with 
equipment which had sustained the considerations of worldhood in Belng and Time. The 
Origin of the Work of Art, ' however, displays a considerably different emphasis and is 
concerned less with the concernful dealings of Dasein in which the equipmental ývorld as 
a whole is sighted in circumspection (Umsicht), than with the historical happening of 
truth. What the painting accordingly discloses is not so much what the pair of shoes 'is 
in truth, ' as is often said, than their character as equipment, 'what the eqLtipment ... is 
in truth. 'No less than the temple, moreover, do the shoes open up a world. 'World and 
earth, ' Heidegger says, 'exist [sind ... da] 
for the peasant woman, and for those who are 
with her in this way, only thus: in equipment. We say "only" and thereby err; for the 
reliability of the equipment first gives the simple world its security and safeguards for 
the earth the freedom of its continual onrush' (GA 5: 20; BW 160). And in a marginal 
note keyed to the remark that 'world and earth exist, ' Heidegger adds: ... exist" = are 
present [anwesend]' (GA 5: 20 note a). Here, no less than with the temple, it is a matter 
of a world and of the earth first becoming present, and so a matter also of the historical 
manner in which art discloses truth, precisely what Bernasconi finds to be lacking in the 
discussion of van Gogh's painting. 
"" GA 5: 23; BW 163. 
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145 GA 5: 21; BW 162. 
146 GA 5: 69-70; BW 206. 
147 GA 5: 37; BW 176. It should be noted that the extensive questioning, of truth is notabh- 
lacking from both the draft and the Freiburg lecture. 
148 GA 26: 268. 
149 GA 5: 37; BW 176. 
150 GA 9: 20 1; BW 13 7. 
151 GS 5: 39; BW 177. 
152 Rene Descartes, Regulae, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery 
(Paris: Vrin, 1997) X: 371-2. 
153 GA 5: 38; BW 177. 
154 That Heidegger recognises something of himself in this is attested by the series of letters 
written during the 1950s and 60s to Erhart Kdstner, in which the philosopher confesses 
his worries about the impending trip to Greece: 'Greece is still always the dream and 
every new advance of thinking lives in it, ' he writes in 1957; Martin Heidegger - Erhard 
Kästner Briefwechsel, ed. Heinrich Petzt (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1986), 34. In the 
notebook kept whilst in Greece, Heidegger notes that such worries stemmed from a fear 
that the reality of modern Greece might not live up to the dream. 'The Greece of todaý- 
could deny [verwehren] the old one, prevent what is proper to it coming to light. ' The fear 
is that Heidegger's own thought of Greece might turn out to be 'a mere invention, ' his 
Denkweg an Irrweg; Aufenthalte (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989). 1 
155 GA 5: 37-8; BW 176. Compare the essay of 1940, 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth, ' where this 
thesis is most fully argued: 'Plato's thinking follows the change in the essence of truth' 
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(GA 9: 237). As Heidegger notes in his concluding remarks to Wegmarken, the 'train of 
thought in this essay' goes back to the 1931/32 lecture course On the Essence of Truth 
(GA 9: 483). See also the exemplary reading of the aletheic turn in Jean-Frazlýois 
Courtine's 'Le Platonisme de Heidegger' in Heidegger et la phinominologie (Paris: Vrin, 
1990), 150-8. 
156 GA 5: 23; BW 163. 
157 GA 5: 39-40; BW 178. 
158 GA 5: 40; BW 178. 
159 GA 9: 193-4; BW 130. 
160 GA 5: 40; BW 178. 
161 GA 5: 4 1; BW 17 9. 
162 On the particular importance of this example, see Bernasconi, The Question of Latiguage 
in Heidegger's History of Being, op. cit., 35-6. In the corresponding lines of both the draft 
and the Freiburg lecture, Heidegger writes of 'der Zeustempel, ' so giving the impression 
that he has a particular temple in mind (U 8; OA 24). Which one? A clue appears to be 
afforded by the fact that Heidegger invites us in each version of the text 'to call on the 
temple at Paestum at its own site' (U 7; OA 22; GA 5: 26; BW 166), issuing the 
invitation immediately before he turns to the temple as a specific example. It is 
generally agreed, however, that none of the temples in Paestum was in fact dedicated to 
Zeus. Emmanuel Martineau, having compared the description of the temple afforded by 
Heidegger in the Freiburg and Frankfurt lectures with those extant temples which are so 
dedicated, concludes that this temple is 'incontestable ment id6al' (OA 56 note 3). For a 
further exploration of Heidegger's temple, see John Sallis, 'Temples of Earth' in S'tone, 
op. cit., 82-115. 
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163 Cf. U 22; OA 24; GA 5: 27; BW 167. It is presumably Hegel's account of the entrance of 
the God into the temple as 'a lightning flash of individuality that smites its wav into the 
inert mass, permeating it with its presence' that is the point of reference here: Astlictik. 
Werke XIII: 117-18. 
164 According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, it was in the introduction of these two terms thit 
the full force of the lectures' sensational impact was felt most acutely; 'Zur EMEffirtilig' 
in Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960), 10 7 -9. lf 
the mere introduction of earth as a category of presencing seems to run counter to 
Heidegger's project thus far - particularly if read in terms of the categorical refusal iii 
Being and Time to countenance anything like an original insertion of Dasein into nature 
- the concept of world developed here marks an equally significant shift. Thus, in 
addition to the Dasein-analytic of Being and Time, 'The Essence of Grounds' of 1929 had 
afforded a sustained examination of world in respect of the transcendence of Dasein (GA 
9: 123-75, esp. 137-62), as had the second part of the winter semester lecture course of 
the same year, The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, in respect of Dasein's world- 
constitution (GA 29/30: 261-415, esp. 410-15). For a detailed examination of this shift 
in emphasis, see Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1971), 183-91. 
165 GA 5: 27-8; BW 167. In the Freiburg lecture, these sentences are almost identical, the 
phrase 'die Menschenwesen die Gestalt seines Geschickes gewinnen' having replaced the 
words 'eine Volkes engefügt sind' (OA 26). 
166 Cf OA 22,52. 
167 GA 5: 31; BW 170. 
168 SZ 108. 
90 
169 GA 53: 26-7. 
170 GA 5: 29; BW 169. 
171 The reference here is, of course, to the reflections of the essay'The Work of Art in the Age 
of its Mechanical Reproducibility' in which Benjamin speaks of 'the present decline of 
aura [desgegenwdrtigen Verfalls derAura]'(GS 1 2: 440,479) before remarking: 'even the 
most complete reproduction lacks one thing: the here and now of the work of art - its 
unique existence [einmaliges Dasein] in the place [Ort] where it is to be f6tind' (GS 1 2: 
437,475). 
172 GA 5: 26; BW 166. 
173 GA 5: 31; BW 170. 
174 GA 5: 30; BW 170. The phrase does not appear in the Freiburg lectures, whei-e 
Heidegger writes instead that 'die Welt waltet, ' the world reigns (OA 28,30). In in 
editorial note to this remark, Emmanuel Martineau states that the formula is 
unequivocal in Heidegger's typescript, adding further that the phrase 'die Welt weltet' is 
used for the first time in the version of 1936 (OA 57 note 9). Not so. In the corresponding 
lines of the draft, written some months before the Freiburg text, Heidegger had written: 
'World worlds - it guides [umleitet] our Dasein like an escort [ein Geleit], in which the 
lingering and hastening, remoteness and nearness, extent and limits of all beings 
remain open to us [uns ... offenbleibt]' 
(U 9). Quite why the phrase does not appear iii 
the Freiburg lecture text is a matter for speculation, however. 
175 GA 56/57: 71. 
176 GA 56/57: 73. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Kisiel, having dealt at length with the 
relation of Heidegger's es of prepredicative immediacy to the validating cs gilt of ne()- 
Kantian theoretical judgement, describes the employment of this 'felicitous expressimi 9 
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drawn from the 'linguistic treasure trove' of the German language (GA 1: 211) as the 
'central insight' of Heidegger's thinking; The Genesis of Heidegger's Bebig and Tinze, op. 
cit., 25. 
177 '0 Blik der Sonne, du schönster, der / Dem siebenthorigen Thebe / Selt laiigein schelllt 
2 (GA 56/57: 74). 
178 Ablderlin and the Essence of Poetry' (GA 4: 38). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Affiliations: Benjamin's Concept of Philosophy 
Every great work has its sibling (brother or sister? ) in a 
philosophical sphere. 1 
Writing in 1929 for Die literarische Welt, Benjamin concludes his review of a lecture 
given by one Edgar Dacque with a passing reference to what he describes as the 
'fundamental breakthrough' of phenomenology. 2 The breakthrough, as Benjamin 
understands it, turns on the 'strict opposition' of phenomenological thinking to 
anything like a notion of system. 'In place of the idealistic system, ' he writes, 'Husserl 
sets the notion of discontinuous phenomenology [die diskontinuierliche 
Phdnomenologie]. 13 
Reference to Husserl are rare in Benjamin's work. The claim itself, however, is 
perhaps enough to indicate that his attitude toward phenomenological research is 
rather less blandly antipathetic than is often assumed. 4 Fleshed out somewhat, it 
would presumably run like this: phenomenological thinking is directed toward self- 
effacement in the face of the things themselves. It is thinking that places itself under 
the demand that 'the impulse of research ... proceed not 
from philosophies but from 
things and from problems [von den Sachen und Problemen], '; -, from 'a free dedication 
to the problems themselves and to the demands stemming from them. 16 Circling 
within the discreet 'spheres of direct intuition' (presumably what Benjamin Intends 
here by 'discontinuity, ' Diskontinuitdt), it could not but stand opposed to the epistemic 
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unity projected by the traditional notion of systeM7 To quote from one of the younger 
and more precocious adherents to Husserl's methodological demands: the concrete 
immediacy of experience that provides phenomenology w1th lts pr1nc1pIe focus 'cannot 
be attained by any conceptual system thus far constructed, but onl-v bN, 
phenomenological life in its ever increasing intensification of itself. 18 So f, -Ir ý, S 
Benjamin's review is concerned, however, the underlying issue here appears rather 
different. The opposition of phenomenology to the traditional notion of system is not 
said to stem from the 'attitude' of phenomenological life as such, what the same 
exponent of Husserl will describe as its essential moment (Wesensmoment des Lebens) 
or the experienceable as such (Erlebbares iiberhaupt), and that Benjamin will himself 
explore in notes of the following year in terms of the disposition (Habitus) of a lived 
life. 9 The issue, rather, concerns the 'opposition' of 'the unity and continuity of 
intuition' to 'the traditional form of such unity, the system. '10 One assumes although it 
is not made explicit by Benjamin, that the reference here is to the analyses of the 
Logical Investigations and, more specifically, to the way in which Husserl undertakes 
there to broach the question of truth. It will be recalled that the determination of 
truth advanced there by Husserl turns on its relation to knowledge. Not, however, to 
the knowing that attends a proposition concerning an object, but to the specifically 
intentional structure of knowing, its character as a fulfilled intention or as intuition 
(Anschauung). It will be recalled further that knowing is not an empty intuition but 
an act of identification (presumably what Benjamin intends here by 'continifitv, ' 
Kontinuitdt) in which what is intuited (what is present in the flesh, lelbhaftig 
answesend, to use Husserl's locution) is the same as what was intended or aimed at. 
This identity (Presumably what Benjamin intends here by 'unity, ' Elitheit) is, for 
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Husserl, truth in its most basic sense, 'the complete agreement of the intended and 
the given as such. '11 Quoting again from the young phenomenologist cited a moment 
ago, this time from a celebrated defence of Husserl orchestrated almost a decade after 
the earlier remarks: 
Phenomenology ... calls for a step by step, expressly intuitive envisaging and 
supervisory demonstration of the issue. Accordingly one cannot - without 
diverting the entire direction [sinn] of the investigations - simply pull out 
results and build them into a system ... It lies in the essence of 
phenomenological investigations that they ... must in each case be repeated 
and rehearsed anew. 12 
Now the notion of discontinuity that Benjamin takes to be exemplary of 
phenomenological thinking makes a rather more celebrated appearance shortly 
before the remarks of this review, in the Epistemo -critical Foreword to the Origin of 
the German Mourning Play, where the 'breakthrough' with respect to 'the logic of the 
system' is, of course, his own. 13 Once again, moreover, the breakthrough turns on the 
character that is determined for truth. On what Benjamin will call das Sein der 
Wahrheit and so, by implication, on ihr gemdl3e Verhalten, the stance or comportment 
that truth entails. 140n the separation, constructed and developed in the ensuing 
pages of the Foreword, 'of truth from the contexture of knowing [Zusammenhatzge 
des Erkennensl. 115 On the claim, whose far-reaching implications those pages will 
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begin to explore, that 'the object of knowledge ... is not truth [der Gegenstand der 
Erkenntnis ... ist nicht die Wahrheit]. '16 
The claim here is clearly the same, then, as the one considered in the previous 
chapter with respect to Heidegger. In contrast to Heidegger's challenge to the location 
of the phenomenon of truth in the act of knowing, however, which rests, as we have 
seen, on an analytical regression from propositional proposItIonal truth 
(Satzwahrheit) to intuitive truth (Anschauungs-wahrheit) to, finally, its more original 
character as disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), Benjamin's argument is largely 
assertoric and low key, and develops rather by way of an attention to what he terms 
the form or method of philosophical projects. 17 These are not, he suspects, incidental 
to such projects. Nor are they simply part of their didactic furnishings. Method, in 
other words, is not mathesis. Rather, it is something eigen, something proper or 
specific to philosophy as such. It is, in Benjamin's terms, an esoterism (eine Esoterik 
eignet) that philosophy'is powerless to discard ..., that it has rightly to acknowledge. '18 
Clearly, therefore, method cannot be thought in terms of a simple preference or 
choice but only, adopting once more the closing formulations of Husserl's Logos 
article, in terms of something preindicated (vorgezeichneten) by the problems or 
issues themselves. 
What, then, is the basic problem or issue of philosophy? That is, in what 
problem or issue does Benjamin find philosophy to be preindicated? In the Foreword 
to the Origin of the German Mourning Play, the basic issue for philosophy is the 
question of truth. Not, therefore, in the sense that philosophy would have been 
already determined or established and only then brought to bear on the question of 
truth; rather, the way in which that question is itself determined would determine the 
97 
nature - the form or method - of the project of philosophy as such. It is in this 
connection that the rather puzzling references made throughout the Foreword to 'the 
method of truth' or to 'the method of knowledge' - rather than to, say, the method of 
Plato or Leibniz, or to the method of phenomenology or mathematics, etc. - need to be 
understood. 'If philosophy is to hold true to the law of its form, ' Benjamin declares 
accordingly, 'not as the mediated guide to knowing [vermitte1nde Atileitung zimi 
Erkennen] but as the presentation of truth [Darstellung der Wahrheit], then the 
exercise of this form, and not its anticipation in the system, will have to be accorded 
its due importance. '19 
The principle point that needs to be retained here, therefore, is that 
Benjamin's ostensibly methodological reflections will have largely plzilosophical 
significance with regard to the determination of truth. 
What, then, is the method of truth? What is ihr gemdl3e Verhalten? What is the 
stance or comportment appropriate to truth? Before undertaking to address this 
question, it is important to note that the reference here to the notion of compoi-tment 
with respect to truth is fundamentally different to that with which Husserl had 
undertaken to demonstrate the possibility of the accordance of a true statement with 
the thing about which the statement is made. It will be recalled from the previous 
chapter that it is only because the statement is also a comporting (Verhalten) toward 
the thing that it can first accord with it. It will be recalled, further, that it is only in the 
referral of such comportment to its ground, what he calls the openness of 
comportment (Offenstdndigkeit des Verhaltens) by which things are such-as (so-wle) 
they are, that Heidegger comes, in the lecture 'On the Essence of Truth, ' to identify 
the essence of truth as the freedom of disclosive letting beings be (entbergende 
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Seinlassen des Seinden). 20With regard to the remarks of the Foreword, however, the 
point rather concerns the manner in which the question of truth is itself to be 
addressed; that is, it is not a matter of the conditions of possibility of truth, what 
Heidegger's marginal note terms the 'ground of the making-possible' of truth, 21 but of 
what is would be required of the analysis in order that truth show itself as tritth. 
What, then, is the method of truth? Benjamin begins with an opposition. To 
the syncretism of the systematic web, which undertakes 'to ensnare truth ... as 
though [als] it were something which flew in from outside, ' he counterposes the 
( alternative philosophical form' of the scholastic tractatus, a form whose priticiple 
characteristic he declares to be 'the renunciation of the uninterrupted course of intent 
[Intention]. 122 In Frangoise Proust's elegant expression, the tractatlis is le tralte 
eclate. 23 Needless to say, the character of the opposition is significant, and amounts to 
something like a change of register. Counterposing the determination of truth proper 
to the system to that proper to the tractatus, Benjamin moves from a position in 
which truth is, to use the formulation of his earlier Kant notes, an activity (Tdtigkeit) 
done to something, to one in which truth is seen as ein tranzendentales 
Intransitivum. 24 Leaving this significance momentarily to one side, let us merely note 
that in the Foreword, just as in the review of Dacque's lecture, discontinuity is 
mobilised as a mark of method: 
Presentation is the embodiment of its method. Method is digression. 
Presentation as digression [Darstellung als Umweg] - such is, then, the 
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methodological character of the treatise ... Thinking starts t1relessh, anew, 
returning in roundabout fashion to the thing itself [die Sache selbst]. 25 
It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that when Benjamin returns in the 
Foreword to the notion of discontinuity he does so under the aegis of a remark taken 
from an essay by one Jean Hering, a student of Husserl, published in the Jahrbiich 
für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung of the previous year. Turning 
once again to the determination of truth as the relation of essences, a relation now 
described by the term resonant (tdnende), 26 Benjamin declares the multiplicity 
(Vielheit) of these relations such as to admit of enumeration (es ist zdhlbar). Such 
essence, Hering suggests in the passage cited by Benjamin, 
lead a life distinct toto coelo from that of objects and their conditions; the 
existence of such essences does not allow of being forced dialectically by the 
selection and addition of some random ... complex which we may encounter in 
an object; rather is their number enumerable [gezdhlt] and each of these must 
be sought on the site of its worldly connections [ihr zukommenden Orte ihrer 
Welt] until one finds it, like a rocher de bronze, or until the hope of its 
existence has been shown to be illusory. 27 
To which Benjamin adds: 
Ignorance of this discontinuous finitude of truth [ihrer 
diskoittinulerlicheri 
Endlichkeit] has often frustrated energetic attempts at a renewal of the 
100 
doctrine of Ideas, most recently those of the later Romantics. In their 
speculations, the linguistic character of truth is replaced by that of a reflexive 
consciousness. 28 
If the affirmative treatment of intentionality made in Herring's essay - which, as the 
citation suggests, comprises an effective rebuke to the attempt to hitch the 
constituting consciousness of phenomenology, the intentional givenness of an object 
to consciousness, to the ethos of an objective construction - runs almost exactly 
counter to the claims of the Foreword, Benjamin chooses to elide this fact, focussing 
instead on the notion of 'discontinuous finitude' in order to give expression to what he 
is calling truth. 
It is in precisely this connection, then, that I shall want to focus on Benjamin's 
exploration of the filial relation of philosophy to art announced in the epigraph to this 
chapter. As the foregoing remarks suggest, the concern here will be less with the 
manner in which Benjamin undertakes to treat art as a particular object of 
philosophical scrutiny, than on the manner in which philosophy itself comes to be 
constituted and thematised through that relation. 
In doing so I shall want to deal, first of all, with the issue of style: with what a 
fragment of the late 1920s refers to as the 'rope' over which thinking must leap if it is 
'to advance into the realm of writing-129 Indeed, to the extent that the opening words 
of the Foreword announce the concern there as being what is proper, elgen, to 
philosophical writing, the notion of style is almost unavoidable. To 
begin with, 
however, I shall want to focus not Benjamin, but on Kant. Following a 
brief discussion 
of the central points of Benjamin's early Kantdeutung, the 1917 essay 
'On the 
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Program for the Coming Philosophy, ' I will come back to the Foreword and to the 
notion of style in order to explore further Benjamin's account there of the method of 
truth. 
I 
Writing in 1917 of the need 'to preserve what is essential' in Kant's work, of the need 
to'ground' the system of Critical philosophy 'anew, ' Benjamin declares his conviction 
that 'Kant's prose itself exhibits [darstellt] a limes of high artistic prose. '30 Although a 
more considered statement of this limit goes unarticulated by Benjamin, the 
importance he accords to it does not. In a move that is presumably intended to shore 
up this conviction concerning the artistic limits established by the Critical text, he 
makes appeal to its letter: 'Whoever does not feel in Kant the striving after the 
thought of doctrine [Lehre] itself, and whoever does not grasp his work with the 
utmost reverence for its letter as a tradendum, as something to be handed on, ' this 
person, Benjamin insists, 'knows nothing of philosophy. 131 For this reason alone, he 
concludes, 
all faulting of Kant's philosophical style is pure philistinism and profane chatter 
[profanes Geschwdtz]. It is quite true that in great scientific systems art must 
also be included (and vice versa), and thus it is also my conviction that Kant's 
prose itself exhibits a limes of high artistic prose. 32 
Suffice it to say, it would be hard to agree unqualified with the sort of assessment 
being made here by Benjamin. Indeed, one of the first to challenge any such claim. 
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and by implication to stand trial on the charge of 'chatter' that Benjamin reserves for 
the wretched class of reader who would draw attention to deficiencies in the Critical 
style, was Kant himself. 33 
Habitually regarded as exemplary in this respect are the closing remarks of the 
Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Having taken the 
opportunity to retrace his steps along the 'thorny paths' of his work, Kant declares 
himself entirely satisfied as to 'the propositions themselves and their grounds of 
proofs ..., the system. 134 Indeed, once Kant's own characterisation of the Critique is 
granted, it could hardly be otherwise. The inventory of all that is possessed through 
pure reason, the system is in fact reason itself. Hence it is on the basis of the unity of 
reason - 'so perfect a unity, ' Kant remarks, 'that if its principle were insufficient for 
even a single one of the questions that are set for it by its own nature, then this might 
as well be discarded since it would also then not be able to answer any other questions 
with complete reliability'35 - that the security of the system can be assured. As one 
might expect, however, things are far from perfect, and Kant is candid in allowing 
that'as to the manner of its presentation [Darstellung], much remains to be done. '36 
Still, the fact that misunderstandings and obscurities are 'hardly to be avoided' in an 
undertaking of this sort means that this is a relatively minor point of contention, one 
whose resolution can be left with impunity in the hands of those with the requisite 
'talent' for such matters, and Kant rejects accordingly any suggestion that this lapse in 
presentation might in any way compromise the systematic integrity of his labours. 
However much it may lack the necessary elegance (die erforderliche Eleganz), the 
construction of the system, once grasped as a unity (als Einheit), is assured. 37 
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Now it is to precisely this notion of system that Benjamin turns in the remarks 
cited above in order to justify his claims for Kant's philosophical style. It is the 
systematic form of Kant's Wissenschaft that generates and sustains the conviction 
that 'Kant's prose itself exhibits a limes of high artistic prose. ' Yet to the extent that 
the claim here turns on an appeal to the letter of the Critical text, on its style as it 
were, it is such as to begin to collapse the otherwise strict distinction being established 
by Kant: the distinction more formally described in the first edition Preface as that 
between discursive or logical clarity and intuitive or aesthetic clarity; that is, 
between the view of things and the procedure by which that view would be presented, 
between the Sache of philosophy and the manner of its Darstellung. 
And yet, it is not as if this distinction could ever be sustained, even by the 
Critical text itself. Indeed, the distinction can be seen already to be thoroughly in 
question in the remarks concerning the presentation of the system itself. The various 
rough patches (Unebenheiten) in the system to which Kant freely admits are 
themselves significantly brought forward as explanations of the various obscurities 
(Dunkelheit) and misunderstandings (Widerspriiche) to which the Critique has given 
rise. Significant because it is precisely such obscurities and misunderstandings that 
alone were to have established the need for a tribunal of pure reason. The broad 
strokes that open the Critical roman de la guerre are too well known to need much 
reiteration here. 38 What should be recalled, however, is the 'peculiar fate' through 
which reason is lead not only to'fall into obscurity and contradiction [Dunkelheit und 
Widerspriiche], 139 but also to a 'misunderstanding of itself [Missverstand ... init ihr 
selbst]. 40 Itis almost as though the tribunal of reason has failed in fact to rule. 
104 
I shall come back to the question of the limit apparently presented by Kant's 
prose in due course. To begin with, however, let us briefly recall just what is at issue 
in Benjamin's implicit appeal to the distinction between spirit and letter (Geist und 
Buchstab) in philosophy. Fichte, in the various introductions to the 
Wissenschaftslehre, and Schelling, in his treatise On the I, have stated this distinction 
with particular cogency. 41 Both do so, moreover, in order to meet precisely that 
challenge laid down by Kant when he invites those with a talent for lucid (lichtuollert) 
presentation to complete (vollenden) and secure the necessary elegance for the 
system of transcendental philosophy. 
Fichte's argument in the Wissenschaftslehre is by far the more sustained. 
There, and in the face of all evidence, not least of which is Kant's own testimony on 
the case, Fichte declares his own system to be none other than the Critical one. 12 
Whatever thoroughgoing independence of procedure (Darstellung) it may have as 
regards that of Kant, it is to comprise the same view of things (dieselbe Ansicht der 
Sache). 43 The claim made on behalf of the Wisselschaftslehre is a modest one, 
therefore. It is to have at last presented 'in systematic form' the system which 
4 although not actually established by Kant .... had certainly 
been envisaged by him. ' 
Fichte stresses his own 'certainty' on this point: 'everything Kant says actually 
consists of fragments and consequences of this system. ' Indeed, it is only because of 
Kant's having presupposed such a system that 'his assertions have sense and 
coherence. 144 It is this system, then, this Ansicht der Sache, already present in Kant's 
text without ever presented there as such, that the Wissenschaftslehre undertakes to 
construct. In the words of one of Fichte's most incisive readers, therefore: that work 
was to have at last provided the I systematic accomplishment and perfection of pure 
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theoretical reason as such, ' not simply by 'completing the deficiencies of the Critique' 
but by articulating 'the new intelligibility of the transcendental as such. '-1-5 
More or less the same argument can be made in respect of Schelling. Having 
briefly assessed in a note to the Form-Schrift of 1794 Fichte's 'precise characterisation' 
of the 'admirable spirit' of Critical philosophy, 46 he offers his own expression of the 
distinction in the Foreword to his treatise of the following year, On the L The aim of 
the treatise, he tells us, is 'to present [darzustellen] the results of Critical philosophy 
as they lead back to the highest principles of all knowledge. 147 And Schelling deduces 
the legitimacy of his enterprise by observing that only those who 'know the letter but 
not the spirit' of Critical philosophy could possibly hold to the view that 'the entire 
course of the Critique of Pure Reason could constitute in any instance the course of 
philosophy as science. 148 An almost identical situation emerges in his own 
Wissenschaftslehre, therefore, where despite a declaration that he 'in no way intends 
to rewrite what Kant has already written, ' Schelling nonetheless takes it upon 
himself 'to grasp what ... is needed 
if his philosophy is to hang together in itself [in 
sich selbst zusammenhdngenl. 149For Schelling as for Fichte, therefore, the appeal to 
the 'spirit' of Critical philosophy over the letter of its text involves no real criticism of 
Kant but affords instead the opportunity to rebuild the system of his work on ever 
more secure foundations. 
Now the position being argued for by Fichte and by Schelling is broadly simil,.,, ir 
to that of Benjamin's own Kantdeutung, the essay 'On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy' of 1917, which employs an identical metaphorics of rebuilding or recasting 
with respect to Kant. 'It is of the utmost importance, ' Benjamin writes, 'for the coming 
philosophy to recognise and separate those elements of Kant's system which have to 
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be taken over and tended, those which have to be rebuilt, and those which have to be 
discarded. 150 Equally, in a way that enjoys yet further analogy with the Fichtean 
characteristic, there is no question of this rebuilding being regarded as a break with 
Kant. Quite the contrary, in fact, Benjamin insisting that 'there will never be a 
shattering, a collapse of the Kantian system ..., only its concrete establishment and 
universal development [Ausbildung]. 151 
In as much as the remarks of the essay on Kant and of the letter to Scholem 
are designed to situate Benjamin's own program of research clearly within the 
compass of transcendental philosophy, certain questions ought now to be addressed. 
The question, for instance, of what it is that Benjamin proposes to 'take over' from 
Kant. Equally, the question of what it is that he proposes to rebuild. Also the question 
of what is to be discarded. What, therefore, does Benjamin understand by 
transcendental philosophy? 
Transcendental philosophy, as Kant understands it, begins when the notion of 
( object' can no longer be taken for granted. Indeed, when the fact that there are 
objects at all, that they can be given, becomes thoroughly questionable, fragw6rdig in 
the positive sense of the term. In his celebrated letter of 1772 to Marcus Herz, Kant 
inquires: 'What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call representation 
to the object? 152The question, as Alexis Philonenko remarks'53 constitutes la crise 
fondementale in the proto-critical project carefully nurtured since the inaugural 
Dissertation of 1770. With it, Kant takes his 'Copernican' turn. In its solution, he 
suspects, will lie 'the key to the whole secret of hitherto obscure metaphysics' and, 
therefore, to what he calls 'transcendental philosophy-154 
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Such is the extent of metaphysical obscurity, however, that to this question 
Kant dismisses all available responses. He rejects both the empiricist version of an 
essentially causal relation between representations and the objects that affect us, as 
well as the 'wholly absurd recourse' to the mystical archetypes of the delis ex 
machina. 55 The effect of this, however, is to leave philosophy in a decidedly 
'precarious position, ' what Philonenko calls an 'almost paroxysmal state, '56 with 
neither an earthly nor a heavenly peg on which to hang its pronouncements. 57 
By addressing the central problem raised by the question posed in the letter to 
Herz, the positive part of the Critique of Pure Reason is intended to provide a 
definitive way out of this predicament. The problem is this: how is it that pure 
concepts agree with objects that the understanding does not bring forth out of itself 
and of which it is not the effect? In other words, what needs to be explained is how 
'the understanding may formulate real principles ... with which ... experience must 
be 
in exact agreement and that nevertheless are independent of experience'? 58 It is 
precisely in respect of these difficulties, however, that the Streit der Auslegungen 
breaks oUt. 59 
On one account, the difficulty here is resolved by threading philosophy 
through the Faktum of existing sciences, specifically Euclidean geometry and 
Newton's Principia. 60 The very'fact'that the mathematical and general sciences exist 
is deemed enough to demonstrate the vacuity of all attempts at the 'empirical 
derivation' of a priori concepts from experience in the manner of Locke or Hume-61 
So when Kant declares that 'I name transcendental all knowledge that is occupied not 
so much with objects but with our a priori concepts of objects as such, ""-' the 
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Transcendental Analytic is read as little more than a subordinate expression of the 
more concrete researches of the secure sciences. Such is, of course, the account of 
Marburg neo-Kantianism. Hermann Cohen, for example, is said by Cassirer to have 
grasped what is 'essential in the transcendental method, ' namely that it begins by 
presupposing the Faktum of experience 'in order then to ask as to the possibility of 
this Faktum. 163 The portion of the Critique of Pure Reason that leads up to the 
Transcendental Deduction is therefore interpreted as a theory of experience. So in 
Cassirer's own response to the question more famously asked at Davos the previous 
year ('What does Heidegger understand by Neo-Kantianism? '): 64 
All prominent representatives of neo-Kantianism are of the same mind on at 
least one point: that the central focus of Kant's system lies in epistemology 
[Erkenntnislehre], that the 'fact' and 'possibility' of science constitutes the 
beginning and goal of Kant's problem. In the question of this problem and in it 
alone were the scientific character and primacy of Kant's doctrine to be 
grounded. 65 
It is this identification of the Faktum of experience with the Faktum of natural science 
that is held, rightly, to be a source of fundamental disagreement between Benjamin 
and the Marburg School. A withering aside in a letter of February 1918, in which 
Benjamin confesses that 'I do not know Rickert's big book, but I know all about his 
method ..., modern in the worst sense of the word, 
'66 would begin thus to bear out the 
observations of Frangoise Prost: 
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the Streit between the theory of knowledge and the existential analytic %vould I 
presuppose an excluded third: a true knowledge 'of higher experience. ' The 
Cohen-Cassirer / Heidegger duo would have excluded Benjamin .... 67 
It is the remarks of the Addendum to the 'Program' essay that provide Benjamin's 
most emphatic statement of intent in this regard: 
The source of existence [die Quelle des Daseins] lies in the totality of 
experience [der Totalitdt der Erfahrung], and only in doctrine does philosophy 
run up against an absolute, as existence, and in doing so run up against that 
continuity in the essence of experience [Kontinuitdt im Wesen der Erfahrung], 
in neglect of which the failings of neo-Kantianism are to be suspected. 68 
It is precisely this notion of the 'totality of experience' on which much of Benjamin's 
early work will turn. As far as that work is concerned, moreover, experience cannot 
be an experience of sense data and equated with the knowledge of an empirical 
object: 
It is the task of the coming philosophy to find for knowledge the sphere of total 
neutrality as regards the concepts of object and subject; in other words, it is to 
conceive the autonomous, originally proper sphere of knowledge in which 
these concepts in no way signal the relation between two metaphysical 
entities. 
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What Benjamin wants to put into question, in other words, is precisel-v the rigidif-ving. 
language of consciousness over against object used to characterise the realm of 
experience. According to his most emphatic statement of affairs: 
The more vastly and boldly the unfolding of the coming philosophy announces 
itself, the more deeply it must struggle for certainty [Gewil3heit], the criterion 
of which is systematic unity or truth [die systematische Einheit oder die 
Wahrheit]. 69 
Now the term 'systematic unity' emphasised here by Benjamin also appears in the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method, where it underwrites the procedure by which 
4 ordinary knowledge' is raised to 'the rank of a science, ' the procedure Kant calls 
architechtonic or the art of systems (die Kunst der Systeme). 70 As Kant is careful to 
point out, this 'art' ought not to be confused with a mere aggregate or accumulation of 
knowledge; rather, it should be seen as an organised unity (articulatio) that grows 
per intus susceptionem. Generative of systems, architechtonic is in fact reason itself. 71 
ii 
'The concept of philosophical style is free from paradox. 172 This remark, written almost 
a decade after the letter to Scholem , is, so 
far as I am aware, Benjamin's only other 
direct reference to the notion of philosophical style. It comes from the short section of 
the Foreword to the Origin of the German Mourning Play entitled 'Philosophical 
Beauty. ' Both the title and the few pages which it entails appear, then, to point in the 
ill 
direction of . yet another, rather less laborious consideration of the shared concerns of 
art and the presentation of philosophy. 
This time, however, all the work is done for us. Assigning the philosopher the 
position of an elevated middle (erhobene Mitte) between the scientist and the artist, 
between the conceptual ordering of the world and its metaphoric construction, 
Benjamin raises the issue of philosophical style, remarking that, 'as a concept, ' it 
remains free from paradox only to the extent that the philosopher shares with the 
artist the task of presentation (Aufgabe der Darstellung). The concept of style, m 
other words, is now all but synonymous with that of presentation: 
The scientist ... shares the philosopher's interest in closing off what is merely 
empirical, the artist shares the task of presentation. Popular opinion has placed 
the philosopher all too close to the scientist, and often to the inferior kind at 
that. Nowhere in the task of the philosopher does there appear to be a place 
for consideration of presentation. The concept of philosophical style is free 
from paradox. 73 
With respect to this double misplacement - that of the philosopher as regards his 
rightful position as an erhobene Mitte, that of presentation as regards its role in the 
Aufgabe of the philosopher - the draft version of these lines is still more emphatic: 
Popular opinion has placed the philosopher all too close to the scientist and to 
the inferior kind at that. His estrangement from the figure of the arti,, --, t finally 
reaches a point where there no longer seems to be a place for the beauty of 
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presentation in the determination of the task of the philosopher [die Schdnheit 
der Darstellung in der Bestimmung der Aufgabe des Philosophischen]. The 
point of the previous discussion was to free the concept of philosophical st. yle 
from paradox 
Thus, philosophy is essentially to involve presentation; more specifically, to the extent 
that philosophy is to constitute 'the method of truth' in contrast to 'the method of 
knowledge, ' its task lies in 'the presentation of truth. ' This involvement is violated, 
however, and the ensuing claims of philosophy to the 'postulates' of style definitively 
supplanted once the scientific arrangement (Disposition) and division (Aufteilung) of 
the world is taken to be the model of philosophical practice. Benjamin elaborates: with 
the division of the world into various regions, each one to be investigated by a 
particular science or discipline, the phenomenon of world as such - what we have 
seen Benjamin to describe variously as 'the Habitus of a lived life, 175 'the totality of 
experience, ' the 'continuity in the essence of experience"76 'the concrete totality of 
experience ..., that is, existence"77 etc. - becomes increasingly 
formalised. The 
systematic unity that was to have constituted the very sense of truth is 
epistemologically dissected into its component parts. Yet the solution is not, as the 
next section (Tivision. and Dispersal in the Concept') makes clear, the syncretic 
gathering of these disciplines: 'Such syncretic completeness has no more in common 
with truth than any other form of presentation that attempts to ascertain truth in 
mere cognitions and cognitive patterns. 178 
By contrast, the artist undertakes no such retrospective (re)construction of an 
epistemically decimated world, but offers an image (Bild) that, by virtue of it,,;, 
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metaphoric character, is always definitive. This image, nevertheless, is ak, ays a 
restricted one: 'ein kleines Bild' in the draft, 79 lein Bildchen' in the Foreword itself., 14) 
The sole aim of Benjamin's text, therefore, its Sache, is to uncover and thereby 
to resolve the 'methodological incoherence' wrought by the philosopher's 
estrangement from the artist and by the severance of presentation from its rightful 
place in the task of the philosopher. 
The Foreword begins accordingly: 
It is proper to philosophical writing [dem philosophischen Schriftum eigen] 
that, with every turn, it stands anew before the question of presentation [vor 
der Frage der Darstellung zu stehen]. 181 
The rhetorical character of this initiatory statement is famously marked. It begins 
with philosophy, with what marks out philosophical writing as being such, namely its 
standpoint with respect to the question of presentation. This standpoint is what is 
proper or peculiar (eigen) to such writing. It is what gives such writing its distinctly 
philosophical character. By beginning with the issue of presentation and with the 
standpoint of the philosophical text with respect to such presentation, the Foreword 
begins with what is most properly its own. It begins, in other words, with itself Next 
comes another self-indication: this standpoint with respect to the question of 
presentation is described as one proper to philosophical writing, rather than to what 
that writing is about. The issue here, then, is not die Sache des Denkens, that toward 
which thinking or writing (the former, remember, leaps over the 'rope' of style hi 
order 'to advance into the realm of writing') would be directed. S2 It is a matter of that 
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before which thinking or writing 'stands anew) and not of thinking or writing on the 
question of presentation, as one thinks or writes on phenomenology, for example. 
And yet, the line does precisely that. It directs itself toward the question of 
presentation as the matter that will be at issue for it. The question, then, is doubled, 
the line thematising explicitly that before which it will already have taken a stance. 
This starkly reflexive movement is finally turned back upon itself, redoubling the 
line's concern with the question of presentation. It is a matter of a writing that, 'with 
every turn, ' stands anew before the question of presentation. Benjamin uses the word 
Wendung: "turn, " "change, " but also "expression, " "turn of phrase, " thus reinscribing 
within this opening line yet another turn toward presentation. 8-3 With every turn (of 
phrase) philosophy must stand before the matter of its own turn toward the question 
of presentation. 
No less marked, however, is the draft version of this same line: 
It is proper to philosophical knowledge [der philosophischen Erkenntnis] that, 
with every turn, it stands anew before the question of presentation. 84 
The difference here could hardly be more sharply focussed. What this earlier version 
makes clear by the alteration of a single word is that the standpoint of philosophy as 
regards the question of presentation is not to be confined to the written character of 
philosophical texts alone. Standing before the question of presentation is proper not 
merely to philosophical writing but also to philosophical knowledge. 
MovIng from the 
final version to the draft has the effect of leaping over the entire 
development of the 
former, over that development that is required in order to translate the 
discourse on 
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knowledge into one on writing and on language. Situating itself on one register 
rather than the other, the draft carries out that translation instant aneous, Iv, 
drastically foreshortening the movement carried out by the final version of the 
Foreword, a movement whose terms are evoked explicitly by a remark from the essay 
'On the Program of the Coming Philosophy': 
The consciousness that philosophical knowledge was absolutely certain and a 
priori, the consciousness of that aspect of philosophy which matches 
mathematics, made Kant turn fully away from the fact that all philosophical 
knowledge has its proper expression [einzigen Ausdruck] in language 
[Sprache] and not in formulae or number. 85 
Most marked of all in the opening lines of the Foreword, therefore, is the contrast 
immediately drawn between the concept of philosophical method being advanced here 
and the mathematical pretension according to which it could be evoked inore 
geometrico, a pretension which, Benjamin suggests, signals nothing so much as the 
'total elimination of the problem of presentation. '86 He distinguishes accordingly 
between the digressive method of the philosophical tractatus and 'the coercive proof 
of mathematics, 187 a distinction all the more forcefully argued for 1n the draft as 
Benjamin states outright his rejection of any determination of philosophy as being 
legitimised through 'imitation of mathematical procedures [der Nachahmung des 
mathematischen Verfahrensl. '88 
Now in light of the remarks of the 'Program' essay cited above, it would not be 
altogether surprising were Benjamin's remarks here to be seen as having at least 
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some reference to the confession with which Kant opens the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science of 1786: '1 have in this treatise followed the 
mathematical method, if not with all rigour [alles Strengel .... then at least imitiatvely 
[den noch nachgeahmt]. 189 As indeed they do. Now on one account, these remarks are 
read as the defining statement of Benjamin's gradual disaffection with the climate of 
Critical philosophy. The Foreword, therefore, in Claude Imbert's elegant expression of 
the point, would treat accordingly of that over which Kant had passi sous sileitce, 
namely 'the permanent condition of actuality [d'effectivitel that writing ... imposes 
upon thought. '90 The insistence upon the standpoint of philosophy with respect to the 
question of presentation would thereby draw to a close the long journey that leads 
Benjamin away from K6nigsberg through Jena to Weimar: from having divined in 
Kant the very possibility of philosophy ('his system ... must last forever, ' etc. ), 91 
through disappointment at the inaccessible (unzugdng1ich) character of the proto- 
historical writings, 92 through frustration at the impossibility of finding in Kant's work 
an appropriate point of access (Zugang) to a genuinely historically conscious 
philosophy, 93 to, finally, the nomination of Kant - 'this despot' of rigourism - as 'the 
greatest opponent' of his own thinking-94 
This has proved to be a highly influential picture, both of Benjamin's reading of 
Kant and of the methodological consequences that follow from it. 95 Unfortunately, it 
is deeply misleading on several accounts: not only does it distort Kant's understanding 
of the character of philosophy, principally by obscuring the distinction made in the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method between philosophical and mathematical 
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knowledge; it also fails to do justice to the far-reaching implications of Benjamin's 
subsequent concerns with regard to the 'method of truth. ' 
What needs first of aH to be said, then, is that Kant is not, of course, entirely 
sympathetic to the mathematical pretensions of philosophy and prefigures in more 
than one place the suspicions aired by Hegel in the Science of Logic concerning the 
use of mathematical terms for expressing philosophical notions. 96 Indeed, he derides 
the attempts to use certain terms 'against the direction of mathematics' as the 
'delusion' of philosophers who expect immediate and absolute certainty from their 
concepts without ever getting involved in the bothersome labours of a transcendental 
deduction. 97Contrary to the claims of the celebrated Wolff, for example, for whom 
'the rules of mathematical method are the same as those of philosophical method, 'ý", 
Kant maintains that the method of metaphysics is not synthetic, like that of 
mathematics and geometry, but analytic or strictly conceptual. Celebrated 
pedagogical consequences follow from this, not least of which is that one cannot hope 
to learn philosophy as one might learn any one of Euclid's apodeictically certain 
propositions: 
Among all rational sciences (a priori) ... only mathematics can 
be learned, 
never philosophy (except historically); rather, as far as reason is concerned, we 
can at best only learn to philosophise. 99 
Philosophy, unlike mathematics, is not susceptible to being learnt by rote; the best 
that one can hope, indeed, is to learn to exercise the talent of reason (Talent 
der 
Vernunft). The break is not absolute, however, and Kant freely grants that 
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philosophers can legitimately maintain an interest in kinds of quantity (infinitv or 
totality, for example), and mathematicians are entitled to treat of spatial qualities like 
line and surface. To this extent, these two employments of reason have 'a common 
object. '100 The point of difference, therefore, lies in the way in which that object is 
handled. So whilst both the geometer and the transcendental philosopher can both 
indeed lay claim to the title of artist of reason (Vernunftkiinstler) - artists NN, ho., -, e 
canvas would accordingly be that of real grounds rather than purely logical ones - it is 
a matter of recognising that these grounds are formal in the one case, since they 
concern entirely pure and a priori determinations of space and time, and material or 
transcendental in the other, since they concern the existence of appearances that 
does not allow of construction. Rather more damaging to Benjamin's case, however, or 
to the case most often assigned to him, is the evocation of mathematics in the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method: 'philosophical knowledge is rational knowledge 
from concepts, mathematical knowledge that from the construction of concepts. "()' 
On this level, at least, therefore, the claims most often attributed to the 
Foreword are thus refuted. Indeed, the suggestion of the 'Program' essay that Kant 
turns away from the fact that all philosophical knowledge has 'its proper expression 
[einzigen Ausdruck] in language [Sprache] and not in formulae or number"102 turns 
out to be a futile exercise in lax reading. And yet, it is entirely likely that matters are 
not as straightforward as this might suggest. For if Benjamin is somewhat remi. --, s in 
his characterisation of the mathematical predilections of the critical philosophy, then 
this is not to say that his remarks do not have some validity. Granted, Kant InsIsts 
upon the fact that the proofs of philosophy are in fact acromatic or discurswe 
explanations 'conducted by the agency of words alone. ' Equally, however, he allows 
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that there are certain circumstances in which mathematics and philosophy may 'offer 
each other their hand. 1103 This relation is not to be consummated, however, and Kant 
stresses the decidedly filial character of the coupling involved: philosophy, he 
suggests, has every reason to hope for a 'sisterly union' with mathematics. And 
Benjamin's grasp of this is no where more securely expressed than in his traducing of 
this expression of philosophy's filial relations: 'every great work, 'reads a remark from 
the early 1920, 'has its sibling (brother or sister? ) in a philosophical sphere. "O' 
III 
Benjamin begins the fragment with the observation that the unity (die Einheit) of 
philosophy, its system (ihr System), exceeds necessarily the reach of all philosophical 
questioning. The unity of philosophy is always in excess of the infinite number of 
finite questions that can be asked of it. As such, Benjamin suggests, 'the system of 
philosophy is in no sense open to question [ist in keinem Sinne erfragbar]' since to any 
such question 'there is obviously only one answer: the system of philosophy itself. '10-5 
The remarks of these opening lines occupy a decidedly medial position, 
therefore: between the equation drawn in the 'Program' essay between systematic 
unity and truth, and the argument of the Foreword according to which while 
knowledge is 'open to question [erfragbarl, truth is not. '106 
Now leaving wholly out of account any consideration of whether this Idea is to 
be understood in the manner of Kant as a regulative one or in the manner of 
Schelling as a constitutive principle, 107 Benjamin calls this 'virtual question' 
by which 
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philosophy might be said to seek its own unity, the Ideal (das Ideal) of the 
philosophical problem. 
Nevertheless, he insists, if the conceptus cosmicus of philosophy does indeed 
remain virtual and so beyond the reach of philosophical questioning, there are certain 
actual constructs (wirkliche ... Gebilde) which, whilst belonging neither to the realm 
of questions nor to that of philosophy, have the deepest affinity (die tiefste Affiniteit) 
to this ideal. These are works of art. It is in works of art that philosophy is able to 
discover the appearance of the ideal of its problem. Philosophy - what Benjamin 
terms Critique - becomes, therefore, a matter of allowing this ideal to appear. And 
since it is a matter, then, of inquiring after its own ideal as it appears in works of art, 
this becomes, moreover, 'the highest philosophical problem. 1108 
Suffice it to say that 'art' has in this connection precisely that sense determined 
for it in the final sections of Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism. It will be 
recalled that, with respect to the infinite and opposed aspects of philosophy, Schelling 
declares art to be the thing that 'achieves the impossible' by resolving (aufzuheben) 
this infinite opposition in a finite product. It is, in Gunter Figal's felitous expression, 
'the happy medium of oppositionality. '109 Further, this resolution is even constitutive 
of art itself, Schelling insisting that 'there is no work of art which does not present, 
either immediately or through reflection, an infinite. ' It is, he continues, in art alone 
that the productive power of such resolution can be unveiled (enthdllen). Art, as the 
medium of this unveiling, becomes thus 'the only true and external organ and 
document of philosophy, which always and continuously documents what philosophy 
cannot present externally [dul3erlich nicht darstellen kann]. ' In a formulation more 
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familiarly Schellingian: 'aesthetic intuition' is thus 'merely intellectual intuition 
become objective. ' 
Now depending rather heavily on Schelling's presentation of the 'wonder' and 
the 'riddle' of art, Benjamin goes on to describe the reciprocal relation of art to 
philosophy by way of the following scenario, one which, he candidly acknowledges, 
relies much on its self-evident 'sentimentality': 
Suppose one meets a young man who is handsome and attractive, but who 
appears to be hiding a secret [ein Geheimnis ... zu bergen scheint] within him. 
It would be ungentle and reprehensible to press him on it, to snatch it from 
him. Yet it is perhaps allowable to inquire whether he has any siblings in order 
to see whether their behaviour might not in some way explain the secretive 
character [geheimnisvolle Wesen] of the stranger. In the same way does the 
true critic inquire after the siblings of the work of art. And every true work 
has its sibling (brother or sister? ) in a philosophical sphere. 110 
The revised version of these lines, from the essay on Goethe's Elective Affittities, is 
nearly identical. What is added brings Benjamin's Position even closer to that of 
Schelling: 
Suppose one meets a young man who is handsome and attractive but closed 
off, because he carries a secret within him. It would be reprehensible to want 
to press him on it. Yet it is perhaps allowable to inquire whether 
he has any 
siblings and so to see whether their nature might in some way explain 
the 
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puzzling nature [Rdtselhafte] of the stranger. In the same way does the Critic 
inquire after the siblings of the work of art. And every true work has its sibling 
in the realm of philosophy. After all, it is in precisely these figures that the 
ideal of its problem appears [erscheint]. "' 
The point that needs to be retained from these lines is this: philosophy is the sibling of 
art. The riddle (Rdtseo or the secret (Geheimnis) carried by the work of art is that of 
philosophy, of the ideal of its problem, itself. The excavation of this secret is the work 
of Critique. As such, Critique is not merely a matter of engagement with the work of 
art, it is also and more fundamentally one of philosophy's engagement with its own 
ideal. 
What, then, of the secret? What does it mean for Benjamin to say that the 
secret of art is the Ideal of philosophy? Why is it the secret alone that opens onto the 
essence of art (dem Wesen der Kunst)? 112 Why is it only in presenting itself as a secret 
(als Geheimnis sich darstellte) that the work of art gives itself to be understood as 
such? '13 
Secrecy always implies a certain injunction on communication. The secret says: 
You shall not communicate ... ; it says: You shall not 
disclose the secret .... Is such an 
injunction operative here? Benjamin himself appears to concede as much since, a feý, v 
sentences later, he notes that Critique must stop short of revealing the secret, 4as if in 
awe of the work. 1114And what stops Critique short is, of course, the secret itself. 
Inasmuch as Benjamin describes this secret as the truth content of the work of 
art, one can note, then, that the secret marks the truth of the work itself. This is 
its 
secret. And yet, although it is with the secret of the work alone that the truth of the 
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work appears, it cannot, Benjamin insists, be a matter of turning this appearance, this 
Erscheinung, into a Bestand, a subsistent reality: 
the truth in a work does not make itself known as something open to question 
[als erfragt], but as something required [als erfordert]. If, therefore, it can be 
said that all beauty refers [beziehe sich] in some way to the true and that its 
virtual place in philosophy can be determined, then in every true work of art 
an appearance of the Ideal of the problem can be found. 115 
Critique does not disclose the secret as such; rather, it discloses the fact that there can 
- and, for the work, that there must - be a secret. 
The secret of the work, then, is its truth. So literally does Benjamin hold to this 
that the remainder of his remarks serve to do no more than draw out the latent 
tautology of this expression. For it is not a matter of trying to secure the secret in 
order then to grasp the truth of the work. The point is not to disclose or to show the 
secret, but to grasp the secret as truth. In the work, truth appears as the secret. In 
Benjamin's more precise formulation: es scheint. It shines. 
This determination of the work of art in terms of the relation of truth to 
Schein prompts Benjamin to ask about the relation of beauty to Schein. If he draws 
here on the language through which aesthetics has traditionally spoken, namely the 
language of beauty, he does so primarily in order to displace it. For it is not a matter of 
a disclosure of the truth behind such appearance. Rather, for Benjamin beauty marks- 
the inseparability of truth from its Schein. Shining forth in the work of art, truth 
appears as beautiful: 'the ground of the being of the beautiful [Seinsgrund 
der 
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Schdnheit] lies in the secret. 1116 And this secrecy, this veiling, is also the place of the 
Schein of truth - that is, of the beautiful. 'The beautiful is neither the appearance nor 
the veil [Nicht Schein, nicht HdIle ... ist die Schdnheit] for something else. It i. -, not 
appearance [Erscheinung] but essence [Wesen] throughout, one that remains 
essential only when being a veiling. 1117 
If the Critique of a work of art is thus the excavation of the beautiful secret of 
the work, then it is not a matter of unveiling that secret as such. Unveiled, truth 
would not shine. It would be unscheinbar. It is a matter instead of allowing Critique to 
raise itself to a true intuition of the beautiful (wahren Anschauung des Sch6nes), that 
is, to 'the intuition of the beautiful as secret. 1118 Critique cannot, therefore, be a 
matter of raising the veil; rather, it is a matter of recognising that in the veiled Scheitz 
of the beauutiful, truth stands forth. 'Thus, with respect to aU beauty, the idea of 
unveiling [der Idee der Enthifflung] becomes that of non-unveilability [der 
Unenthiillbarkeit. 1'119 This is the idea of art Critique. 
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Notes 
1 'Jeder große Werk hat sein Geschwister (Bruder order Schwester? ) in einer 
philosophischen Sphäre' (GS 13: 835). 
GS IV 1: 536. Die Literarische Welt was one of Berlin's numerous weeklY periodIcals and, 
in the eight years following his failure to habilitate, provided Benjamin with a mtich 
needed source of income and an outlet for his work. The review of Dacqu6's Lessing 
Lecture, 'A Crisis in Darwinism? ' was published in the issue dated 12 April 1929. On 
Benjamin's involvement with the journal, see Momme Brodersen, Walter Benjamin: A 
Biography (London: Verso, 1996), 158-62. 
GS IV 1: 536. 
Such antipathy is presumably aduced on the basis of the well-documented and rather ill- 
informed hostility to Heidegger. Although Benjamin offers nothing in the way of a 
systematic reading of Husserl's work, it does appear that he had at least a degree of 
familiarity with it. And although Adorno's edition of the Briefe endeavours to removes all 
but one of Benjamin's references to the father of phenomenology, a rather less 
bowdlerising approach does indeed begin to bear out a remark from a c. v. of 1928, in 
which Benjamin stresses the importance of 'the philosophy of Husserl and the Marburg 
school' to his own intellectual itinerary (GS IV 1: 218). So, in addition to early readings of 
the Logos article of 1911 and the first volume of the Ideas attested in letters of 1913, 
1915 and 1915 (Briefe 1: 144,302,410), Benjamin also shows familiarity with the 
principle organ of Husserl's work, the Jahrbuch ffir Philosophie und phdnomenologische 
Forschung, the Foreword to the Origin of the German Mourning Play citing at length an 
essay published in the issue of 1921 (cf. GS 1 1: 218; Or 37-8). And although Benjamin 
nowhere aligns his own researches with those of phenomenology, the 1918 essay 'On the 
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Program of the Coming Philosophy' does suggest that it is only on the basis of 'the maliv 
problems raised by phenomenology' that one might begin to elucidate the 'pure 
transcendental consciousness' (GS 11 2: 163; SW 1: 104) which constitues the overriding 
concern of that essay. So, too, in the Habilitationsschrift, where the discussion of mood., 
which brings the central section of that work to a close will be cast explicitly by 
Benjamin in the guise of a 'phenomenology' (GS 1 1: 318; Or 139). See, finallý-, the 
numerous references to Husserl in the indexes provided by the editors of the Gesanuitelte 
Briefe. For considerations of the various philosophical influences on Benjamin, see 
Franqoise Proust, L'histoire a contretemps: Le temps historique chez Walter Benjamin 
(Paris: cerf, 1994), 10-14,15-19 and, more briefly, Claude Imbert, Te pr6sent et 
I'histoire' in Wismann (ed. ), Walter Benjamin et Paris, 743-92 (748-51 and 749 note 
13). To Proust's careful exploration of Benjamin's medial position viz. -A-viz. the 
Kantstreit between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, one might contrast Peter 
Fenves' unfounded assertion that Benjamin's work as a whole affords a thoroughgoing 
and sustained engagement with phenomenology; 'The Genesis of Judgement' in David 
Ferris (ed. ), Walter Benjamin: Theoretical Questions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996), 75-92. When Fenves writes that 'the often cited remark "truth is the death of 
intention" does no differ so radically from Husserl's conception of truth as the fulfillment 
of intention' (ibid., 223 note 3), he conflates what is, by Benjamin's own lights, the 
purely methodological concept of Intention which has the sense of systematic mediation 
or posession, with Husserl's analytic concept of die Intentionalltdt as the structure of 
lived experience. The overstatement of his subsequent claim that the Foreword to the 
Origin of the German Mourning Play constitutes Benjamin's attempt 'to displace and 
reinscribe the methodological implications of discrete phenomenological research into 
"ideas" or essences... (ibid. 223 note 3) pales into insignificance, however, wheii 
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compared with his attempt to rewrite the juvenile essay of 1914 on Hblderlin as a 
translation" of the phenomenological concept of noema ... 1nto the poetological concept 
of das Gedichtete' (ibid. ). 'Benjamin's reading of H61derlin proceeds, ' so Fenves claims, 'to 
demonstrate the thoroughgoing permeation of the Kantian forms of Uituition (space- 
time) with one another, and, once bound together, with das Geistige, the end result of 
which is an intuitional - intellectual network so tightly bound up with itself that, as a 
unity, it realises das Gedichtete .... H61derlin's poetic process thus arrives at a Gedicht 
('Blbdigkeit') that fulfills das Gedichtete. The poem is, to use the language of Husserlian 
phenomenology, the fulfillment of its noema; it is, in other words, true' (ibid., 227-8 note 
13). That the essay demonstrates nothing of the sort goes, I think, without saying. At 
the other extreme, see Rolf Tiedemann's attempt, carried out under the supervision of 
Adorno, to draw an thoroughgoing distinction between Benjamin and 'the intentions of 
Husserlian phenomenology and its pure and simple description of an "ontological realm 
of absolute origins ... ; Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins (Frankfürt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1973), 16. Compare, moreover, Adorno's strange assertion that 
the Epistemo- Critical Foreword to the Origin of the German Mourning Play constitues a 
realisation of the 'unfulfilled promise' of phenomenology; Uber Walter Beillambi: 
Aufsdtze, Artikel, Briefe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 35ff.. 
Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, op. eit., 61. Husserl's emphasls. 
Ibid., 60. 
Ibid., 61. 
8 The young phenomenologist is, of course, Heidegger, the remark coming froin the 
discussion of rigour undertaken in the 1919 lecture course The Idea of Philosophy a? zd the 
Problem of Worldviews (GA 56/7: 110). Heidegger's apparent opposition to the conceptual 
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system is sustained well beyond this and other early Freiburg courses (see, for example, 
GA 58 §2). In Being and Time, for instance, he aduces the system as one instance of 'the 
various ways in which phenomena can be covered up [m6glichen Verdecktheltl' (, SZ 36). 
Compare Husserl's remarks on 'the "system... of phenomenology; Philosophie als strerige 
Wissenschaft, op. cit., 5-6. 
GS V 2: 1038. The notes in question are the first of those written for projected Arcades 
Work. For Heidegger's remarks, see GA 56/57: 116. 
10 GS IV 1: 536. 
11 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968) 11 1: 122. 
Compare the definition of Emmanuel Levinas: 'Truth is an adequation of thought, as a 
purely signifying intention, to an object given in intuition, an intuition that grasps an 
object that is present in all its concrete reality, "in the flesh ... ; The Theory of Intuition in 
Husserl's Phenomenology, translated by Andre Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1995), 134-5. 
12 GA 20: 32-3. Emphasis mine. 
13 GS I 1: 213; Or 33. 
14 GS 1 1: 216; Or 36. 
15 GS 1 1: 210; Or 30. 
16 GS 1 1: 216; Or 36. Emphasis mine. 
17 With regard to this assertoric character, there is some truth in 
Andrew Bowie'. -; 
suggestion that 'when [Benjamin] revised the original version 
(he] excluded some of the 
explanatory material'; From Romanticism to 
Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German 
Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1997), 218. Even the draft, however, the argument 
proceeds largely by way of assertion, Benjamin not actually carrying out 
the analyses 
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but only, identifying their central terms, refernng to their results. It is presumably in 
this regard that one needs to read Benjamin's confession in a letter to Scholem of 19 
February 1925 that 'the Foreword is unmitigated chutzpah' (Briefe IL 422), as well as 
the now famous responses that it solicited from its examiners: 'the author's 
incomprehensible means of expression ... must be seen as betokening a lack of objective 
clarity' (Hans Cornelius), and from its reviewers: the approach to the work is barred 
the'seven seals of the Epistem o -critical Foreword' (J. M. Lange); the citations are taken 
from Broderson, Walter Benjamin, op. cit., 149,150. 
18 GS 1 1: 207; Or 27-8. 
19 GS 1 1: 208; Or 28. The draft of this line reads: 'not as the mediated guide to the 
knowing of truth [vermittelnde Anleitung zum Erkennen der Wahrheit] ... ' (GS 13: 925). 
20 See chapter 1,63-5, above. 
21 GA 9: 177 note a. The remark is appended to the word Wesen in the first line of the 
essay (BW 115). 
22 GS 1 1: 208; Or 28. Cf. GS 1 3: 925, for the draft version of these remarks. For a 
suggestive meditation on the underlying consequences of Benjamin's turn to the notion of 
treatise, see Proust, L'Histoire a contretemps, op. cit., 163-72. 
23 Proust, L'Histoire a contretemps, op. cit., 166. 
24 GS IV 1: 43. 
25 GS I 1: 208; Or 28. It is the contrast of the Umweg of Benjamin's text to the Weg of 
Heidegger that provides the impetus for the account of Ian Lyne's The Temporallh, of 
Language, op. cit. - 
26 Although the connection is not made by Benjamin, the context of the 'lingulstic character 
[sprachlichen Charakters]' of truth (GS 1 1: 218; Or 38) means that it is worth recalling 
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here the definition of 'tone' given by Kant in §53 of the Critique of Judgement as an 
affective capacity belonging to 'every expression of language Ueder Ausdruck der Sprache]' 
(Ak V: 328. Emphasis mine). 
27 Jean Hering, 'Bemurkungen über das Wesen, der Wesenheit, und die Idee, ' Jahrbiich für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 4 (1921), 495-543 (522); eited GS I 1: 218; 
Or 37-8. 
28 GS I 1: 218; Or 38. 
29 GS IV 1: 203. 
30 Letter to Gerhard Scholem of 22 October 1917 (Briefe 1: 390). 
31 Briefe 1: 389. Benjamin's emphasis. It is presumably remarks such as this which lead 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe to the following conclusion: 'For Benjamin .... Kant is the 
name for the project of philosophy as such, ' a conclusion which Lacoue-Labarthe extends 
in the suggestive direction of 'a sort of repetition (before the Heideggerian letter) of Kant 
in which the whole of Benjamin's work is situated'; 'Avant-propos' to Walter 
Benjamin, Le Concept de critique esthetique dans le romantisme allemand, translated by 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Anne-Marie Lang (Paris: Flammarion, 1986), 7-24 (17, 
16). Compare the astonishing claim of Beatrice Hanssen, however, made on the basis of 
the remarks of this letter, that 'Benjamin's position is best characterised in his own 
words, as an attempt to disregard the letter or minutiae of Kant's writings', Walter 
Benjamin's Other History, op. cit., 27. Emphasis mine. 
32 Briefe 1: 389-90. It is important to bear in mind the considerable importance that the 
word "chatter" will assume in Benjamin's work. See, for example, the remarks of the 
contemporaneous fragment 'On Language as Such and on Human Language, ' an early 
draft of the concluding pages of the Origin of the German Mourning Play. Benjamin 
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writes in the draft of 'the profound sense in which Kierkegaard grasps the %vord 
"chatter"' (GS 111: 152; SW 1: 71), in the Habilitationsschrift of "'chatter... in the profound 
sense in which Kierkegaard grasps the word' (GS 1 1: 407; Or 233). As the editors of the 
Gesammelte Schriften point out (GS 11 3: 939), Benjamin probably drew the term from 
Theodor Haecker's partial translation of Two Ages as Kritik der Gegenwart (Basel: Hess, 
1914), where Kierkegaard's word snak (chatter or bavardage) is indeed translated as 
Geschwdtz. For an excellent discussion of the far reacing influence of Haecker's 
translation on the German thought of the Twentieth century, see Allan Janik, 'Haecker, 
Kierkegaard, and the Early Brenner' in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two 
Agges, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon: Alabama University Press, 1984), 189-222. With 
respect to Benjamin's concern here with the 'letter' of Kant's text, the following remarks, 
in which Kierkegaard chastises the move by one Thomasine Gyllembourg to preface her 
novel A Story of Everyday Life with her own 'review, ' present themselves as exemplary: 'I 
wish the author had not done it .... In my opinion the book has been harmed by this 
preface precisely because it can prompt rash and impulsive people and loose tongues to 
say: "Is that it? " "The whole thing can be said in one page. " It is certainly true that 
what is said by a chatty person [snaksomt Meneskel or a sassy, degenerate child makes 
no difference whatsoever, but when it concerns a book by a reputable, distinguished, 
and established figure in literature, something else is manifestly more desirable 
Soren Kierkegaard, Two Ages, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 60. The point here is that the addition of its 
own 'review' renders the book redundant and, rather than promoting reading, fosters 
4 chatter. ' On the extent of Kierkegaard's use of the term "chatter, " see Peter Fenves, 
"Chatter": Langauge and History in Kierkegaard (Stanford: Stanford Universit), Press, 
1993), and, in particular, the final chapter, 'Notifying the Authorities, 
' which treats of 
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Two Ages. It is worth noting, however, that Benjamin nowhere mentions a reading of 
Two Ages and, given the context of his remarks in both the draft fragment and the 
Habilitationsschrift - the Fall as the move from 'immediacy (Untnittelbarkeit) in 
communication [der Mitteilung]' into 'the abyss of the mediacy of all communication [der 
Mittelbarkeit aller Mitteilung] .... into the abyss of chatter' (GS Il 1: 154; SW 1: 72) - it is 
more compelling to read them as a supplement to The Concept of Anxiety, a work to 
which Benjamin does refer (Briefe L 148), and to Kierkegaard's account there of the Fall 
as the 'annulment of immediacy' (the logical analogue, he says, of innocence in the 
ethical sphere) and the emergence of 'the enigmatic word [gaadefuldt Ord]' in 'the 
amiguity [Tvetydighed] of anxiety'; The Concept of Anxiety, translated by Reidar Thomte 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 37,44,45. That Benjamin probably 
does have in mind ... chatter" in the profound sense in which Kierkegaard grasps the 
word' whilst writing of Kant in the letter to Scholem is suggested by the fact that, from 
1913, he was to have set the Danish philosopher alongside the Critical one, noting in a 
letter to Carla Seligson that 'whenever a few pages of Kant had tired me out, I fled to 
Kierkegaard, ' moving 'as no normal man can, ' between the Groundlaying for the 
Metaphysics of Morals and EitherlOr over the course of a few weeks (Briefe L 92). One 
final point of reference in the context of an inquiry into the affiliation of philosophy and 
art expressed by the epigraph to this chapter, comes in 'Kierkegaard: the End of 
Philosophical Idealism, ' Benjamin's review of Adorno's Habilitationsschrift (GS 111 1: 
380-3). Although Benjamin does not say as much, it is hard not to read this review as a 
commentary on and re-statement of the Benjamininan formulation of the opening line of 
Adono's essay: 'If one attempts to understand the writings of philosophers as literature 
then one has missed their truth content [Wahrheitsgehalt]'; Theodor W. Adorno, 
Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Asthetischen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 9. In 
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his review, Benjamin remarks Kierkegaard's 'revelation' of the 'mythical elements' of 
German Idealism, a revelation he locates not in the philosopher's overt theses but in 
'the hermaphrodite character of his literary appearance, which seems so often to turn his 
works into bastards of poetry and knowledge' (GS 111 1: 381). On this review and on the 
dependency on Benjamin's work of Adorno's book, see Peter Fenves, 'Image and Chatter: 
Adorno's Construction of Kierkegaard, ' Diacritics 22: 1 (1992), 100-14 (110), and Reiner 
Rochlitz, 'Le meilleur disciple de Walter Benjamin, ' Critique 582 (1995), 819-35 
(820-2). 
33 See the remarks of the second edition Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason: 'a talent for 
pelucid presentation' is 'something I am conscious of not having myself (KrV B x1iii). 
Compare also the remarks of Lewis White Beck: 'Kant's style is not to everyone's liking, 
not even to his own. But few men have had juster estimates of their own style than 
Kant had of his ... '; A 
Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1963), 3. For a more considered account of the vexed issue of 
"Kant's style, " see Jean-Luc Nancy, Le discours de la syncope: L Logodaedalus (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1976). Nancy's concern in this work is less with the style of a philosophical 
writing per se, than with the rupture (1a syncope) which the issue of style - and so of 
Darstellung (Nancy's own equation) - introduces into philosophy once philosophy itself 
comes to be seen as 'a certain how [comment] of presentation': 'There thus comes about 
a moment when philosophical orthography can no longer certify, authorise, or 
authenticate itself in any way - but when philosophy designates, implicates, and 
disavows itself through what will very quickly become the modern notion - and so one 
exterior to philosophy - of "literature. " This is the moment of 
Kant. ' It is on the basis of 
Kant alone, Nancy concludes, therefore, 'that the express 
distinction ... 
between 
philosophy and literature becomes possible and necessary' 
(ibid... 26). Geoffrey 
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Bennington's formidable essay Te la fictions transcendentale' in Michel Lisse (ed. ), 
Passions de la litterature: Avec Jacques Derrida (Paris: Galil6e, 1996), 141-160, extends 
and complements Nancy's analyses in order to show how it is precisely when Kant 
opens 'the celebrated and obscure ... distinction between limit and border. between 
Grenze and Schranke' (ibid., 141), that the frontier between literature and philosophN 
breaks down: 'wherever there is a frontier .... or perhaps wherever there is a thought of 
the frontier, there is something like literature' (ibid., 142). In similar vein, although less 
convincingly, Peter Fenves metaphoric account, A Perculiar Fate: Metaphysics and World 
History in Kant (Ithacca: Cornell University Press, 1991), reads the Critical text in terms 
not of a 'securing of fundamental positions' but of 'their illustrative presentation' (ibid., 
2), a presentation which, he suggests, always exceeds the positions it is intended to 
secure. Equally important for what I shall want to argue viz. -A-viz. Benjamin and Kant 
is Michel Foucault's suggestion that 'la critique kantienne marque ... le retrait du savoir 
et de la pensee hors de 1'espace de la representation'; Les Mots et les choses (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1966), 255. As both context and Foucaults own contemporaneous 
translations - of, most importantly, Kant's Anthropology - attest, la r9presentation is 
here to be read as Darstellung. See, finally, the remarks of Paul de Man's 
Thenomenality and Materiality in Kant' in Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1996), 70-90, where attention is drawn to 
'how decisively determining the play of the letter and of the syllable, the way of saying 
(Art des Sagens) as opposed to what is being said (das Gesagte) - to quote Walter 
Benjamin - is in this most unconspicuous of stylists' 
(ibid., 89). As I hope to show, it is 
precisely this opposition, one which comes into play only at the very close of 
de Nlan's 
otherwise extraordinarily insightful essay, that becomes properly 
fragiviirdig in 
Benjamin's text. 
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34 KrVB xxxvii. 
35 KrVA xiii. 
36 KrV B xxxviii. Kant's emphasis. 
37 KrVB xliv. 
38 The characterisation is that of Jean-Frangois Lyotard, 'Judicieux dans le diff6rend, ' La 
Faculte de juger (Paris: Minuit, 1985), 195-236 (200). 
39 KrVA viii. 
40 KrV A xii. John Sallis offers a useful dual reading of this line (as misunderstanding of 
itself and misunderstanding with itself) in Spacings, op. cit., 9. 
41 The distinction, properly introduced into philosophy by Karl Reinhold in 1790, enjoyed 
far-reaching currency in the apres-Kant of German Idealism as what Rolf-Peter 
Horstmann describes as a 'relatively elegant' solution to the problem of adopting a 
stance with respect to that of Kant; Die Grenzen der Vernunft - Eine Untersuchung zu 
Zielen und Motiven des deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main: Anton Hain, 1991), 60. 
The opening chapter of Horstmann's book provides a good overview of such stances. 
42 For Kant's contestation of this identity, apparently made without having ever read the 
relevant works by Fichte, see the celebrated open letter of August 1799 where Fichte's 
work is denounced as containing 'a totally indefensible system, ' a 'fact' which leads Kant 
to declare it 'sufficient that I renounce any connection with that philosophy' (Ak XII: 
370). John Sallis' Spacings - of Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, H(ýgel 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), 25-35, offers a good account of Fichte's 
attempt to re-resent the Critical spirit. 
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43 J. G. Fichte, 'First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre' in Fichtes Werke, ed. I. H. 
Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975) 1: 420. Cited in Sallis, Spacings, op. cit., 25 aiid 
in Horstmann, Die Grenzen der Vernunft, op. eit., 61. 
44 'Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, ' ibid., 478. Cited in Sallis, Spamigs, op. 
cit., 34 and in Horstmann, Die Grenzen der Vernunft, op. cit., 62. 
45 Miklos VeW, De Schelling a Kant: Les Deux voies de rIdealisme allemand (Grenoble: 
Jer6me Millon, 1998), 320. 
46 F. W. J. Schelling, Über die Möglichkeit der Philosophie in Sämtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. 
Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta'scher, 1860) 1 1: 105 note. 
47 Schelling, Vorn Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte in menschlichen 
Wissen in Sämtliche Werke 1 1: 152. 
48 Ibid., Sdmtliche Werke 1 1: 153. 
49 Schelling, Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre in 
Sämtliche Werke 1 1: 375. 
50 GS 11 1: 159; SW 1: 101-2. 
51 Letter to Scholem of 22 October 1917 (Briefe 1: 390). 
52 Letter to Marcus Herz 21 February 1772. Ak X: 130. 
53 Alexis Philonenko, L'Oeuvre de Kant (Paris: Vrin, 1969) 1: 98. See also Ernst Cassirer's 
commentary on the letter in the opening paragraphs of his review of Heidegger's Kant 
and the Problem of Metaphysics, Kantstudien XXXVI (1931), 1-26 (1-3), and that 
provided by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood in their recent edition of the Critiqiie of Pure 
Reason, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 47-9. Kant's letter makes reference to the Dissertation which 
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fails, he suggests, to do justice to 'the obscurity of our faculty of understanding' in 
respect of experience (Ak X: 131). 
54 Ak X: 130. 
55 Ak X: 130. 
56 Philonenko, L'Oeuvre de Kant, op. cit., 98. 
57 Groundlaying for the Metaphysics of Morals Ak IV: 425. The remark on the miOlichen 
Standpunkt of philosophy is, of course, central to Heidegger's own engagement with 
Kant and is cited at crucial points throughout his work. See, for example, the conchiding 
remarks of the 1930 essay 'On the Essence of Truth' (GA 9: 199; BW 136) and of the 
lecture course of the same year On the Essence of Human Freedom (GA 31: 303), as well 
as the Davos Disputation with Cassirer (KPM 279; 175). 
58 Ak X: 131. 
59 The term is Cassirer's; see 'Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation, ' op. 
cit., 1. 
60 Ian Lyne argues persuasively for reading the systematic Umweg of the whole of 
Benjamin's work in terms of a critique of the understanding of time which follows from 
this recourse to Newtonian physics; The Temporality of Language, op. cit., chap. 3. 
Strangely enough, although this may well be an heuristic device on Lyne's part, the 
opening chapter of that work appears to endorse precisely the reading of Kant against 
which Benjamin (and, as Lyne points out, Heidegger) were reacting. What is of concern, 
in other words, is not, as Lyne holds, 'the way in which Kant's investigation of the 
it concept of the existence of a thing as such" took Newtonian science as its starting point' 
(ibid., 131, citing GS V: 34), but the way in which neo-Kantianism takes Kant's starting 
point to be that of Newtonian science. For the remarks on neo-Kantianism that fbllow, I 
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am indebted both to discussions with Ian Lyne, as well as to Alexis Philonenko',; Etcole 
de Marbourg. - Cohen, Nartorp, Cassirer (Paris: Vrin, 1989), as well as the polemical 
remarks of Jean-Luc Nancy, Tapsus judicii' in L'Imp&atif catýgorique (Pans: 
Flammarion, 1983), 35-60 (49-52). 
61 Kant, KrV B 128. 
62 Kant, KrVA 11-12; B 25. 
63 'Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger' (KPM 294,184-5). 
64 KPM 274; 171. 
65 Cassirer, Temerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation, 'op. cit., 2. 
66 Letter to Gershom Scholem of 1 February 1918 (Briefe 1: 426. Emphasis mine). Heinrich 
Rickert's'big book'is Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung of 1913. 
67 Frangoise Proust, L'Histoire d contretemps, op. cit., 12. 
68 GS 11 1: 170; SW 1: 109. 
69 GS 11 1: 158; SW 1: 100. 
70 KrV A 832; B 860. 
71 Compare Jacques Derrida, 'Chaire vacante: Censure, maitrise, magisralit6' in Du Droit 
a la philosophie (Paris: Gali16e, 1990), 343-70 (362). 
72 GS 1 1: 212; Or 32. 
73 GS I 1: 212; Or 32. To the best of my knowledge, the only commentator to devoted anY 
consideration to this remark is Frangoise Proust; see L'Histoire d contretenips, op. cit., 
166-7. With respect to the philosopher's position as an erhobene . 1111te between the 
artist and the scientist, it is worth recalling Benjamin's description of tratislatiorz as 
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'midway between poetry and doctrine [mitten zwischen Dichtung und Lehrej' in the 
Introduction to his translations of Baudelaire (GS IV 1: 17; SW L 259). 
74 GS 13: 931. 
75 GS V 2: 1038. 
76 GS Il 1: 170; SW 1: 109. 
77 GS 11 1: 171; SW 1: 110. 
78 GS 1 1: 213; Or 33. 
79 GS 13: 931. 
80 GS 1 1: 212; Or 32. 
81 GS 1 1: 207; Or 27. Osbourne's translation reads: '... a restricted image. ' 
82 GS VI 1: 203. 
83 The point is made by Rainer Ndgele, Theatre, Theory, Speculation: Walter Benjamin and 
the Scenes of Modernity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1991), xvi-xvii. 
84 GS 1 3: 925. Emphasis mine. Here, as elsewhere, the principle difference between the 
draft and the final version of the Foreword is most accurately expressed as that between 
what Benjamin calls philosophical knowledge and philosophy as given through 
presentation. Compare, for example: 'Die Darstellung, wenn sie als die eigentliche 
Methode philosophischer Erkenntis sich behaupten will ... ' (GS 1 3: 928) with 'Weiin 
Darstellung als eigentliche Methode des philosophischen Traktates sich behatipten will 
9 (GS 1 1: 209; Or 29), and: 'Gegenstand der Philosophie sind die Idee' (GS 1 3: 9'-), ýi') 
with: 'Gegenstand dieser Forschung sind die Ideen' (GS I 1: 209; Or 29). 
85 GS 11 1: 168; SW 1: 108. Compare the remarks of Alexis Philonenko: 'It is genuinely 
essential to recognise that Kant always refused to offer a Critique of Langauge and his 
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practice consists merely in trying sometimes to explain the meaning of one term, 
sometimes in choosing another and in clarifying the meaning of a metaphor, without 
ever pretending to be a linguist. What characterises Kant in his century 1,; that he is 
almost the only philosopher to make no reference to the Cratylus'; La Th&rie karitienize 
de l'histoire (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 149. 
86 GS 1 1: 207; Or 27. 
87 GS 1 1: 208; Or 28. 
88 GS 13: 925. 
89 Ak IV: 478. Compare, however, the remarks of the 'Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness 
of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality' of 1764 where Kant declares 'with 
Bishop Warburton that nothing has been more damaging to philosophy than 
mathematics, and in particular the imitation of its method in contexts where it cannot 
possibly be employed' (Ak IL 283); translated in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, eds. and trs. David Walford and Ralf 
Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 256. Presumably this is not 
one of those contexts. 
90 Claude Imbert, 'Le Pr6sent et I'histoire, ' op. cit., 768. Compared to the readings cited in 
note 96, below, Imbert's position is a nuanced one, concerned as it is with Kant's 
apparent silence and not with his position per se, and follows from her careful account of 
the extent of Kant's involvement in the Foreword. On le silence 
de Kant, compare the 
remarks of Philonenko, La Thgorie kantienne de rhistoire, op. cit., 
149. cited in note 8.5, 
above. 
91 Letter to Scholem of 22 October 1917 (Briefe 1: 389). 
92 Letter to Scholem of 23 December 1917 (Briefe 1: 408). 
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93 Letter to Scholem of I February 1918 (Briefe L 426). 
94 Letter to Ernst Schoen of May 1918 (Briefe L 455). The briefest glance at the indexes to 
the Gesammelte Briefe suffices to show the extraordinary extent to which Iýant drops olit 
of Benjamin's philosophical vocabulary from this point onwards. For a careful and 
exacting account of this gradual shift, see Timothy Bahti, 'Theories of Knowledge: Fate 
and Forgetting in the Early Work of Walter Benjamin'in Ndgele, Benjamin's Ground, op. 
cit., 61-82 (62-6), where the shift is characterised as one 'from knowing to reading. all 
the while along an axis of immediate intuition turning into some other kind of insight or 
observation' (ibid., 64-5). 
95 Exemplary in this respect is Beatrice Hanssen's claim that the Foreword 'resumed the 
critique of Kant's prediliction for mathematical formalisation ... already taken Lip ... 
toward the end of the "Program of the Coming Philosophy ... ; Walter Benjamin's Other 
History, op. cit., 39. See also the remarks of Martha B. Helfer, The Retreat of 
Presentation: the Concept of Darstellung in German Critical Discolirse (Albany: SUNY. 
1996), 178: 'Benjamin ... chastises 
Kant for trying to eliminate the Darstellung 
problematic from philosophy by modeling his Critiques on a mathematical paradignl. ' A 
broadly similar claim is made in the expository account of Reiner Rochlitz who, despite 
insisting upon the resolutely Kantian foundations of Benjamin's thinking, implies a 
thouroughgoing opposition of Benjamin to Kant on this point; Le dýsenchantement de 
I'art: La Philosophie de Walter Benjamin (Paris: Gallimard nrf, 1992), 30-1,48-9. 
Compare, however, the altogether more suggestive comments of Rainer Ndgele, 
'Benjamin's Ground' in Ndgele (ed. ), Benjamin's Grolind, op. cit., 19-37 (24-5), of 
Imbert, 'Le Pr6sent et I'histoire, ' op. cit., 768-9, and Bhati, 'Theories ot' 
Kno"A, Ied, 'I'U, ' op. 
cit., 63. 
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96 See Jean-Luc Nancy, La Remarque speculative (Paris: Gahl6e, 1973), 141-2. 
97 Kant, KrV A 233; B 285-6. 
98 Christian Wolff, Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General, cited in Lewis NNIAO 
Beck, 'From Leibniz to Kant' in The Age of German Idealisms, eds. Robert C. Solomon 
and Kathleen M. Higgins (London: Routledge, 1993), 5-39 (9). 
99 On this celebrated phrase, 'familiar in the lyc6es, ' see Jacques Derrida, 'Chaire vacante, ' 
op. cit., 360-70. The analogy with Benjamin's own rejection of the mathematical 
character of philosophical method is clear. 
100 KrV A 715; B 743. 
101 KrVA 713; B 741. Kant's emphasis. 
102 GS 11 1: 168; SW 1 108. 
103 KrV A 726; B 754. 
104 GS 1 3: 834. 
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106 GS 1 1: 209; Or 30. 
107 Rolf Tiedemann makes more or less the same point with respect to status of the Idea in 
the Origin of the German Mourning Play, coming down firmly on the side of the 
Idea as 
constitutive principle; cf. Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins, op. cit., 
34-5. 
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109 Gunter Figal, 'Aesthetically Limited Reason: On Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy' in 
Philosophy and Tragedy, eds. Miguel de Beistegui and 
Simon Sparks (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 141. 
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ILTRAGEDY 
Qu'il ny ait pas de remöde ä la mort, que le mortalWý soit le 
Partage de l'homme ... c'est ce qui, dans la tragýdie sophoclýenne, 
Prýpare l'avýnement de la philosophie. 
FranVolse Dastur, La mort 
CHAPTER THREE 
'A Good Death': Heidegger and the Essence of Tragedy 
We presumably arrive at a trace of the essence of tragedy 
not when we illuminate it psychologically or aesthetically, 
but only when we think its essential form, the being of 
beings, by thinking Movm &K-qV ... TTIg d6LKiag. 1 
In the Introduction to Being and Time Heidegger draws a seemingly unequivocal 
distinction between the ensuing analytic of Dasein and the plethora of interpretations 
available for Dasein's particular ways of being. 2 He readily accepts that the 
existentiell accounts afforded by poetry, politics, anthropology, ethics, etc., do not 
preclude and may even require or call for (fordern) existential analysis. What he 
disputes is any possibility of their attaining the level of originality claimed for the 
'productive logic' of his own investigationS. 3 This is not to say that such interpretations 
are no longer entirely valid as ways in which Dasein can be interpreted. They are. 
Rather is it to say that whatever factual (sachlich) merits they may posses as regards 
the particular realms that provide the impetus for their respective methods, a 
persistent failure to ask as to the being of Dasein means that they have altogether 
missed the real philosophical problem. 4 'Only once the basic structures of Dasein are 
adequately worked out with explicit orientation toward the problem of being itself. ' 
Heidegger declares, 'will the results of the previous interpretations of Dasein gain 
their existential justification. 15 
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At least as important as this distinction, however, is the pudeur that Heidegger 
is always quick to respect as regards the more concrete function of his own researches. 
For whilst it may fall to fundamental ontology to leap ahead and pla-v the role of 
groundlaying to those sciences whose pedagogic fixation with results renders them 
incapable of awaiting the completion of its tiresome labours, it in no way follows from 
this that it ought to be seen as affecting an advance (Fortschritt) over them. (3 
Confining himself accordingly to the altogether more 'modest' task of a preliminary 
repetition and desedimentation of what has already been uncovered ontically (des 
ontisch Entdecken) so as to render it 'ontologically more transparent, '-, Heidegger 
concludes his lengthy introductory statement of intent with some candour: not only 
will the analytic prove to be 'necessarily inadequate' when seen from the standpoint of 
the theoretical sciences but, rather more significantly, its contribution to these will 
only ever be an indirect one (nur indirekt). 8 
Both points are made rather more graphically in a lecture presented some 
years earlier to the Marburger Theologenschaft. Even in this early distillation of the 
essence of his approach, 9 Heidegger's overriding concern is to distinguish his own 
considerations from those of the various sciences, from theology to relativity physics, 
from history to philosophy itself. Rather than being joined to this seemingly endless 
6 parade, ' therefore, the considerations voiced in the lecture are situated by Heidegger 
on the level of a propaedeutic or pre-science (Vorwissenshaft), one whose task it 
is to 
subject this parade to 'police scrutiny' so as to determine whether a particular 
field of 
research is legitimately I in touch with its issue [bei ihrer Sache ist]' or merely 'fed 
by 
some traditional and worn-out verbiage. '10 In the case of philosophy, 
for example, 
147 
these policing duties are famously said to take the form of the occasional 'house search 
of the ancients, in order to see what they were up to. "I Very much like the notion of a 
productive logic, therefore, first introduced in the lecture course of the following year 
in order to clarify the way in which fundamental ontology is to leap over the sciences 
in order to secure their basic concepts, 12 the 'pressing but decidedly siibordinate' 
concern of such pre-science is to 'conduct inquirles into what could uItImately be 
meant by what ... science and philosophy have to say about existence and about the 
world. 113 
So rather than wanting simply to rectify the shortcomings of the various 
positive sciences and their corresponding regional ontologies, therefore, fundamental 
ontology is asking another sort of question altogether, one that does not belong to 
existentiell inquiry but lends itself to a thoroughgoing attempt to ask how such 
inquiry might be possible in the first place. As the Exposition of the Task of a 
Preparatory Analytic of Dasein has it: of showing how 'the question of being is the 
spur [die Stachefl for all scientific thinking. 114 
The development in Being and Time of the notion of conscience (das Gewissen) 
as the call of care (der Ruf der Sorge) affords a good instance of this sort of distinction. 
In what amounts to an effective clarification and concretion of his earlier remarks, 
Heidegger now declares the demand (Forderung) for an ethics rebuffed by the 
'phenomenal findings' of an analysis that is concerned less with meeting expectations 
and issuing practical directives for action - by modelling ethical deliberation along the 
lines of demonstrative and calculative formulae, for example - than with setting out 
an attestation of Dasein's ownmost potentiality- for-being: 
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the expectation of an actually usable purpose from assured possibilities of 
69 action" that are available and calculable ... is founded upon the interpretative 
horizon of common-sense concerns, which forces the existence of Dasein under 
the idea of a regulable business practice .... 
15 
All the same, it would appear from the various admonitory remarks made in the 
lecture courses and publications immediately following the appearance of Being and 
Time that such expectations were sufficiently exaggerated for Heidegger to find 
himself having to answer critics who doubted the claims of fundamental ontology to 
have adopted a standpoint wholly antecedent to such concerns. So in an aside to his 
lectures on Leibniz and in a withering note to Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics of 
the following year, he seizes the opportunity to accuse such critics of a fundamental 
misunderstanding of his entire enterprise and of raising 'cheap accusations, '16 
principally that of an 'ethical egoism' apparently inscribed within the project of 
fundamental ontology, which are, on the terms established by the project, clearly 
inadmissible. 17 Quoting again from the development carried out in Being and Time: 
The call of conscience gives no such "practical" directives for the sole reason 
that it calls Dasein to its ownmost potentiality- for-being ... The call discloses 
nothing that could be positive or negative as something to care for, because it 
refers to an ontologically completely different mode of being, namely existence 
[die Existenz]. 18 
149 
Now this argument against 'the interpretative horizon of common-sense concerns' with 
respect to the notion of ethics is most famously reprised, of course, in the 'Letter on 
"Humanism... of 1946. There, Heidegger recalls the anxieties voiced by a 'young friend' 
shortly after the publication of Being and Time at his insistence that the paths of 
ethics and ontology be distinguished in this way. When, the young friend had asked of 
the philosopher, are you going to write an ethics? Of course, Heidegger already had as 
his young friend would have realised if only he or she had read Being and Time with a 
little more care. Retrospectively situating that work as an attempt 'to advance thought 
in a preliminary way toward the truth of being ... by reaching back into the essential 
ground from out of which thinking concerning the truth of being emerges, '19 Heidegger 
shows his hand, declaring: 'the thinking that thinks the truth of being as the inceptive 
[anfdngliche] element of man as one who ek-sists is in itself originary ethics. '20 
The apparent evidence of such assurances notwithstanding, several readers of 
Heidegger presumably a good deal more illustrious than his unfortunate young friend 
have been moved to ask a similar question: Ought not ontology, in particular the 
fundamental ontology of Dasein presented in Being and Time, to foster an ethics? 
Among the first to pose the problem in this way was Jean Beaufret who, in a letter of 
1945, confessed to a protracted struggle to 'preciser le rapport de Fontologie avec une 
0 ethique possible. 121 Setting the tone of his response with a decidedly uncharitable 
assimilation of Beaufret's cautiously worded statement of research to the reckless 
attempt to provide an ethical supplement to ontology -a strategy clearly designed to 
allow for an implicit restatement of the position set out almost twenty years earlier: 
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the 'Letter on "Humanism"' feigning to ask whether ontology ought not to be 
supplemented (ergdnzt) by an ethicS, 22 Being and Time having declared any 
clarification of the hermeneutic situation immediately to be forgone if one begins with 
an initially theoretical subject so as then to supplement it (zu ergdnzen) with an 
ethiCS23 - Heidegger nonetheless considers the point at length. He readily accepts, for 
instance, that were it to be 'thought more originally, ' Beaufret's line of inquiry would 
have a 'meaning and essential importance. 124 What he disputes is whether it can have 
any real basis in the sphere of legitimate ontological questions. In contrast to the 
anxieties of the young friend, however, Beaufret's own difficulties appear not to stem 
from his having paid insufficient attention to Being and Time. If there is error on 
Beaufret's part, Heidegger implies, it lies in his failure to have read Sophocles: 
Before attempting to determine more precisely the relationship between 
"ontology" and "ethics, " we must ask what "ontology" and "ethics" themselves 
are. It becomes necessary to ponder whether what can be designated by both 
terms still remains appropriate [gemdJ3] and proper [nahe] to what is assigned 
to thinking, which, as thinking, has above all to think the truth of being ... The 
tragedies of Sophocles, provided such a comparison is in any way allowable, 
shelter [bergen] the ýOog in their sayings more incipiently [anffinglicher] than TI 
do Aristotle's lectures on "ethics. 1125 
Hunting down the etymology of the word ýOog, Heidegger finds that it's more original 
meaning, more original than either "ethics" or the "ethical, " is "abode" or "place of 
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dwelling" (Aufenthalt, Ort des Wohnens). Eschewing the most immediate justification 
for his findings - the one afforded in fact by Aristotle himself in those same lectures on 
"ethiCS"26 - Heidegger finds an altogether more apt illustration of the point in a 
fragment handed down by Plutarch and ascribed to Heraclitus. The fragment, in 
whose 'simplicity' the essential meaning of the word ý%3 comes 'immediately to light, ' 
reads: A@c)ý; dv@pW'TrW 8aWov. Diels translates: Tem Menschen ist seine Eigenart sein 
Ddmon. 127 Kirk renders the saying in English: 'man's character is his daimon. '28 
Burnet, whom Heidegger often consulted in German translation, eliminates the 
residual Hellenism: man's character is his fate. 129 Kahn, in whose taxonomy the 
fragment is placed amongst the thinker's 'ethical and political advice, ' follows suit: 
iman )s character is his fate (his daimon or his divinity). 130 And Heidegger himself, 
observing the way in which the fragment is 'commonly translated, ' tenders only a 
slight grammatical variant on the rendering of Diels: 'seine Eigenart ist dem 
Menschen sein Dämon. 131 
Clearly there can be no question of reconciling Heidegger's findings with such 
translations, which are scorned accordingly for their failure to think in a suitably 
'Greek' manner - that is, in a manner 'appropriate to the Sache that is to be 
thought. 132 The more important point here, however, surely concerns the way in which 
each of the translations enumerated above can be said to work & contresens, 
foreclosing immediately on that line of inquiry that the reference to Heraclitus was 
intended to prise open: the inquiry into what ontology and ethics themselves are. 
When Heidegger does come properly to translate the fragment, therefore, the basis for 
his doing so is no longer a purely philological one, but one appropriate to die Sache 
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selbst. Hence: 'the (ordinary) abode is for man the open site for the presencing of the 
gods (the extra -ordinary). 133 No less problematic here, however, no less inappropriate 
to the Sache that is to be thought, is the sense in which the terms "abode" or 
"dwelling" are habitually taken. And justifying his translation by reference to another 
remark by Heraclitus, Heidegger goes even so far as to cast real doubt on whether we 
are today at all able to think what is 'actually' named by them. Still, an important hint 
in the direction of such thinking is given a few lines further on, when it is pointed out 
that dwelling had already been identified in Being and Time as the very 'essence' of 
Dasein's fundamental constitution, namely b eing- in- the -world: 34 
Being-in does not designate a spatial "inside one another" of things present-to- 
hand, any more than the word "in" originally means a spatial relationship of 
this kind; "in" stems from innan-, to dwell [wohnen], habitare, to abide [sich 
aufhalten]; "an" means: I am in the habit of [ich bin gewohnt], familiar with, I 
tend to something; it has the meaning of colo in the sense of habito and diligo. 
This being to whom this sense of being-in belongs we characterise as the being 
that I myself in each case am [bin]. This word bin is connected with by [bei]; "I 
am" [Ich bin] means in turn: I dwell in, I abide in the presence of [bei] ... the 
world as something familiar in such and such a way. To be, as the infinitive of 
I am, " i. e. understood as an existential, means to dwell in the presence of .... to 
be familiar with .... Being-in is thus the 
formal existential expression of the 
being of Dasein, which has the essential constitution [wesenhafte Verfassung] of 
being- in- the- world. 35 
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Here, dwelling does not refer to some particular place or address at which one resides, 
any more than world was seen in chapter one to refer to a cosmological mundus that 
could come to be portrayed by way of a map or globe. Dwelling in the sense of being-in- 
the-world means being alongside (bei) other beings and so being situated there (da) in 
the matrices of particular contexts. It means, still according to the analyses of Being 
and Time discussed in chapter one, to take up a direction toward what is present-to- 
hand, to exist as that open space for the disclosure of beings as a whole, to be that 
disclosive site on the basis of which beings can arise as phenomena and come to 
presence. Hence, dwelling in the sense of being-in-the-world also means to be situated 
aletheologically, to be lodged in what, following the displacements broached by 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art, ' might be called a particular historical constellation of truth. 
So when, in order to justify the translation of fragment 118 proposed just a few 
moments before, the 'Letter on "Humanism... turns back to Heraclitus and to a story 
famously preserved by Aristotle, 36 the failure of the visiting strangers to recognise 
themselves as in the presence of something 'exceptional' and 'counter to the usual 
course of life' is only to be expected. 37 Commenting on the story, Heidegger repeatedly 
describes the strangers in terms of their 'curiosity, ' that is, in terms of that decidedly 
fallen mode of being- in -the -world whose essential characteristic Being and Time had 
already presented as an Aufenhaltlosigkeit. 'The two constitutive factors of curiosity, 
that of not-tarrying in the surrounding world with which one is concerned, and that of 
distraction by new possibilities, found the third of the essential characteristics of this 
phenomena, that which we call never-abiding-anywhere, ' Heidegger had remarked, 
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before declaring: 'Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of being-in-the- 
world unveils a kind of being of everyday Dasein in which Dasein continually uproots 
itself. 138 The difference between these strangers and the one from Elea could not be 
more marked, therefore. For whilst the philosophical attitude may well begin in the 
originary pathos of wonderment, curiosity begins in what Heidegger is here calling 
'distraction' and its effects are felt somewhat closer to home. In contrast to the 
thaumatic contemplation of beings, to that apprehending of what is present-to-hand 
that Being and Time calls dwelling, curiosity has no interest in wonderment to the 
point of incomprehension. Certainly, it fosters a desire to see, 'but only [nur] so as to 
have seen. 139Certainly, it fosters a desire to know, 'but simply [lediglich] so as to have 
seen. 140 And it comes as no surprise, therefore, that when Heidegger offers his own 
account of the motives underlying the strangers' visit, he does so in the following 
terms: 'The visitors want this "experience" not so as to be overwhelmed by thinking 
but simply [lediglich] so that they can say that they saw and heard someone who 
everyone [man] says is a thinker. ' Hoping to catch Heraclitus when, 'sunk in profound 
meditation, he is thinking, ' 'the curious ones instead find him by [bei] a stove. ' Their 
4 curious importunity toward the thinker, ' suggests Heidegger, renders them 'at a loss' 
to draw any meaningful inference from this view of his impoverished 'abode. ' In the 
face of such a 'disappointing sight' 'even the curious' loose any desire to 'draw near' 
and are only prevented from leaving when the thinker, reading the 'frustrated 
curiosity in their faces, ' calls them in with the words ELVCLL 'Yap Kal ETaWa OE063, here 
too the gods are present. 41 
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Now, with respect to the thoroughgoing identity of existence and dwelling 
established in Being and Time, it is only to be expected that more or less the same 
point be made by the'Letter on "Humanism : 
The word ilOog names the open region in which man dwells. The open site of his 
abode allows what pertains to the essence of man to appear [ldl3t das erscheineit 
was auf das Wesen des Menschen zukommt] and which in doing so abides in 
nearness to him. The abode of man contains and preserves the advent of what 
belongs to him in his essence [der Aufenthalt des Menschen enthält und 
bewahrt die Ankunft dessen, dem der Menschen in seinem Wesen gehört]. 42 
When set alongside the passage from Being and Time cited a moment ago, these lines 
will have some far reaching consequences for Heidegger's remark concerning Attic 
drama. For if the tragedies of Sophocles do indeed shelter in their sayings an inceptive 
sense of ýOo! 3 ('the open region in which man dwells, ''the open site of his abode'), might 
this not also mean that they contain and preserve in equally inceptive fashion what it 
is that 'belongs' to man in his essence? Might it not mean that these tragedies shelter 
something of the very being of man? 
My concern in this chapter, then, is to build on the broader analyses of chapter 
one in order to ask as to Heidegger's recourse to tragedy in order to re-secure the issue 
which, since Being and Time at lease, will have formed the centrepiece of his entire 
enterprise, to wit, that of 'laying bare [die Freilegung] the a priori that must be made 
visible if the question "what is man? " is to be discussed philosophically. 43 
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What a priori? In the analyses of Being and Time Heidegger had proposed the 
name Dasein or Dasein in its disclosedness. 44More precisely, the had proposed this 
name as a way of generating the circular foresight that first enabled those analyses 
and that was, in turn, confirmed and extended by them. For in that comportment 
toward being that provides the first formal indication of Dasein's existence, Dasein is 
shown itself to be the question of being: 'the question of being, ' Heidegger had written, 
'is nothing other than the radicalisation of an essential tendency of being that belongs 
to Dasein itself, the pre-ontological understanding of being. 145 From which it follows, 
as again we saw in chapter one, that working out the question of the meaning of being 
has to take the form of a working out of Dasein's already operative understanding of 
being, of letting Dasein, interpret itself (sich auslegen), so to speak. 
In the 'Letter on "Humanism", ' however, Heidegger proposes a rather different 
name for this a priori. Now he calls it abode or place of dwelling. No longer a case of 
listening in on (abzuhdren) the phenomenal content of Dasein's self- disclosure, the 
concern now is to bring 'the relation of being to the essence of man' to language. 46 And 
whereas the project of fundamental ontology was geared in its entirety toward the 
problematic of gaining an appropriate means of access (Zugang) to the phenomenon of 
being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of Dasein, it is now a matter of 
asking what it is that belongs (gehdrt) to man in his essence, understood in terms of 
his dwelling, his being there (da) and alongside (bei) that dimension that Heidegger 
had called world and that is now called 'the clearing of being into which man stands 
out on the basis of [aus] his thrown essence. 147 
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I 
Let me turn first of all to the particular context in which Sophocles' tragedies are said 
by Heidegger to shelter the open site of the abode of man, the site which, contaming 
and preserving 'the advent of what belongs to him in his essence, ' allows this essence 
'to appear. ' 
Note the curious conjunctions here: the abode preserves the advent (Ankunft) of 
essence, allows this essence to appear (1413t ... erscheinen). Presumably these locutions 
are intended to give notice that the notion of essence (wesen) is here being understood 
not in its nominal sense, but in what was seen in chapter one to be its more essential 
sense, that is, in its verbal sense as the essential unfolding and coming to presence 
(wesen) of something. 48 In the context of the 'Letter on "Humanism"' such an 
orientation would not be entirely surprising. For the whole point of the analysis thus 
far will have been to contest the 'dangerous' and 'uncontrollable' set of presuppositions 
which, underscoring every humanism, purport to have determined the essence of man 
by way of what Heidegger identifies as 'an already established interpretation of 
nature, of history, of world, of the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole [ein 
schon feststehende Auslegung der Natur, der Geschichte, der Welt, des Weltgrundes, 
das heißt des Seinden im Ganzen1.149 
Made right at the beginning of the analysis, the identification serves to 
establish at least three significant points. 
There is, first of all, a point concerning the way in which man is to be located: 
that is, concerning his place with respect to beings as a whole. The point here is that 
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the interpretation established by the humanist tradition stands or falls on the location 
of man as one particular being within beings (innerhalb des Seienden) or as one being 
amongst others (unter anderen). I will return to the significance of these locutions in 
due course. For the moment, let us simply note the evident reserve on this point 
registered by Heidegger in a sardonic aside: 'One can proceed in this way ... and 
thereby always be able to say something right [Richtiges] about man. 150 
From which follows, second, a point concerning the way in which man as a 
specific object of inquiry is to be delimited, set off as one particular being over against 
others. The point this time turns on the attribution to man of a specific difference. 
What difference? A difference, Heidegger suggests, of ratio, reason. Man is set off from 
other beings, from those beings within which or amongst which he has already been 
located, by his determination as rational animal, as a living being endowed with 
reason. Now whilst Heidegger in no way wants to contest the factual veracity of this 
claim - which, very like the location of man within or amongst beings as a whole, is 
judged 'not false' and so not to be 'dismissed out of hand, 51- what he does dispute is 
the capacity of any such determination to shrug off its defining 'principle. ' Does the 
essence of man lie 'inceptively and most decisively' in the dimension of homo 
animalitas? Heidegger says not and charges humanism accordingly with having failed 
altogether to take the measure of this essence by having defined man by way of 
something that he quite clearly is not. The locution on this point is emphatic: 
one must be clear on this, that by proceeding in this way one abandons man to 
the essential realm of animalitas, even if one does not equate him with 
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animals, but attributes a specific difference to him. In principle [Prinzipl, one Is 
still thinking of homo animalitas even when anima is posited as anima sive 
mens and this in turn posited as subject, person, or spirit. Such a positing is the 
manner of metaphysics. 52 
Metaphysics thinks man on the basis of (von) animality, and not in the direction of (zu 
hin) his humanitas. 
At least as damaging to the humanist case, however, is its appeal to the 
defining character of reason. For however else it may be determined, the essence of 
reason is, so Heidegger writes, 'always and in each case grounded in the fact that for 
every apprehension of beings in their being, being is in each case already illuminated, 
propriated in its truth. 153 The implicit reference on this point is to Kant, Heidegger 
invoking here both the Transcendental Dialectic (reason determined as 'faculty of 
principles') and the Analytic (reason as 'faculty of categories'). Once can presume, 
however, that the more important allusion in these lines is to the principle of reason 
itself ('or some other way') which, as an assertion regarding the ground of beings, had 
already provided the point of departure for a much earlier treatise, 'On the Essence of 
Ground. 154 Narrating the act of peculiarly Socratic midwifery by which Leibniz 
undertakes to draw the axiomatic form of reason from out of a determination of truth 
as a propositional a priori, Heidegger transcribes the habitual expression of the 
principle (nohil est sine ratione) into its positive form (omne ens habet rationern). He 
remarks: 'The principle speaks about beings and does so from the perspective of 
something like ground. 155 For Leibniz, the principle of inclusion, praedicatum inest 
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subjecto, holds that all complex propositions can be reduced, by means of analysis, to 
primitive statements or axioms, what Heidegger terms first truths (ersten 
Wahrheiten). A relation thus obtains between such truths and the principle of reason 
since it is the principle alone that is able to provide a ground -a reason - for beings. 
Without it there would be truths that could not be resolved into such axiomatic form, 
thereby contravening the character of truth as such. 'Since this is impossible, however, 
and truth persists, the principium rationis, since it springs from the essence of truth, 
also persists. 156 
Need it be said that Heidegger's reservations here with regard to the notion of 
rational animal are not entirely without precedent, enjoying at least a passing 
resemblance to Descartes' response to the question which, following the discovery of 
the cogito, was to have provided the point of departure for the second of the 
Meditations: What is man (quid est homo)? It will be recalled that the question is 
raised by Descartes in order to guard against error; more specifically, to guard against 
error 'in the very thing that I maintain to be the most certain of all"57 to Wlt, the cogito 
or the ego sum as res cogitans. As such, the question forms a necessary part of the 
ongoing subjection of the philosopher's 'former opinions' to the rigorous scrutiny of 
hyperbolic doubt that was to have secured the discovery of 'one certain and immutable 
thing' upon which to construct a metaphysics. 58 What, therefore, did Descartes think 
formerly that he was? 'A man. But, ' he asks, extending the range of questioning still 
further, ' what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal? Certainly not. 159 It IS the scope 
and radicality of the sort of questioning at work here that dictates the emphatic 
rejection on this point. For were the nomination animal rationale to stand 
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unchallenged it would involve appeal to certain 'obscure' notions which themsel-ves 
stand in need of further clarification: 'it would be necessary then to ask what animal 
and rational mean [quidnam animal sit et quid rationale] and in this way from a 
single question would we fall into other, more difficult ones. 160 The point, then, is that 
the determination of man as rational animal is inadequate to the mathematical 
paradigm of certainty and evidence on which Cartesian metaphysics is to be 
constructed, the 'obscurity' of reason and animality rendering them concepts 
inadequate to the exposition of the being of the sum. 
Of course, the analogy between the positions is apparent at best. For whilst 
Heidegger sees in Descartes' iteration of the problem of the subject an 'authentic 
impulse toward philosophical questioning, 161 He disputes nonetheless the adequacy of 
the ontological clarification given for the being of the sum. To the extent that the mode 
of being of the cogitationes is not itself questioned but understood merely as substance, 
it remains the case that Descartes falls prey to the error of 'ontological indifference' 
with respect to the being of the sum, which is merely asserted and presented 
accordingly as the presence-to-hand of a thinking thing. 62 
Hence, third and most decisively, there is also a point concerning the way in 
which 'the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole, ' is to be thought. The 
locution is once again emphatic: 
Metaphysics does indeed represent [stellt ... vor] beings 
in their being and so 
also thinks the being of beings. But it does not think being as such, does not 
think the difference between them. Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of 
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being itself. This is why it never asks in what way the essence of man belongs 
to [zur ... gehi5rt] the truth of 
being. 63 
Inasmuch as these lines develop and extend the identity of metaphysics and 
humanism that had been stated - but not argued for - toward the end of 'Plato's 
Doctrine of Truth, 164 the point here concerns the failure of humanism to think the 
difference between being and beings, that is, to think the very difference within which 
it operates. Metaphysics - and so, by extension, the humanism that it founds - fails to 
think being as such; it thinks only beings as such. Failing to think this difference it 
cannot, so Heidegger argues, but turn being into a being, into God or a cosmic ground, 
for instance. For metaphysics - as for the humanism that it founds - the question 
about being effectively remains a question about beings, a question that fails 
accordingly to think in the direction of (zu ... hin) being. And yet, it is not simply being 
that goes unquestioned, but the truth of being, the openness within which alone beings 
can show themselves in their being. 'As the clearing itself, the truth of being remains 
concealed for metaphysics. 165 
Now whilst such a determination may well be adequate to the metaphysical 
concept of man, it says precisely nothing about his phenomenal basis, on which, 
according to Heidegger, the tradition is as good as silent. The formal structure of the 
argument being developed here is clearly the same as that of Being and Time, 
therefore, where, as we have already seen, the distinction between fundamental 
ontology and the positive sciences was made in such a way as to secure the former as 
the sole means of access to the a priori phenomenal ground upon which alone the 
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question about man can be raised in an appropriate manner. Identical too, moreover, 
is the principle charge being levelled here by Heidegger: 
The origins that are relevant for traditional anthropology, the Greek definition 
and the theological guideline, indicate that, over and above an attempt to 
determine the essence of the being called "man" [einer Wesensbestimmung des 
Seienden "Mensch"], the question of his being has remained forgotten, 
conceived as something "self-evident" in the sense of the being present-to-hand 
[Vorhandenseins] of other created things. 66 
Referred back to its roots in traditional ontology, humanism is seen to be no more than 
an extension of a general zoological principle that serves, in turn, as the organon of a 
formal ontology of the abstract entitas or thing as such. 67 Heidegger, by contrast, 
refuses to accept that a general ontology, which treats by rights only of things present- 
to-hand, of founded presence, should be given droit de cite in the field of existential 
properties. In the ontologies afforded by traditional metaphysics, for example, in 
which 'the res cogitans, consciousness, and the interconnectedness of experience, serve 
as the methodological point of departure, ' the relations between things hold eo ipso for 
all ontological relations. With the result, so Heidegger charges, that the phenomenal 
content (phenomenalen Bestand) of Dasein is altogether missed. Among the most 
emphatic remarks in this respect are those of the 1925 lecture course 
History of the 
Concept of Time directed against Husserl's exposition of the natural attitude. 
Confessing his unease as regards the manner in which Husserl's account of the unity 
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of lived experience can be shown ultimately to adhere (hd1ten) to the notion of rational 
animal, Heidegger raises the following questions with regard to 'the being of the fulýy 
concrete man': 
Does its being allow itself to be assembled, as it were, from out of the being of 
its material substratum, the body, of the soul and the spirit? Is the being of the 
person the product of the modes of being of these strata of being? Or is it here 
that it becomes evident that this sort of prior division and subsequent 
assemblage is not directed toward phenomena, that whatever approach is 
taken to the personal, the person is taken here as a multilayered thing of the 
world [ein mehrschichtiges Weltding], the being of which will never be reached 
no matter how doggedly we pursue the reality toward which we are directed> 
What is retained, then, is always the mere being of an already given object, a 
real object; this means that it is always a matter of being as objectivity, in the 
68 
sense of being an object for reflection. 
Humanism, relieved of any specific orientation in the direction of man, can thus 
operate only according to what, in an exacting commentary on Heidegger's text, 
Franýoise Dastur terms a logic of Ergdnzung, addition: 'it is because man has been 
reduced to mere animal organism, ' she writes, to what Heidegger terms ein 
zoologisches Objekt, 'that it seems necessary to attribute to him an immortal soul, 
personality, and rationality. 169 As such, humanism has too little respected (geachtet) 
the essence of man, with the result, so Heidegger charges, that his essential 
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provenance (Wesensherkunft) goes unrecognised. It follows from this that the 
discourses that Heidegger identifies as humanist not only fail to yield even a confused 
presentiment of this essential provenance and so to entertain at least some token of 
respect for the essence of man but, in a way that only aggravates the situation, have 
actually impeded or closed off (verhindert) the possibility of these ever being raised as 
legitimate areas of inquiry, so rendering them altogether inaccessible (unzugdng1isch) 
to questioning. Humanism's defence of humanitas is said thus to rest upon an inability 
to realise the proper dignity (eigentliche Mirde) of man and upon a concealment of the 
question of his essence. 
This, then, is the connection in which to read the proposal now advanced by 
Heidegger: 'ought not thinking, by means of open resistance to "humanism, " to risk an 
impulse that could for the first time cause us to be suspicious of the humanitas of 
homo humanus and its baslS? 170 
To the question of 'whence and how the essence of man is to be determined, ' 
Heidegger dismisses all available responses, therefore. He rejects both a zoological 
account of an essentially privative ontology of life - Tasein ... as 
life 
... and then 
something else on top'71 - and the theological account according to which man, the ens 
72 finititum, is determined in his opposition to God, the ens realissimum. The 
consequence of this, however, is to leave man in a decidedly impoverished position, 
with nothing, as it were, to call his own. 
73 
It is in order to find a way out of this predicament that Heidegger broaches the 
following indication which, in addition to allowing the 'way into which the essence of 
166 
man belong to being' to become open to question, fragw6rdig in the positive sense, also 
sets such an opening at the very hear of that relation: 
Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that man unfolds in his 
essence [in seinem Wesen west] only where he is claimed by being. Only in this 
claim "has" he found that wherein his essence dwells ... Such standing in the 
clearing of being I call the ek-sistence of man. 74 
This, then, is the context in which Sophocles' tragedies are said by Heidegger to 
shelter the abode of man, the open site that contains and preserves his essential 
unfolding, determined now on the basis of the ek-static character of his existence. The 
context is, as Heidegger readily admits, one of a surprisingly 'odd' and 'extreme' 
humanisM, 75 one in which it is not man per se that is at stake, but his historical 
essence (das geschichtliche Wesen des Menschens) in its provenance from the truth of 
being, his essential unfolding from the history of being. 
When set back in this context, Heidegger's remarks concerning tragedy take on 
a quite different light. For what the tragedies of Sophocles can now be said to shelter 
in their sayings (in ihrem Sagen) is less the essence of man already determined in 
accordance with a fixed interpretation of his position within beings as one being 
amongst others, than the site of the essential unfolding and coming to presence of man 
as the being who dwells ek-statically within the world. As such, and developing 
further the analyses of chapter one, this site ought not to be seen as a depiction or 
portrayal of such dwelling, nor as having brought it to light as an already existent 
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state. Rather, it ought to be seen as a happening that, in the words of one 
commentator, 'enacts and accomplishes' the dwelling of man within the world. 7,6 
The reference here is, of course, to the invitation, issued with the verv first 
words of the 'Letter on "Humanism... to rethink the essence of action: 'We are still far 
from pondering the essence of action decisively enough., 77 Action, Heidegger 
maintains, has been regarded only as the bringing about of an effect (als das Bewirkeiz 
einer Wirkung), not in its more essential determination as accomplishment 
(Vollbringen) in the sense of unfolding something into the fullness of its essence, to 
bring it to full unfolding. 78 Yet if this is indeed the case, only that which already "is" 
can be accomplished in this way. Heidegger remarks in the same context: 'To the 
Sache of thinking there belongs historically in each case only one saying [eine ... Sage], 
the one that is appropriate to its Sachheit. 179 Only that which some particular epoch or 
world renders historically possible or discloses as being possible within its own 
context, can be brought to full unfolding. 80 But what "is" above all is being. Hence: 
Thinking accomplishes [vollbringt] the relation of being to the essence of man. 
It does not make or cause this relation. Thinking brings it into being solely as 
something handed over to thought from being. Such offering consists in the fact 
that in thinking being comes to language. Language is the house of being. In its 
home man dwells [wohnt]. The thinkers and the poets are the guardians of this 
home. 81 
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The sayings of Sophocles' tragedies can thus be said to accomplish or carry out the 
being of man as dwelling by bringing 'what belongs to him in his essence' to full 
disclosure. It is in tragedy, Heidegger seems to be saying, therefore, that man first 
becomes manifest in his relation to being; that is, that man first comes to dwell in the 
midst of beings as a whole. 
ii 
Although I have not yet begun to consider the specific character of the recourse to 
tragedy, the question already needs to be addressed as to the extent of Heidegger's 
claims for it. Are they not problematic in their scope? In light of the remarks of 
chapter one concerning the project of world disclosure toward which the work of art is 
directed, I would want to suggest not. And certainly not if - borrowing a phrase from 
John Sallis - it is mortality that furnishes Heidegger with the 'proper name; of man, 
'displacing, if not entirely replacing, Dasein. 182 For how else is tragedy to be 
understood if not - this time in the words of Frangoise Dastur - that 'ephemeral form 
of art' in which one finds 'an inaugural representation of the fundamentally mortal 
condition of man'? 83 
With regard to the position that I am developing here, Dastur's remarks 
warrant careful consideration. Not least of all because the position that she is 
concerned to ascribe to tragedy enjoys a status analogous to that argued for by the 
'Letter on "Humanism". ' Although not immediately apparent, the extent of this 
analogy is readily discerned in Dastur's repeated insistence that the tragedian's 
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depiction of a world of funerary rites and cenotaphs, of blood and ashes, a world 
peopled by both the living and the dead, be cast in the formidable role of antechamber 
to the philosopher's own reflections on death. 84 Tragedy, she holds in a striking 
phrase, paves the way for philosophy (prepare I'avýnement de la philosophie). 85 
To begin with, Dastur makes the point by way of the following historical 
construction. Death, she contends, 
only becomes the object of philosophical discourse when it no longer appears as 
"death in general, " as an "accident" that befalls the living, nor even as their 
inescapable "fate, " but as "death proper, " as "my-death, " which entails that the 
one who thinks takes on board the possibility of his or her own disappearance. 
Philosophical discourse on death is thus properly speaking a discourse on 
mortality or on being-mortal as such. 86 
It is important to note the almost imperceptible way in which Dastur passes from - or, 
more accurately, binds together - two things in these remarks: the 'appearance' 
through which death becomes a possible issue for philosophical reflection, and an 
equation of the very possibility of thinking ('celui qui pense ... ') with a thought of 
mortality as such ('prise en compte ... la possibilite 
de sa propre disparition'). That it is 
Heidegger's text that provides the framework for her doing so is not in doubt. Not only 
because the phrase la mort en general recalls the declaration of the 1925 Marburg 
course History of the Concept of Time, in which Heidegger says that there Is no such 
thing as der Tod iiberhaupt. 87 Rather more significant in the present context are the 
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ensuing analyses of the book, where it is through his own mortality (d trauers sa 
propre mortalite) alone that man is said to enjoy a relation not only to 'death -in 
general", ' but also to 'the very possibility of his existence as such. ',, ', ` Another passage 
from the earlier analyses clarifies the matter further: 
If death ... can only impose silence on conceptual discourse, and if, as that 
which never appears to me "in person, " it constitutes the non-phenomenon par 
excellence, it nonetheless remains the case that ... knowing and feeling oneself 
to be mortal constitutes the ground of the experience that man has of himself 
[1'experience que I'jtre humain a de lui-m6me]. From which it follows that it is 
this strange knowledge of his own end ... that renders possible a discourse not 
on "death, " but on the relation that a thinking being entertains with his own 
mortality. And this discourse is properly phenomenological, therefore, since it 
is a discourse on the appearance to oneself of the finite character of one's own 
existence [1'apparaftre a soi-m6me du charactere fini de sa propre existence]. 89 
Evoking the 'fine example' of Sophocles' Antigone, Dastur defends the thesis that it is 
in tragedy that this 'appearance' first takes place. What comes to be disclosed by 
tragedy, she argues, is existence propre; that is, existence not as 'an absolutely lived 
life [une uie absolument vivante]' but as one that 'includes within it a relation to the 
world of the dead. '90 
I take it that Dastur's intention here is to read tragedy in the manner of a 
principle of intelligibility, one that spells out the 'appearance' of the factically limited 
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character of existence so that it may be read as the ground of all possible 4experience. ' 
This is, moreover, the connection in which to read the distinction that is carefullY 
drawn in these passages between the mort en gineral that survient a living being, and 
the relation that man entretient (maintains, exercises, conducts, cultivates, etc. ) with 
sa propre mortalite. Suffice it to say, the claim being made on behalf of this distinction 
is hardly an empirical one; rather is it, to use Dastur's own appellation, a 
phenomenological one, in the sense, first of all, determined in the Introduction to 
Being and Time. That determination prescribes that the analysis proceed with regard 
to the way in which death shows itself, that is, it must be an analysis that attends to 
the process in which death comes to show itself as death and that thematises what, 
within such a process of self-showing, death shows itself to be. This is why Dastur 
writes: 'it is a discourse on the appearance to oneself of the finite character of one's 
own existence ... of mortality. 
' 
In a later essay on death, Dastur turns again to tragedy, extending her case for 
it in the direction of what is now described as an image d'une assomption de la 
mortalite. 91M least as important as that interpretation, however, is her response to 
the guiding question of that essay: How is one to live with death, all the while knowing 
that one has (doit) to die? Drawing a strategic distance between her own position and 
the premise that 'death is a malaise of which man can be cured, ' a premise that 
underpins the veritable 'arsenal' of technological possibilities that harbour the goal of 
'defeating death, ' however momentarily, and 'setting ourselves up as masters of 
existence, ' Dastur offers the following answer: 'it is now more urgent than ever for 
man to become the mortal that he 
iS. 192The position, as Dastur candidly admits, is far 
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from novel and enjoys broad analogy with the one set out in Heidegger's own 
statement of emergent mortality. 'Rational living beings, ' reads a statement of 1955 
duly cited by Dastur, 'must still become mortals. 193 Briefly assessing this analogy in a 
note, she concludes her essay by raising the question of whether 'it might not be 
accurate to say that this injunction constitutes the entire ethics [toute 1'ethiquel of this 
thinker unjustly maligned for having subordinated ethics to ontology. 194 
Now if Dastur's hunch here is correct, as I think it is, then it ought to follow 
that it is tragedy's notional status as 'a first representation of the fundamentally 
mortal condition of man' that secures the basis for Heidegger's claims regarding the 
inceptive manner in which Sophocles' tragedies shelter the T*3 of man. Indeed, 
commenting further on the lucidite of her own response to the question of how we are 
to live with death ('it is now more urgent than ever etc. ), Dastur invites yet further 
analogy with precisely this aspect of Heidegger's text. 'To become mortal, ' she explains, 
I is to come properly to dwell on the earth and to abide in it. 195 
And yet there is, of course, no such reference in the 'Letter on "Humanism", ' no 
such turn back to death. On one level, this is not altogether surprising. The concern of 
the text is announced with its opening lines: to remedy the historically insufficient 
determination of the essence of action (das Wesen des Handelns), to ponder it more 
decisively. And what, as Heidegger himself had asked in Being and Time, just after 
having put out of play the ethical thread seemingly evoked by the notion of conscience 
with which we began, can death have in common with the concrete situation of action 
(der konkreten Situation des Handelns)? 96 
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Heidegger is more than a little circumspect on this point and, within the 'Letter 
on "Humanism", ' there is only one indication: an indirect reference, appended to the 
beginning of the analysis in such a way as to register its concerns, back to Being and 
Time. The reference follows a more extended passage devoted to language (Sprache) in 
which Heidegger again alludes, directly this time, to Being and Time and to the 
'essential dimension of language' touched upon there. 97 One assumes, although the 
connection isn't made explicit, that the allusion here is to §34 of that work and to the 
referral there of language to its ground in discourse (Rede), the articulation of the 
intelligibility of the there (die Artikulation der Verstdndlichkeit des Da) by which 
Heidegger had undertaken to clarify the Greek notion of Wyog; that is, to the referral 
that had, in turn, allowed him to show how the ontological locus of the phenomenon of 
language has to be located in Dasein's essential constitution. Projecting the issue of 
language onto the upcoming analyses of humanism, Heidegger writes: 
The widely and rapidly spreading erosion of language ... comes from a threat to 
the essence of man. A merely cultivated use of language is still no proof that we 
have as yet escaped the danger to our essence ... Language still 
denies us its 
essence: that it is the house of the truth of being. 98 
Although the connection is again not made explicit, the principle point that needs to be 
retained from this projection and from the allusion to 'the essential dimension' of 
language touched upon in Being and Time is that language is to be seen not as a 
property of man but, more significantly in the present context, as that through which 
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the claim (Anspruch) of being to the essence of man is carried out or accomplished 
(vollbringt). Indeed, it is only from out of this sort of claim, which will be explored 
further under the aegis of the notion of ek-sistence, that man 'finds that wherein h's 
essence dwells [das ... worin dein Wesen wohnt]. ' Only because of such dwelling "'has" 
he language as the home [Behausung] that preserves the ek-static for his essence. ")9 
To this appropriation of the issue of language to that of dwelling is appended, 
then, the implicit reference back to Being and Time: 
In this claim upon man, in the attempt to ready man for this claim, is there not 
implied an endeavour for man? Where else does "care" tend but in the direction 
of bringing man back to his essence? What else does this mean if not that man 
(homo) become human (humanus)? 100 
A brief recollection of what is actually at issue in Heidegger's reference to care as 
tending in the direction of bringing man back (zuriickzubringen) to his essence, and so 
of how this reference may also bring into play the issue of death, should help to clarify 
the point. 
III 
From the outset, the analysis of death in Being and Time is designed to defend an 
assertion made in an earlier section of the work when, following the hard-won 
clarification of the 'unified phenomenon' of being-in-the-world, Heidegger is concerned 
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to explicate care as the structural whole of Dasein. Registering the need for any 
interpretation laying claim to originality (Urspriinglichkeit) to delimit Dasein as a 
whole, he draws attention to the possibility that the notion of care might manifestlý 
contradict (widerspricht offenbar) the possibility of any such delimitation. So when 
Heidegger uses care as a designation for the way in which Dasein is always beyond 
itself (iiber sich hinaus), we are effectively encouraged to draw the conclusion that the 
structural whole of Dasein is such as to contradict and so to preclude the possibility of 
Dasein ever being-a-whole. 
As Heidegger is candid in acknowledging, the difficulty here seems to stem 
from the very first moves of Being and Time; specifically, it stems from the efforts 
there to secure the outset and point of departure for the inquiry in an analytic of 
Dasein. For what was required in order for the question about being to be posed in its 
full transparency was, as we saw in chapter one, a concomitant transparency of the 
questioner. The overriding concern of the initial moves, therefore, was to secure a 
preliminary understanding of the essence of Dasein by distinguishing it from that of 
das Vorhandene, identifying the former as what is in each case mine (ist je meines), as 
comportment toward possibility, as existence. 101 
Now in the section (§41) of Being and Time given over to the explication of care 
as the being of Dasein, Heidegger repeats these opening formal indications verbatim, 
before adding the rider: 
Ontologically speaking, however, being toward one's ownmost potentiality- for- 
being means: Dasein, in its being, is in each case already way ahead of itself [ist 
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ihm selbst ... je schon vorweg]. Dasein is already beyond itself not as a way of 
behaving toward other beings that it is not, but as being toward the 
potentiality-for-being that it itself iS. 102 
Needless to say, the declaration that Dasein's being is in each case always way ahead 
of itself should not be taken as referring to its dealings with others is slightly 
misleading and, grasped too quickly, tends rather to distort the delicate bifurcation in 
the structures of Dasein's ecstatic existence within which the analysis is operating. 
Taken on face value, moreover, it clearly gives free rein to the sorts of errors against 
which we saw the remarks of the lectures on Leibniz and those of the Kantbuch to be 
directed. So in what is presumably an anticipation of the order of grounding that will 
retrospectively have structured the analyses of Being and Time as a whole, Heidegger 
focuses here on the worldly ecstatic structure by which Dasein stands out into the 
world, leaving for later the specifically temporal structure, namely Dasein's standing 
out toward the horizonal structure that delimits the ecstases of originary temporality. 
Further, to the extent that Heidegger is availing himself of the sorts of distinctions 
discussed at the outset of this chapter, one ought also to say that the declaration being 
made here is not a matter of existentiell assertion. As a being that is thrown into a 
world, Dasein always and already manifests care for that world in which it exist, 
where care does not refer to some practical activity or another, but is employed as an 
ontological term to designate Dasein's way of being-in -the -world. Adds Heidegger, 
therefore: 'Being- way- ahead-of-itself does not mean anything like an isolated tendency 
in a worldless subject, but characterises being- in-the -world. ' 
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Two significant points follow from this. Heidegger is able, first, to confirm 
being-way- ahead - of-itself (das Sich-vorweg-sein) as a designation for the whole of the 
essential constitution of Dasein. Dasein's comportment toward possibility, the fact 
that it comports itself toward its own being as something that is at issue for it, means 
that Dasein is always already way-ahead-of-itself. The argument is seemingly 
straightforward: if existence is definitive for Dasein's mode of being, and if the essence 
of this existence lies in Dasein's comportment toward the possibilities that it is, then 
so long as Dasein is it must in each case be beyond itself. Equally, however, and this is 
the second point, to the extent that this itself has already been characterised 
ontologically as being-in-the-world then Dasein's being- way- ahead-of- itself is shown, 
4more completely grasped .... to mean: being- way-ahead-of- 
itself- in-already- being- in -a- 
world. '103 
Now according to the objection being feigned by Heidegger just a few pages 
further on, it is precisely this state of affairs that establishes the 'tribunal' ruling 
against the possibility of Dasein's ever being a whole. For if Dasein's existence does 
consist in its being in each case already way-ahead-of-itself, that is, in its projecting 
onto what still remains to be seen, there is 'strong evidence' indeed weighing against 
any such possibility. For so long as Dasein is there are possibilities still to be settled. 
So long as Dasein exists there is something still outstanding. Like a fruit that is not 
yet ripe, so long as Dasein is it is marked by a certain Unganzheit, by a certain lack of 
wholeness. Like the fruit, it has not yet 'run its course. ' 104 The phenomenological 
requirement that Dasein be grasped as a whole founders, therefore, on the structure of 
care. 
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And yet: 
To that which is thus outstanding, the "end" itself belongs. The "end" of being- 
in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to potentiality-for-being, that s, 
to existence [zum Seink6nnen, das heil3t zur Existenz geh6rig], limits and 
determines each possible totality of Dasein [begrenzt und bestimmit die je 
mögliche Ganzheit des Daseins]. 105 
It is this limitation and delimitation that makes the analysis of death strictly 
necessary. For it is only in its no longer being there (sein Da) that Dasein comes finally 
to be a whole, that is, to settle the possibilities that it itself is. Nevertheless, in coming 
thus to be a whole Dasein also loses the being of its there (des Seins des Da),, the place 
from which its own being is disclosed. In the Marburg lectures of1925 Heidegger will 
say: Dasein's being a whole makes it simply disappear (macht es gerade 
verschwinden). 106 It would seem that the only witness capable of swaying the tribunal 
and so of securing the originality demanded for the analysis is the only one that 
cannot be called: Dasein itself. Indeed, the imbroglio is such that one could well be 
forgiven for sharing Heidegger's earlier feigned consternation on the point. 
What follows these analyses, namely the account proper of death as a 
phenomenon of Dasein, serves only to provide a way out of this predicament by 
confirming and extending those analyses. So far as the existential analytic is 
concerned, therefore, the actual account of death remains rightly subordinate to the 
explication of care as the fundamental constitution of Dasein. It is because of this that 
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being-toward-death is now called the most originary (urspriinglichste) concretion of 
care, dying said to be grounded (griindet) in care, and the ensuing sections of the work 
said to give no more than a phenomenal conformation of the ontological status 
accorded to care as the essential structure of Dasein being-in-the- world. 107 Later 
Heidegger makes the same point: 'The care structure does not speak against the 
possibility of being-a-whole, but is the condition of possibility of such an existentiell 
potentiality-for-being. 1108 
The question that needs now to be raised is this, therefore: How is the whole of 
Dasein's existence concretely unveiled (sich ... enthiillen) in the phenomenon of death? 
The following remarks, which come from the preliminary sketch of the existential- 
ontological structure of death, make the point succinctly: 
Death is a possibility-of-being [eine Seinsmdglichkeit] that Dasein has always 
to take upon itself. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-being [steht sich ... selbst in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen 
bevor]. In this possibility, what is at issue for Dasein is its being- in-the-world 
as such. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being- able-to-be -there [Nichts- 
mehr-dasein-k6nnens]. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has 
been fully referred [vdllig ... verweisen] to 
its ownmost potentiality-for-being. 
Standing thus before itself, all relations in it to other Dasein are undone. This 
ownmost, non-relational possibility is at the same time the extreme one. 109 
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From this passage, which concentrates virtually the whole of the analysis, three points 
need to be retained as being central to Heidegger's case. 
To begin with, the passage identifies death as that with which Dasein comes to 
stand before its ownmost potentiality-for-being. Death is Daseln's own - that is, it is 
something proper, eigen, to Dasein, something toward which Dasein always relates as 
its own. This identification has the effect, first of all, of establishing a context in which 
death is removed form the structure of replacement ... in and by ... (Vertretung in ... 
und ... bet) that, proximally and for the most part, Dasein can and must (katin und 
mul3) stand in for another Dasein. 110 What establishes this context is the mineness 
(Jemeinigkeit) of death. It is the fact that death is essentially my own (wesenindl3iX, je 
der meine) that precludes the possibility of any such structure of replacement. 
Repatriated into the very structure of Dasein's existence, itself situated firmly within 
the compass of Jemeinigkeit, death can be shown thus to be the 'ownmost, 
nonrelational, unsurpassable possibility' of Dasein. 111 
Hence the second point central to Heidegger's case: the determination of death 
as possibility. 112 Death is a possibility that Dasein has always to take over, a 
possibility toward which it has always to comport itself. Yet death is presumably not 
just one more of those possibilities that Dasein in each case is. Indeed, one could 
presumably say that it is the possibility, the possibility that is most proper to Dasein, 
the possibility toward which Dasein has no choice but to comport itself. And one could 
presumably say also that if Dasein is that being which, having its own being as 
something that is at issue for it, comports itself toward its being as its ownmost 
possibility - such is, it will be recalled, the second formal indication of Dasein deduced 
181 
at the outset of Being and Time - then death, as that singular possibility in which 
Dasein's being is most at issue would be the possibility that first opens up the space in 
which Dasein can comport itself toward possibility as such. Might not death, in other 
words, be the possibility that opens up a space in which Dasein can first comport itself 
toward its being as its ownmost possibility? Death as sheer possibilisation? '13 (Indeed, 
it will be necessary to come back to this point in order to show how it is death as 
Dasein's owmost possibility that dictates that death is for the most part irrelevant, 
unbetreffend). Comporting itself toward this possibility, Dasein is brought thus to 
stand before itself (steht sich das Dasein selbst ... bevor) in its ownmost potentiality- 
for-being, given back to or disclosed to itself from this possibility. By disclosing Dasein 
to itself, disclosing it in its ownmost possibility, death would serve thus to draw 
Dasein back before itself. Almost the same point is made in the lecture course of 1925, 
Heidegger this time remarking: 
The certainty that I am myself in that I will die is the basic certainty of Dasein 
itself. It is an authentic statement of Dasein, while the cogito sum is only the 
appearance of such a statement ... Only in dying can 
I say with absolute 
certainty that "I am. "114 
One can only be struck by these remarks. And first of all by their apparent contrast to 
the context established for death by the analyses of Being and Time. There, the 
context is clear: death is to be thought in terms of the categories of modality alone; it is 
to be thought as possibility, Mdglichkeit. Hereq meanwhile, the statement that "I am 
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myself in that I will die, " what Heidegger terms ein eche Daseinsaussage, is seeminýullv 
expressed in precisely those terms disqualified by the later analyses: death is thought 
here in terms of the quality of judgements; it is thought as certainty. Gewl*, 6hel*t. 
Seemingly, however, because Heidegger immediately brings this certainty back within 
the compass of possibility, referring in a manner that is no less striking to death as die 
dul3erste Mdglichkeit of the I am, " its furthest, extreme, uttermost possibility. 
One should note also, however, that the allusion here to Descartes is rather 
more significant than perhaps at first appears. Indeed, once aligned with the analyses 
of worldhood carried out in Being and Time and the brief consideration there of the 
Cartesian characteristic, all the signs are that Heidegger has a further connection in 
mind. 
It will be recalled that to Descartes' claim to have solved once and for all the 
relation of the res cogitans to the res extensa, Heidegger retorts that he has in fact 
merely narrowed down the question of the world to that of natural things 
(Naturdinglichkeit); that is, Descartes has in fact done little more than enclose the 
being of the sum, attributed the ontological title of substance, definitively within an 
ontology of Vorhandenheit. If the cogito sum ever were to serve as the point of 
departure for an analytic of Dasein, Heidegger speculates, it would have need, 
therefore, of an inversion (Umkehrung), one in which the sum would be asserted 
primarily in the sense that 'I am in a world. '115 It is in precisely this connection, then, 
that the ensuing remarks of the lecture text need to be understood: if a statement 
along the lines of cogito sum is 'to mean anything at all, ' it is only as sum moribundus. 
the moribundus alone giving meaning to the sum. 116 For if it is in dying alone that I 
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can say that "I am, " if it is death that is die dul3erste Mdglichkeit of the -I am" then, 
recalling once more the identity of existence and dwelling established in Being and 
Time ( ... I am" means ... I dwell in, I abide in the presence of etc. ) it follows that it is 
only in dying that I can say that I dwell alongside (bei) other beings; that is, it is onIN 
in dying that I can abide there (da) in a world. 
Hence, third and final point, what is at issue for Dasein with regard to the 
possibility of death is its b eing- in- the -world as such. Death is the possibility of 
Dasein's no- longer -b eing- able -to -be -there, that is, the possibility of its no longer being 
Dasein, its no longer being the there that it most properly is. Now, however, the point 
is extended: this possibility is such as to belong to (geeh6rt) being- in-the-worl d as the 
essential constitution of Dasein. In this connection one could say, then, that the 
nonrelational character of death is turned inward, as it were. In the manner in which 
Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it is not only, as Heidegger states, its 
relations (Bez4ge) to other beings that are dissolved (geldst). It is, more emphatically, 
also a matter of a severance of Dasein from itself, from the there that it is. With death, 
it would seem, Dasein comes to be separated from itself. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Heidegger reintroduces at this point the 
notion of anxiety, already examined in the analytic of moods where, as anxiety about 
(worum) and for (worvor) being-in-the -world, it took the form of a privileged instance 
of Dasein's disclosure. The connection with the earlier analyses is noted: Anxiety is 
anxiety for being-in -the -world itself. In Heidegger's more precise 
formulation: das 
Worvor dieser Angst ist das In-der-Welt-sein selbst-117 Yet death is also referred to 
anxiety by way of another, more fundamental connection. Recall again: 'If Dasein 
184 
stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully referred [verweisen] to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-being. ' In being referred to the possibility that is most its 
own and in being thus disclosed to itself from this possibility, Dasein is severed from 
all relations to beings as a whole. Equally, however, to be referred (ueriveisen) i,; also. 
as John Sallis points out, to be exiled. The self-disclosure is one that effectively exiles 
Dasein, thrusts it out from what is comfortable and familiar, exiles it fully. Hence, in 
coming to stand before itself Dasein is exiled. Only in being exiled thus does Dasein 
come back to what is most properly its own. Recall, now, the analyses of the lecture 
'What is Metaphysics? ' Recall, specifically, that it is in anxiety that everything 
appears to shrink away from Dasein and that it is this disappearance of beings as a 
whole that renders Dasein anxious. Anxiety arises thus from nothingness. Or, more 
accurately, Dasein comes to grasp nothingness as a possibility by way of anxiety. 
Heidegger sums up the situation as abweisend Verweisung: referential exile. 118 
In the ensuing sections of Being and Time Heidegger narrates the passage from 
Dasein's flight in the face of ... (Flucht vor ... 
) which, thematised in terms of falling 
(Verfallen) and in terms of the replacement of Dasein's being- way- ahead -of- itself by 
the phenomenon of a not-yet (Noch-nicht), that is, in terms of a transition from the 
sphere of what is most properly Dasein's own to that of broad generality, characterises 
proximally and for the most part Dasein's relation to death, to the level of 
authenticity. Dasein may well be thrown toward the ownmost, nonrelational, 
unsurpassable possibility of death as the most originary concretion of existence. It 
may well be the case that 'if Dasein exists it has already been thrown into this 
possibility. " 19 Death may well be the possibility that is most Dasein's own, Dasein's 
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ownmost possibility. Such does not, however, preclude the possibility that I Dasein 
always can comport itself to this possibility in such a way that what is disclosed bY it 
is evaded or covered up. Indeed, not only can Dasein cover up or fall awav from such 
disclosure, but it does so: 'proximally and for the most part Dasein covers UP its 
ownmost being-toward- death, fleeing beforeit. 1120 
Authentic being- toward- death, meanwhile, is comportment toward death as 
possibility; that is, instead of a comportment toward death which would undertake to 
transform it into something actual (Verwirklichung), authentic being- toward- death is 
a comportment that grants death its status as possibility: 'If being-toward- death has 
to disclose understandingly the possibility that we have characterised, and if it is to 
disclose it as a possibility, then in such being- toward - death this possibility must not be 
weakened; it must be understood as possibility, it must be cultivated as possibility, 
and in comportment toward it sustained as possibility. 1121 
Clearly, therefore, authentic being-toward- death can be a matter neither of 
dwelling on (sich autenthalten bei) death, of expectation (Erwarten), nor of calculating 
how we are to bring it about, since each of these serves to promote its character as 
actuality, thereby annihilating (vernichten) its character as possibility. To the extent 
that death gives no support (keinen Anhalt), 122 nothing to be actualised, and nothing 
that Dasein could itself be (sein k6nnte), the comportment involved in authentic being- 
toward-death means that death be granted its full character as mere possibility. 
Heidegger characterises this comportment as Vorlaufen, running ahead. Vorlaufen, 
however, is neither Vorhaben nor Vorrikken nor Vorschrei, 6en nor Vornehmen, neither 
planning ahead nor moving ahead nor putting forward nor carrying out; rather, it is 
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the movement by which Dasein projects itself onto its death as sheer possibility. In 
running ahead it is a matter of projecting out toward this possibility, but in a way that 
would forego its transformation into something actual. In running ahead, what comes 
to be disclosed is nothing less than Dasein's inability to be what is most its own: 
'bei ng- toward- death as running ahead into possibility is what first makes this 
possibility possible and sets it free as possibility., 123 
Prior to running ahead, Heidegger seems to be implying, death would be 
something not entirely possible; it would be more akin to perishing (Verendetz), to the 
way in which the fruit, having ripened, falls finally to the ground. 124 
Equally, however, 'to project oneself onto one's ownmost potentiality- for-bei ng 
means: to be able to understand oneself in the being thus unveiled: to exist 
[exist ieren]. 1125 If Dasein did not run ahead, it would not exist. If Dasein were not 
dying, it would not exist. Only in dying can Dasein be said to be. 
And yet, Heidegger does not only call this Vorlaufen. He proposes also another, 
more discreet name for this mode of being-toward- death, one that has passed almost 
unnoticed in the literature. In being authentically toward-death, in running ahead 
toward its own death by sustaining its character as sheer possibility, Dasein would 
also be endlich, finite: 126 
In such a being toward its end Dasein exists in a way that is authentically 
whole as that being that it can be when 'thrown into death. ' It does not have an 
end at which it simply stops, but exists finitely [existiert endlich]. 127 
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want to turn now, after this long journey through the 'Letter on "Humanism"' and 
through Being and Time to one of the two instances when Heidegger undertakes to 
treat directly of the poetic sayings of Sophocles' tragedies. These treatments are made 
in the 1935 lecture course, later published as Introduction to Metaphysics, and the 
1942 lecture course H61derlin's Hymn 'The Ister'. 128 I shall want to focus here on the 
first of these treatments. In doing so, I shall not undertake to reconstitute the 
intricacies of Heidegger's analysis - itself, he claims, 'of necessity inadequate. 1129 Nor 
will I attempt to comment on its strategic implications for the context in which it 
appears (a discussion of the traditional opposition between being and thinking). 
Instead, 1 shall want to concentrate on those sections of the commentary which, in 
light of the analyses that I have just retraced, allow us to understand Heidegger's 
claim regarding the inceptive sense of ý%3 that resonates in Sophocles' tragedies. I 
shall want to show how, for Heidegger, these tragedies are seen as 'decisive' in opening 
up a 'concealed directive' for the way in which he undertakes to broach the question 
130 concerning man. 
IV 
In the 1935 lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger begins his treatment 
of the 'poetic project' in which the essence of man is 'established' with an extended 
consideration of the first line of the second chorus from Sophocles' Antigone: 
11OXXd Ta 8ELVd KOýU dVOPW'01) 6ELVOTEPOV lT4XEL. 
Heidegger translates: 
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Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing 
More uncanny looms or stirs beyond man. 131 
In a way that anticipates in large part the standpoint that will be adopted in the 
'Letter on "Humanism", ' Heidegger makes this treatment so as to be able to take the 
measure of who man is (zu ermessen wer ... der Mensch sei). But why through a 
treatment of tragedy, precisely? Heidegger answers: Because it is in tragedy alone 
that one finds a properly poetic projection (dischterischen Entwurf) of the essence of 
man amongst (bei) the Greeks. 132 It is in this sense, then, that the famous choral ode 
from Sophocles' Antigone is said to be 
no mere description and exposition of the spheres and comportments of active 
man as one being amongst others, but the poetic projection [den dichterishen 
Entwur4 of his being from out of its extreme possibilities and JiMitS. 133 
One presumes, although the connection is not made explicit, that Heidegger's use of 
the word Entwurf is intended to give notice that tragedy is being seen less as a 
"sketch" or "outline" of the essence of man amongst the Greeks, and more as a process 
of disclosure and showing forth. In other words, even before undertaking to read the 
chorus, the Introduction to Metaphysics seems to be appropriating for that reading all 
the resources that are released in Being and Time by the connection drawn between 
projection and the full disclosedness of being-in-the -world. Indeed, it Is only in 
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connection with this project of world -constitution to which the properl-v transcendental 
aspect of Being and Time always aspires, that one can begin to grasp the otherwise 
rather questionable claim that Heidegger offers up as justification for his tragic turn: 
it is in tragedy alone that 'the being and, belonging to it, the Dasein of the Greeks, is 
properly established [sich eigentlich stiftete]. 1134 
Heidegger begins the analysis by considering the first line of the chorus. I'vIan, 
he says, is identified there 'in one word' as T6 6ELV6TaTOV . Heidegger translates: das 
Unheimlichste, the most uncanny. This word, he states, encompasses man in 'the 
outermost limits' and 'sudden abysses' of his existence. 135 
To the violence of Heidegger's translation0f T6 8ELvov and0f T6 8ELI'()TCXTOV in 
the ensuing commentaries there have been repeated references. First of all, by 
Heidegger himself in the lecture text of 1942, remarking that the translation is one 
that is befremdlich, foreign, gewaltsam, violence, philologically false. 136 Also by Michel 
Haar, who provides a careful account of the remarks of the Introduction to 
Metaphysics before concluding that 'the entire reading rests on the translation of 
8ELVO'V - habitually rendered by redoubtable - as unheimlich. 1137 Equally by Will 
McNeill, who raises the possibility that Heidegger's translation of the word 6E L 1,16V 
broaches 'the very problem of translation as such. 1138 And by Miguel de Beistegui, who 
declares that 'it matters little thatTO' 8ELVO'v does not "mean" das Unheimliche, if this 
is the direction in which it pointS. 1139 Everything, it seems turns here around the 
singularly deinotic (violent, foreign, etc. ) character of Heidegger's translation Of T6 
8E L VO'V. 
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In the treatment of the chorus made in the lecture course of 1942, Heidegger 
cites as 'instructive' two other translations, both by H61derlin, of the opening line of 
the chorus: 
There is much that is extraordinary. Yet nothing 
More extraordinary than man. 140 
There is much that is forceful. Yet nothing 
Is more forceful than man. 141 
Unlike Hblderlin's translations, which point in the direction of the inhabitual (das 
Ungewdhnliche) and the forceful (das Gewaltige) alone, Heidegger's own translation is 
intended to point in a more fundamental direction by stressing the specifically 
uncanny character Of TO' 6ELv6v, its character as that which is not at home in the 
homely (nicht im Heimischen heimisch ist). He writes: 
the translation0f 8ELVO'v by unheimlich goes beyond what is expressed in the 
Greek word with regard to its explicitness. We may also say that the 
translation is incorrect [unrichtig]. Yet on that account it is perhaps more true 
[wahrer] than its translation by fearful, forceful, inhabitual [furchtbar, 
gewaltig, ungewöhlich]. 142 
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Interestingly enough, both of H61derlin's translations are also cited in an short essav 
by Paul Friedldnder, '11OXXC't Ta 8ELVCL, ' published the year before Heidegger delivered 
Introduction to Metaphysics. 143 It is unfortunate that Friedldnder's essay has gone 
wholly unnoticed in the literature on Heidegger's commentary on the chorus. For 
although Heidegger would certainly object to many of the central claims of that text - 
most evidently Friedhinder's closing arguments concerning the 'ethico- political 
implications' of the tragische Weltsicht - there are nonetheless striking parallels 
between what both philosophers have to say. Not only does Friedldnder organise his 
account around and an interpretation of the ambiguities that bestride the word 
8ELVO'V, 144 albeit one that is rather more philologically and grammatically sound, but 
the central identification of the two counter-turning phrases (Gegensatze) around 
which Heidegger will structure his concerns is also made. 145 So, too, the issue toward 
which my own remarks will be directed, that of death as the uttermost limit (die 
dul3erste Grenze). 146 1will come back to each of these points in due course. To begin 
with, however, let me make one point concerning Heidegger's soi-disant deinotic 
translationd TO' 8ELVbV. 
Following his citations from H61derlin, Friedldnder addresses himself to the 
objections of Wilamowitz, who chides H61derlin for his 'idiotic translation' Of 6E Lv6v by 
the forceful, das Gewaltige, and by the extraordinary, das Ungeheure. 147 On this point 
FriedIdnder, needless to say, demurs, citing a remark from Grimm in which the 
coriginal concept' of das Ungeheure is shown to lie not 'in that which is not ordinary 
[nicht geheuer] but essentially in what is uncanny [unheimlichl. 1148 Such might be, 
Friedldnder suspects, the basic direction in which Sophocles inflects the word. It 
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would seem, then, that what is rather more problematic than Heidegger's translation 
of the word 8ELV6V is his insistence upon the singularly deinotic character of that 
translation. 
Let me ignore, then, the various pretences that assist Heidegger's case here - 
the pretence, for example, that allows him to pass over the fact that neither of the 
terms around which his analysis turns in actually present in this line: T6 8ELP61, is not 
used, only the plural TCL 8ELV6[; the superlative6ELVO'T(ITOV is eschewed by Sophocles in 
favour of the comparative8CLVO'TEPOV- and pass immediately to his initial clarification 
Of T(') 6ELI)61): 
The Greek word8ELVO'V is ambiguous in that uncanny ambiguity with which the 
sayings of the Greeks bestride the counterturning confrontations of being [die 
gegenwendigen Aus-ein-ander-setzung des Seins]. 149 
The ambiguity that Heidegger here takes to characterise the word 8ELV6V is far from 
straightforward. The word, he says, is ambiguous (zweideutig). It means (bedeutet) 
more than one thing. The bulk of the ensuing commentary will be devoted to exploring 
the implications of this statement. The ambiguity is then qualified. It is uncanny 
(unheimlich). The ambiguity that marks the word 8ELV6V is uncanny. AELP611, the word 
for the uncanny (das Unheimliche), is ambiguous in a way that is itself uncanny. In its 
ambiguity the uncanniness Of 6ELVO'V is thus doubled. It is seized already by what it 
names. AE LVO'Vis itself already deinotic. 
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Heidegger proceeds, next, to explore the various ambiguities that characterise 
the word6ELv6v. AELVO'v, he tells us, means first of all the fearful (das Furchtbare). Not. 
however, in the habitual sense of the term, as the intimidating source of Pettý- fears 
(k1eine Furchtsamkeiten). Rather, 6ELv6v means the fearful 
in the sense of the overwhelming prevailing [des iiberwaltigenden Waltens] that 
in the same way compels the panic of terror, true anxiety [die wahre Angst], the 
gathered silent awe that resonates in itself. 150 
F6 8ELVO'V in this first sense clearly refers the TroWg of the opening line of the chorus, 
to what Heidegger's translation of that line calls the manifold or the many, die Viele. 
The point is then clarified: 'it is beings as a whole that is ... the overwhelming. '151 
AE L VO'V in this sense refers to beings as a whole. It is beings as a whole that is 
unheimlich in the sense of the fearful. It is beings as a whole, the sheer facticity of 
their being, that compels (erzwingt) the moods of terror and anxiety. 
And yet, Heidegger tells us, 8CLVO'v does not simply mean the fearful (das 
Furchtbare). It also means the forceful (das Gewaltige). More accuratelY, insofar as it 
means the fearful8ELv6v also means the forceful. But how is this to be understood? It is 
to be understood, Heidegger says, 
in the sense of one who uses force [die Gewalt braucht], not merely by having 
force at his beck and call [iiber Gewalt verffigt] but by being actively forceful a 
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[gewalt-tdtig] to the extent that the using of force [das Gewaltbrauchen] is the 
basic trait not only of his actions but of his Dasein. 152 
Whereas the previous sense of the word8ELVO'v explored its implications with respect to 
beings as a whole with only implicit regard to its bearing on man, the sense this time 
refers explicitly to the deinotic character of man. It is man who, much like those 
beings in the midst of which he stands, is said now to be 8ELV61' in the sense of the 
forceful. Man is 8ELv6v because he is the one who uses force. Not, however, in the sense 
that force could be said to constitute a subsequent property or capacity, something 
upon which man could be said to draw in any given circumstance. Indeed, Heidegger 
goes out of his way to caution against any unauthorised application of force to a sense 
of volition. The terms forceful activity (Gewalt-tdtigkeit) and using force 
(Gewaltbrauchen) are being used, he says, in 'an essential sense. ' One assumes, 
although again the point is not actually made by Heidegger, that force in this sense 
refers neither to its habitual meaning as simple brutality nor to any notion of Willkiir, 
the faculty of maxims or the executive function of the will. The decisive word in this 
context is brauchen: 'to use' or 'to have use for' (in the sense that one says of something 
that es ist brauchbar, it is workable or useful), but also 'to need' or 'to require' (as one 
says of a matter that es ist braucht, it is necessary). Man, one could say, is 8E Lv6v in the 
sense that he needs to use force. 
Yet, Heidegger continues, man is not 6ELVO'V in this sense alone. He is indeed 
8E L PO' 10 in the sense of the one who is actively forceful (der Gewalt-tdtige), but also in 
the sense of the one who is exposed to or set out into (ausgesetzt) the overwhelming, TO 
195 
8ELVO'V in the first sense. As with the 'Letter on "Humanism", ' therefore, the point here 
concerns the attribution to man of a 'singular determinacy, ' of a determinacy that I 
'distinguishes man from himself. 1153 It has been insufficiently noted, however. that this 
characterisationOf TO 
8ELVO'V ought not to be thought as affording an additional sense 
of the word. Rather, it is intended to gather together the earlier senses of the word, 
marking thus the uncanny ambiguity of the notion Of 8ELV6V itself. Heidegger's use of 
the term zweifach, twice or double, marks the point emphatically: 
Man is the actively forceful one not in addition to and aside form his being 
other things, but solely in the sense that, on the basis of his being actively 
forceful against the overwhelming, he uses force. It is because he is twice 8ELV6V 
in an originally unitary sense that he is TO 8ELVOTaTOV, the most forceful [in 
einem ursprünglich einigen Sinne zweifach 8eLvo'v ist erTä 8ELVOTÜTOV, das 
Gewaltigste]: actively forceful in the midst of the overwhelming. 154 
The superlative character of man's 8ELv6v, his character as T6 
8ELVOT(ITOV, the most 
8ELVO'V, is not, then, the effect of a quantitative or qualitative increase or excess of force-, 
rather is it the consequence of that doubling Of 8ELVO'v noted above. Its basic trait, 
Heidegger notes accordingly, 'lies in the interchange of the double sense Of 
8ELVO'V. 1155 
The nomination of man as T6 8ELVOTaTOV 
is such as to gather together the counter- 
turning ambiguities Of TO' 8ELV6V marked at the outset, bringing to the fore the 
fundamental trait of the8ELVO'v: as theMOSt 6ELv6v, the most forceful of beings, man is 
also the most uncanny, das Unheimlichste. 
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The question that needs now to be asked is this: What is to be understood by 
the uncanny, das Unheimliche? Heidegger defines it as that which throws us out of the 
homely, out of what is familiar and habitual (aus dem Heimlichen, d. h. Heimischen). 
As the overwhelming, 8ELVO'V in the first sense, the uncanny names that which 
prevents us from being at home, das Unheimische, the unhomely. 'The unhomely does 
not let us be at home. Therein lies the overwhelming [das Unheimische Idl3t uns nicht 
einheimisch sein. Darin leigt das Uberwältigende]. 1156 As the most uncanny, das 
Unheimlichste, man does not only dwell in the midst of the prevailing of beings as a 
whole, but does so in a way that means that he cannot be at home. As the one who is 
actively forceful, man exceeds the limits of the homely (die Grenze des Heimischen), 
doing so in the direction of the unhomely in the sense of the overwhelming. Heidegger 
writes: 
The knowing man [der Wissende] sets out into the midst of order, draws being 
into beings, yet is never able to prevail over the overwhelming [das 
Uberwdltigende zu bewdltigen]. As such he is thrown back and forward between 
order and disorder, between the base and the noble. Every actively forceful 
harnessing of the forceful Ueder gewaladtige Bdndigung des Gewaltigen] is 
either victory or defeat. Each in separate ways hurls him out of the homely and 
thus each in separate ways first unfolds the dangerousness of achieved or lost 
being. 157 
Another passage clarifies the matter further: 
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It is in being thus set out from the homely that the homely is itself first 
disclosed as such. But at the same time and only thus is the strange, the 
overwhelming first disclosed as such. In the event of uncanniness beings as a 
whole are opened up as such. This opening up is the happening of 
unconcealment. This is nothing other than the event of uncanniness. 158 
Most of the rest of the commentary of the lecture text is in fact devoted to a discussion 
of the manner in which man exists thus inmitten of beings as a whole. Heidegger 
focuses his remarks now around the two structurally synonymous phrases that give 
full voice to the counter-turning character of that existence: 11C(PTOTr6pO3 &Tropo3 and 
ýýCTrOXL! g d'TrOXL! 3, which he renders respectively: 'Everywhere venturing forth 
underway, inexperienced without escape, ' and 'towering high above the site, forfeiting 
the site. '159 
To begin with, Heidegger focuses on the first strophe and antistrophe of the 
chorus. The concern there is with the overwhelming, that is, with beings as a whole. 
The overwhelming is the sea, the earth, living things, 'each one overwhelming (6ELV6V) 
in its particular way. ' In a manner that calls to mind the evocation in the 1919 lecture 
course The Idea of Philosophy of the earlier chorus as a lived event in which 'the first 
joyful morning flashes into view, '160 beings as a whole are 'here said as if for the first 
time. '161 Treating of the overwhelming, however, the chorus treats also of man. 
Indeed, the 1942 commentary will be more direct still: 'although telling of the sea and 
the earth, of the animals and the wild and of storms this strophe and antistrophe 
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tell also 'exclusively of man. 1162 It tells, in other words, of those belngs alongside (bei) 
and in the midst of which (inmitten) man dwells in the world. Yet as the actively 
forceful one - the one who needs to use force in order to be the being that he is - this 
dwelling is far from passive. Man is T6 6ELVOTCLTOV, das Unheimlichste, the most 
uncanny of beings because, abiding in the midst of the many that are uncanny, he is 
not at home. Not at home, man unleashes the force that he needs to use against that 
which overwhelms him, prevailing over it: 
This breaking out, breaking up, capturing and conquering is in itself the first 
opening up of beings as sea, as earth, as animals ... The forceful act of poetic 
saying, the project of thinking, of the construction of buildings, of the action 
that founds a state, is not some awakening of the capabilities that man has, but 
a harnessing and an ordering [Rigen] of those forces [Gewalten] through which 
beings disclose themselves as such in man's entering into their midst. This 
disclosedness of beings is that force over which man has to prevail in order first 
to be himself in forceful activity in the midst of beings, i. e. to be historical. 163 
It should be noted, however, that this forceful activity, this breaking out and breaking 
up, capturing and conquering (Ausbrechen und Umbrechen, Einfdngen und 
Niederzwingen) by which beings as a whole are mastered (bewdltigt) in the sense of 
their being disclosed is not unlimited in all directions, as it were. It is, as Michel Haar 
stiggests, without ever drawing out the consequences of this insight, a matter of 
prevailing over the overwhelming, pour un temps-164 Indeed, it could hardly be 
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otherwise, granted the extent to which this disclosure is not, as we saw in chapter one. 
an unopposed happening, but one that is run through by concealment, granted the 
extent to which 'the clearing in which beings stand is in itself also concealment. '111-5 
Nevertheless, and this brings us to the passage to which I want primarily to draw 
attention: 
on one thing does all forceful activity founder immediately [unmittelbar]. This 
is death. It ends beyond all completion [iiber-endet alle Vollendwig], it limits 
beyond all limits. Here there is no breaking out or breaking up, no capturing or 
conquering. Yet this uncanniness that sets us once and for all outside 
everything homely is not some special event that must come to be named 
amongst others because it, too, finally happens. Man has no escape [ist ohne 
Ausweg] with regard to death, not merely when he comes to die but constantly 
and essentially. Insofar as man is he stands in the inescapability of death. 
Dasein is thus the happening of this uncanniness itself [ist das Da-sein die 
geschehende Unheimlichkeit selbst]. 166 
Another remark concludes the discussion, clarifying the matter further: 
With the naming of this forcefulness and this uncanniness, the poetic project of 
being and of the essence of man sets its limits upon itself. 167 
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Notes 
I The Saying of Anaximander' (GA 5: 357-8). On this remark, see the suggestive note of 
William J. Richardson in Martin Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The 
Hague: Martinus Niihoff, 1974), 519 note 11. Heidegger offers three different 
translations of Anaximander's phrase 6L86VaL &KTIV ... TT19 d&Kýag. He cites first 
Nietzsche's suggestion in Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Greicheiz of 1873: 
'they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice [sie miissen Bu, 6e zahleit und ffir 
ihre Ungerechtigkeiten gerichtet werdenf (GA 5: 321). Next he cites Diels: Ihey pay 
recompense and penalty to one another for their recklessness [sie zahlen ebtander Strafe 
und Bul3e ffir ihre Ruchlosigkeifl' (GA 5: 322), offering finally his own translation: 'they, 
these same ones, let belong (in the overcoming) the order of dis-order [geh&ren lassen sie, 
die Selbigen, Fug (im Verwinden) des Un-Fugsf(GA 5: 357). 
The following methodological considerations, which resume the opening discussions of 
chapter 1, ought to be supplemented by the reading offered by Jean-Franqois Courtine, 
'La Cause de la phenom6nologie' in Heidegger et la ph6nom6nologie, op. cit., 161-85. 
sz 10. 
Cf. SZ 45 and note a. 
SZ 16. 
Cf. SZ 51. 
SZ 51. 
SZ 45. 
Thus Michel Haar in a note to his translation of this 'first sketch' of Being and Time; 
Heidegger (Paris: L'Herne, 1983), 36. 
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10 Z 7. As regards phenomenology as prescience, compare the remarks of The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, in which this propaedutic role is complicated somewhat: 
'Hitherto phenomenology has been grasped ... as a philosophical prescience [einc 
philosophische Vorwissenschaft], preparing the ground for the properly philosophical 
disciplines of logic, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. But in this 
determination of phenomenology as prescience the traditional reserve of philosophical 
disciplines is taken over without asking whether that same reserve is not called into 
question and eliminated by phenomenology itself (GA 24: 3). 
11 Z 7. On the 'police' function of philosophy, see Kant, KrVB xxv. 
12 The identification between the Vorwissenschaft of the lecture and the nomination of 
fundamental ontology as productive logic is made by Heidegger himself when, in the 
Marburg course of 1925, the latter is also termed 'pre-scientific ... disclosure' (GA 20: 3). 
13 Z 7. Emphasis mine. 
14 SZ 52. 
15 SZ 294. Heidegger's emphasis. Compare again the remarks of the 1925 lecture course 
Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time (GA 20: 175-7,391). Taking his 
distance from both a material ethics and a 'merely' formal one, Heidegger's point of 
reference is, as the context makes clear, the respective 'demands' of Scheler (SZ 290-1 
and note) and of Kant (SZ 293). See, too, the more expansive discussion of Scheler's 
material ethics in the lecture course of 1925 (GA 20: 175-7) and the emphasis placed on 
the way in which 'Kant determined the basic principle of his ethics in such a way that we 
call it formal' in the lecture of 1924 (Z 13). On the development of conscience, see the 
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analyses of Courtine, Toix de Is conscience et vocation de 1'6tre, ' Heidegger et la 
phgnominologie, op. cit., 305-25. 
16 GA 26: 177. 
17 Thus: '... if the statement "It belongs to the essence of Dasein that, in its being, it is 
concerned with this being" is located at the point of departure of an ontological analysis 
of Dasein .... then it is a simple imperative of even the most primitive methodology to at 
least inquire whether or not this ontological statement of essence does or could present 
an ontic claim from a world-view that preaches a so-called ... existentiell, ethical egoisin' 
(GA 26: 240). Then: 'We abstain here from adopting a position with respect to the 
criticisms that have surfaced thus far. This is held back - insofar as the real melange of 
"objections" move in the dimension of the problems - for a special publication' (KPM 234 
note 293; 160 note 293). 
18 SZ 294. Heidegger's emphasis. 
19 GA 9: 237; BW 258. 
20 GA 9: 256; BW 258. Emphasis mine. For persuasive readings of Heidegger's work as 
having engaged with the issue of ethics from the start, see Jean Grodin, 'Das 
junghegelianische und ethische Motiv in Heideggers Hermenutik der Faktizitdt' in Wege 
und Irrwege des neueren Umgangs mit Heideggers Werk, ed. Istvin M. Feher (Berlin: 
Duncker and Humboldt, 1991), and John van Buren, 'The Young Heidegger, Aristotle, 
Ethics, ' in Dallery and Scott, eds., Ethics and Danger, op. cit., 169-85. 
21 Beaufret's letter remains sadly unpublished, although a French translation of the 'Br1ef 
über den "Humanismus" does append the 'früherer Briefe' referred to hy Heidegger at 
the end of the later text (GA 9: 363), his initial response to Beaufret's inquiries, 
dated 23 
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November 1945; see Questions (Paris: Gallimard nrf, 1976) 111: 155-7. Around the saine 
time as Beaufret, although eliciting rather less in the way of response, Emmanuel 
Levinas was addressing more challenging versions of this question to Heidegger. See 
VOntologie est-elle fondementale, ' Revue de m6taphysique et de morale 56 (1951). 88-98. 
Such questions had even been implicit in Levinas' work from as early as an essay of 
1932, 'Martin Heidegger et ontologie' in En Dýcouvrant 1 existence auec Husserl et 
Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1967; nouvelle edition), 53-76, which, althoulh not framed in the 
expressly "ethical" terms that Levinas will adopt from 1947 onward, certainly points in 
that direction. See, too, Jacques Derrida's rightly celebrated essay on Levinas, 'Violence 
et la metaphysique, ' which draws heavily on the 'Letter on "Humanism... in order to 
examine Levinas' attempt to provide an 'Ethics of Ethics' that could 'give rise neither to a 
determined ethics, nor to determined laws, without negating and forgetting itself; 
L'Ecriture et la diffdrance (Paris: Seuil, 1967), 164. An extended reading of the various 
threads uniting Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida's understanding of "ethics" is provided 
by Robert Bernasconi, 'Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics: Reiterating the 
"Letter on Humanism", ' Heidegger in Question, op. cit., 211-24. For a more recent 
attempt to orient the text of fundamental ontology toward une 6thique possible, see 
Jacques Taminaux, 'La phenomýnologie de faction et de la pluralitý, 'Archivo di Filosofia 
LIV (1986), 1-3. 
22 GA 9: 353; BW 254. 
23 SZ 316. Significantly, the word Ethik appears each time in quotation marks. 
24 GA 9: 358; BW 259. 
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25 GA 9: 353-4; BW 255-6. In light of the thesis that I want to advance here, Heidegger's 
word anffinglicher ought to be taken in the root sense of Anfang as that which first 
seizes, grasps or takes hold (fdngt). Its identification with the pre-Socratic anffinglichc 
Denker means that, as we saw in chapter 1, it is carefully to be distinguished from 'the 
later beginning [das Beginnen] of metaphysics' (GA 55: 80). In this regard, I would note 
that I find problematic David Farrell Krell's translation of these lines in Dainzoit Life: 
Heidegger and Life Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 1: 'the 
tragedies of Sophocles "in their sayings shelter the Yloog in a more pristine form than do 
Aristotle's lectures on "ethics". ' On incipiency and the incipient beginning, see Dennis 
Schmidt, 'On the Obscurity of Origins: Hegel and Heidegger as Interpreters of 
Heraclitus' in Philosophy Today XXVI (Winter 1982), 322-31, and Schilrmann, Le 
principe d'anarchie, op. cit., 122-5. See, too, §12, Tas anfängliche Denken, das eine 
Bereitschaft ... ' of Heidegger's own notes of 
1938-9, recently collected under the title 
Besinung (GA 66: 40-2). 
26 'ýOLKý results from ýOoug and indeed derives its name with a tiny variation in form, from 
this word'; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics II 1 1. See, however, the objections raised by 
Kahn, cited in note 30, below. 
27 Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Wiedmannsche 
Buchhandlung, 1922) 1: 100 (fragment 119 in the enumeration). 
28 G. S.. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 211. 
29 John Burnet, Early Greek Thinking (London: A. and C. Black, 1920), 124. 
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30 G. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge Universlty Press, 
1989), 260. In a statement that runs exactly counter to the direction of Heidegger's 
ensuing claims, Kahn holds that 'the meaning of the sentence depends on the sense given 
to daimon, ' stating further that 'ethos "character, " is closely related to ethos "custom, 
habit. " In the plural, ethos can refer also to custom or customary haunts. But in this 
fragment 
.... as 
in other poets and in Aristotle, ethos means very much what we 
understand by character: the customary patterns of choices and behaviour distinctive of 
an individual or a given type' (ibid., 335 note 376). On T"10og as 'the hidden but 
characteristic part of a person - the place, as it were, to which one returned when one 
was really him- or herself, ' and TiOEa as 'places and regions, ' see the perceptive comments 
of Charles Scott, The Question of Ethics, op. cit., 143-7 (144). 
31 GA 9: 354; BW 256. 
32 GA 9: 358; BW 259. 
33 Ter (geheure) Aufenthalt ist dem Menschen das Offene für die Anwesung des Gottes 
(des Un-geheuren)' (GA 9: 356; BW 258). The translation is, like so many of those 
advanced by Heidegger, unorthodox. As I shall want to demonstrate, in this context it is 
relatively unproblematic, however. 
34 Heidegger will refer not just to the identification in Being and Time of dwelling as a 
'formal existential expression of the being of Dasein, ' but also to other analyses more 
contemporary with the 'Letter on "Humanism". ' So: 'dwelling is the essence [Wesenj of 
being-in-the-world (cf. Being and Time). This reference to "being-in" as "dwelling" is not 
some etymological word play. The reference in the essay of 1936 on Hblderlin's phrase 
"Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this earth" is no adornment of a thinking 
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that rescues itself from science by way of poetry' (GA 9: 358; BW 260). The latter 
reference is presumably to a remark from the lecture 'H61derlin and the Essence of 
Poetry' where Heidegger states that ... to dwell poetically" means: to stand in the presence 
of the gods and to be struck by the essential nearness of things' (GA 4: 42). although one 
could point equally to a remark from the lecture of 1956, '... poetically man dwells in 
which dwelling is said to be 'the basic character of man's existence [des nzenschlichen 
Daseins]'(VA 23). 
35 SZ 54. Heidegger's emphasis. The ellipses are Heidegger's own. On this paragraph, 
which draws its principle insights from Grimm's Worterbuch, see the helpful note 
provided by MacQuarrie and Robinson in their translation of Sein und Zeit. 
36 Aristotle, De partibus animalium 1 5: 645a. 17-20. The story, Heidegger says, is in tune 
with (mit ... stimmt) the fragment (GA 9: 355; BW 256). Aristotle narrates the story 
principally in order to justify the ensuing sections of his own thesis concerning the study 
of animals. 'We must not, ' he says, 'recoil with childish aversion from examination of the 
humbler animals ... for in everything that flourishes, marvels are present [ýv TrdcrL y6p 
TOIL9 ýVaWd'Lg E'VECYTL TL OaV[IaCYT6v]. And, like Heraclitus, when some strangers came to 
visit him but found him warming himself at the stove and hesitated to go in, is reported 
to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter since even here divine things are present, 
so we should embark on the study of every living being without shame, for each will 
reveal to us something flourishing and beautiful. ' Heidegger first narrates this story, not 
usually included in editions of Heraclitus (neither the Dielz-Kranz edition, nor those of 
Burnet or Kirk consider it worthy of note), at the beginning of the summer semester 
lecture courses he devotes to Heraclitus in 1943, where its position lends it a status 
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analogous to that of the citation from Plato's Sophist that establishes the exordial mood 
of Being and Time. He remarks there, in terms largely retained bv the 'Letter on 
"Humanism", ' that 'such "stories, " even when these are inventions, or precisely because 
they are so, contain a more original truth than data that are established by historic,, il 
research' (GA 55: 5). 
37 6... gegen das übliche Dahinleben der Menschen... ' (GA 9: 355; BW 257). 
38 SZ 172-3. Cf. GA 20: 382-3. The fact that Heidegger prefaces the remarks of Being and 
Time with a discussion of the 'tendency simply-to-perceive [zum Nur-Vernehnienl' that 
fosters curiosity, a tendency expounded in particular relation to Aristotle and 
Augustine's respective interpretations of 'the care for seeing' that is 'essential' for man 
(SZ 171), leads me to think that one could read much of the 'Letter on "Humanism", ' 
principally the emphasis upon the deed (Tun) of thinking as what exceeds all viewing 
(Betrachten), as what exceeds the kcopýa of theoretical reason, in terms of this rarely 
discussed section of Being and Time (§36). It is interesting to note also that Heidegger 
follows the section on curiosity with one devoted to the equally fallen matter of 
'Ambiguity' which, as we shall see, is itself a central notion to the discussion of tragedy in 
Introduction to Metaphysics. As with the analyses of Tear, ' discussed below, it would be 
instructive to trace the way in which many of the everyday comportments and modes of 
bein g- in- the- world uncovered in Being and Time find themselves recast in a more 
authentic guise in the various readings of Greek tragedy. 
39 SZ 172. Heidegger's emphasis. The contrast of 
Oau[id(ELV to curioslty ls Heldegger's own 
(ibid. ). 
40 SZ 172. Emphasis added. 
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41 GA 9: 355-6; BW 257. 
42 GA 9: 354; BW 256. 
43 
... die 
Frage "was der Mensch sei" . .. ' (SZ 45). On such Apriorism us, cf. SZ 50 note 1. 
44 Jacques Derrida makes more or less the same point in'Les Fins de I'homme, 'op. cit., 157, 
and in De 1'esprit, op. cit., 31. 
45 SZ 15. This claim, according to which a 'complete ontology of Dasein' remaIns the 
prerequisite if 'anything like a "philosophical" anthropology is to rest upon a 
philosophically sufficient basis, ' thereby linking the question about being to the question 
of what man is, is made in the 1925 lecture course History of the Concept of Tinze with 
respect to the manner in which the question about being has 'today fallen into 
forgottenness. ' Having devoted several weeks to his preliminary reflections on the 
character of phenomenological research, Heidegger is addressing himself to the 
'fundamental neglect' of the question of being as such (GA 20: 178). Such is, he says, 
'hardly a matter of mere negligence, merely overlooking a question that ought to have 
been raised, any more than the orientation to the traditional definition of man is a 
chance mistake' (GA 20: 179). See, too, the remarks of the 1930 lecture course On the 
r7- 
Essence of Human Freedom (GA 31: 126-7). 
46 GA 9: 313; BW 217. 
, 17 GA 9: 350; BW 252. 
48 Worth remarking in this context is the observation made by Hermann Paul in his 
Deutsches Worterbuch that the substantive form of the word Wesen deri\, es from an 
Indogermanic root suggesting "to reside" or "to dwell, " senses that the verb wcseiz 
preserved until the time of Luther. See also Heidegger's retrospective assessment earlier 
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on in the 'Letter on "Humanism... where, recalling the expression in Beirig atid Tinze 
according to which 'the "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence' (SZ 42: cited GA 9: 325, 
BW 229), he points out that 'the word "essence" was carefully written in quotation 
marks. This indicates that "essence" is now being determined neither from esse esse7zhae 
nor from esse existentiae, but from the ek-static character of Dasein' (GA 9: 327: BIN 231). 
This retrospective remark, as well as the broadly similar one appended to the published 
version of the 1940 lecture course European Nihilism (cf. Niet 11: 194-5y ignores, 
however, the largely underdeveloped sense of "essence" in the earlier work, where 
Heidegger appears to regard the notion of Wesen as virtually interchangeable with that 
of Essenz; see, for example, the following restatement of this formal indication of Dasein's 
being: 'the "essence" ["Essenz"] of Dasein is founded in its existence' (SZ 117). John Sallis 
would disagree on this point and claims to find in Being and Time a 'hardly surprising 
redetermination of essence, ' one announced 'as a kind of reversal: the essence of Dasein 
is existence'; 'Flights of Spirit, ' op. cit., 34. The point here, however, would be that this 
4 redetermination' of the essence of Dasein is not a redetermination of the notion of 
essence as such. 
49 GA 9: 323; BW 227. 
50 GA 9: 323; BW 227. 
51 GA 9: 322,330; BW 226,233. An identical point is made in §34 of Belng and Tinte (. -, Z 
165). 
52 GA 9: 323; BW 227. Heidegger's emphasis. The point is addressed briefly but astutelý, ý, 
Frangoise Dastur in 'Three Questions to Jacques Derrida' in Dallery and Scott (eds. ), 
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Ethics and Danger, op. cit., 25-41 (30-2). See, too, the considerations of Derrida to which 
Dastur's comments are directed, in De 1'esprit, op. cit., 47-57. 
53 GA 9: 322; BW 227. For a similar point, see SZ 48. For an insightful extension of 
Heidegger's case "against" reason, see Heribert Boeder, 'The Distinction of Reason' m 
Seditions, op. cit., 101-9. 
54 In fact, Heidegger makes explicit reference to this long essay of 1928, and to this 
discussion in particular, just a few lines before these remarks (cf. GA 9: 322, BW 226). 
55 GA 9: 127. He adds in a marginal note: 'Wherever and whenever there are beings there is 
also ground; thus there is grounding wherever there is being' (GA 9: 127 note a). 
56 GA 9: 129. 
57 Descartes, Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, Oeuvres de Descartes, op. cit. VII: 25. 
58 Oeuvres de Descartes VII: 24. 
59 Oeuvres de Descartes VII: 25. Cf. ibid., 19 for an expression of this earlier belief. 
60 Oeuvres de Descartes VII: 25. Compare, however, the remarks of the opening pages of the 
Discours, where Descartes makes appeal to 'la ralson ... qui nous rend hommes, et nous 
distingue des b6tes' (ibid., VI: 2). 
61 GA 24: 220. 
62 GA 20: 296. 
63 GA 9: 322; BW 226. Emphasis mine. 
64 'The beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the same time the beginning 
of "humanism... (GA 9: 236). 
65 GA 9: 331; BW 234. 
213 
66 SZ 49. Heidegger's emphasis. 
67 See the remarks of Introduction to Metaphysics: 'this definition of man is at bottom a 
zoological one [ist im Grund eine zoologische], ' and it is upon the (Coot, of this zoological 
definition that 'the Western doctrine of man ... has been constructed' (EM 150). Pus, 
then, is the connection in which to read Heidegger's remark In the 'Letter on 
"Humanism... that 'the thinking that inquires into the truth of being and so defines man's 
essential abode from and toward being is neither ethics nor ontology' (GA 9: 357; BNV 
259). The reference here to 'ontology' is directed not, as Joanna Hodge concludes, toward 
Being and Time, but toward formal ontology - what Heidegger now calls 'the "ontology- 
of metaphysics': 'By way of its beginning [Ansatz] another questioning, this thinking [i. e. 
that of Being and Time] is already removed from the "ontology" of metaphysics (even that 
of Kant)' (GA 9: 357; BW 258), the ontology that had been described in Being and Time 
as both 'ontology taken in its broadest sense and without reference to particular 
ontological directions and tendencies' (SZ 11) and the 'traditional ontology' that accords a 
'priority ... to the present to hand' (SZ 147). For Hodge's remarks, see Heldegger and 
Ethics (London: Routledge, 1997), 100. For a considered view of Heidegger's Destruktion 
of zoology, most succinctly expressed in Introduction to Metaphysics (cf. ENI 108,150) 
and in the remarks of the 1925 Marburg course (cf. GA 20: 155), see Franýoise Dastur, 
'Pour une zoologie "privative", ' Alter 3 (1995), 281-317. 
68 GA 20: 173. Franqois Raffoul provides an exhaustive account of Heidegger's varlous 
remarks to this effect; cf. Heidegger and the Subject (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1998), 22-39. See also David Farrell Krell's commentary on these lines in Dainion LLf(', 
op. cit., 80-2. 
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69 Dastur, 'Three Questions to Jacques Derrida, 'op. cit., 31. 
70 GA 9: 246; BW 248. The Frank Capuzzi and J. Glenn Grey translatlon of the phrase 
6stutzig zu werden' is 'to cause perplexity. ' Although not strictly accurate, this translation 
has the undoubted merit of referring these remarks back to the exordial mood of Being 
and Time and its drafts (cf. SZ 1; GA 20: 179; Z 1, etc. ). Insofar as humanism, on analogy 
with the ontic slumbers projected by 'ancient ontology' (SZ 3), sanctions the wholesale 
neglect of being as die Sache des Denkens and so precludes any interrogation of the very 
conditions under which it might itself become possible, such a referral is an entirely 
persuasive one, therefore. 
71 SZ 50. 
72 The studied caution of this second gesture is reminiscent of Kant's refusal in the first 
Critique to draw any specific ontological inference from the conceptual inadmissibility of 
the ens realissimum (KrV A 592-621; B 620-49). Kant concludes his demonstration of 
the impossibility of either an ontological, cosmological or physio- theoretical proof for the 
existence of God by remarking: 'the ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a regulative 
principle of reason' (KrV A 619; B 647), thus avoiding the snares of speculative theology 
whilst also leaving room for practical faith. So, too, Heidegger, who maintains that it is 
not only rash but a fundamental error of procedure if one assumes that his own 
demonstrations have decided on the existence or non-existence of God (cf. GA 9: 350, BW 
261). 
73 Compare Michel Haar's remarks on 'the poverty of homo humaiius or man without 
faculties' in Heidegger et Pessence de rhomme, op. cit., 122-32. See also Derrida',, 
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insistence on the need to distinguish between the Privation of man and the Entbehrting 
of the animal; De 1'esprit, op. cit., 85. 
74 GA 9: 323-4; BW 227-8. 
75 'Thus we are thinking a humanism of an odd sort [seltsamer Art]' (GA 9: 345, BNN, 248). 
'Is this not "humanism" in an extreme sense [in dul3ersten Sinn]T (GA 9: 342; BW 245). 
76 ... A Scarcely Pondered Word. " The Place of Tragedy: Heidegger, Aristotle, Sophocles' in 
Philosophy and Tragedy, eds. Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 169-90 (170). 
77 GA 9: 313; BW 217. 
78 Charles Scott's elegant translation of Vollbringen as carrying out seems to me astute in 
this instance; see The Question of Ethics, op. cit., 178-9. 
79 GA 9: 358; BW 259. 
80 Cf. Haar, Heidegger et 1'essence de 1'homme, op. cit., 165. 
81 GA 9: 313; BW 217. 
82 Sallis, Echoes, op. cit., 121. 
83 Franýoise Dastur, La mort: Essai sur le fin, tude (Parls: Hatier, 1994), 15. Dastur's 
emphasis. Compare the remarks of an earlier study, H61derlin: tragidie et modernW (La 
Versanne: encre marine, 1992), in which Dastur makes an extensive treatment of 
Hblderlin's various works dealing with tragedy. In the present context, her contention 
that le sujet de tragedie est le temps' (ibid., 38), ought to be noted. Argued for with 
respect to Hblderlin's various attempts to rewrite Empedocles as a modern tragedy, 
Dastur makes the point as follows: '[Empedocles'] suffering comes from the fact that. as a 
mortal, he is tied to the "law of succession, " to time ... For the tragic 
hero ... his tragic 
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sacrifice represents only a temporary solution to his epoch, to destiny. This is why, a., 
Hblderlin makes clear in the "Remarks, " the theme of tragedy is nothing other than time 
itself (ibid., 37-8,59). For further consideration of the merits of Dastur's essays, see 
David Farrell Krell, Lunar Voices: of Tragedy, Poetry, Fiction and Thought (Cilicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1995), 8-9 note 9 and 21-2 note 21, and Jean-Claude Monod. 
Thenomenologie et "chrono-logie", ' Esprit, April 1996,194-200. 
84 Significantly, this role is one in which Sophocles in particular is credited with having, 
grasped in its essentials. The position is extended slightly in Dire le temps, Dastur's most 
important and analytic work to date. Preparatory to a consideration of the relation of 
phenomenology to philosophy, she makes the suggestion that 'philosophy as a mode of 
autonomous thought is only born from the retreat of the divine - to which Sophocles' 
tragedies are the witness ... ; it is because the microcosm is no longer the image of the 
macrocosm the border between the divine and the human becomes problematic [se fait 
inigmel and that the meaning of "being" becomes aporetic. ' So far as Dastur is concerned, 
moreover, the position here is broadly analogous to that argued for at the outset of Being 
and Time; cf. Dire le temps: Esquisse d'une chrono-logie ph6nom6nologique (La 
Versanne: encre marine, 1994), 50 and note. The historical reflections of Walter 
Kaufmann's Tragedy and Philosophy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
seems to me to argue implicitly for a similar thesis. See, for example, the opening claim 
that 'philosophy is younger' than tragedy. Indeed, remarks Kaufmann, 'the two greatest 
Greek philosophers did not merely come after the greatest tragedians, their kiiid of 
philosophy was shaped in part by the development of tragedy' (ibid., 1-2). 
85 La mort 17. 
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86 Ibid., 18. 
87 GA 20: 433.1 will come back to this declaration in the following section. 
88 CE La mort 46-51 and 61-9. 
89 Ibid., 37. Dastur's emphasis. 
90 La mort 16. Earlier in the essay Dastur cites the fragment from Heraclitus which will be 
so central to Heidegger's case, ýOo3 dvOp6mý 8a[[-tov in order to demonstrate that 'la vie de 
Fhomme soit vie "avec" les morts' (9). In this regard, see also Dennis Schmidt's 
observation A propos the fact that 'in Being and Time, Heidegger takes the project of 
thinking the prospects of connectedness to the point of asking about our relation with the 
dead, ' a relation that is itself 'the bond overriding every other bond for Antigone'; Vliy I 
am so Happy, ' Research in Phenomenology XXV (1995), 3-14 (6). Looking ahead 
somewhat to chapter 4, attention should also be drawn to Ernst Cassirer's examination 
of mythic existence in the second part of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, an essay to 
which both Heidegger and Benjamin respond at length. 'A basic trait of the mythic 
consciousness of objects, ' notes Heidegger in his review of Cassirer's book, 'lies in the fact 
that a demarcated boundary [eine abgesetzte Grenze] is lacking ... between the living and el 
the dead' (KPM 2560. On Cassirer's presentation of this trait, see Alexis Philonenko, 
L'Ecole de Marbourg: Cohen, Nartorp, Cassirer (Paris: Vrin, 1989), 167. 
91 Comment vivre avec la mort? (Paris: tditions pleins feux, 1998), 25. The phrase also 
appears in La mort 15. 
92 Comment vivre avec la mort? 36. Dastur offers a far more direct expression of' her 
position a few lines earlier: 'I would like, ' she says, 'to risk the following thought: being, 
existence, is perhaps nothing other than gift of death [le don que nous fait la mortl' (ibid., 
218 
35), and concludes her observations with the following strangely tragic call to 'laughter': 
'In laughter we experience what Nietzsche so magnificently called "the innocence of the 
future. " We experience the fact that we are innocent, that death is not the punishment 
for a crime that we commit simply by being born but, on the contrary, what allows us to 
exist [d'6tre 1d], and it is thus in laughter that, paradoxically, we enter into the most 
profound relation to out mortality' (ibid., 37-8). Here, at least, Dastur's point of reference 
is less Heidegger than Bataille. See, most evidently, the remarks of Le Coupable: 'Le fou 
r1re ou Pextase nous placent au bord du m6me abime, c'est la "mise en question" de tout 
le possible. C'est la point de rupture, de lAchez-tout, Fanticipation de la mort'; Oeuvrcs 
compl&es (Paris: Gallimard, 1977) V: 355. See also La mort, op. cit., 76-9. 
93 VA 17 1. 
94 Comment vivre avec la mort? 36 note 17. 
95 a habiter veritablement la terre et a sejourner dans son corps' (ibid., 36). 
96 Cf. SZ 302. 
97 GA 9: 318; BW 222. This dimension is admirably explored in Franqoise Dastur's 
'Language and Ereignis' in Sallis (ed. ), Commemorations, op. cit., 355-69, esp. 
357-9. See 
also the brief remarks of Friedrich -Wilhelm von Hermann in Die 
Selbstinterpretation 
Martin Heideggers (Meisenheim am Glam: Anton Hain, 1964), 183-4, and the more 
critical remarks of Lyne, The Temporality of Language, op. cit., 84-9. 
98 GA 9: 318; BW 222. 
99 GA 9: 323; BW 227-8. As David Farrell Krell points out in an editorial note to the 
English translation of these remarks, the ensulng reference to care Is 
here already 
inferred in the reference to the notion of 'the ecstatic' 
(BW 228). 
219 
100 GA 9: 319; BW 223-4. Heidegger refers on two other occasions in the 'Letter oti 
"Humanism... to the notion of care, each time in order to make more or less the same 
point (cf. GA 9: 331,350; BW 231,252). 
101 SZ 42. See also SZ 42 note b. That this is, properly speaking, an identification of Dasein 
as possibility is left in no doubt, Heidegger adding: 'Dasein is [istj in each case its 
possibility' (SZ 42. Heidegger's emphasis). Such might, he suggests in a note, be taken as 
a 'definition' (SZ 42 note d). 
102 SZ 191-2. Heidegger's emphasis. 
103 Tas Sich-vorweg-sein besagt voller gefäßt: Sich-vorweg-inz-schon-sein-in-einer-II(? lt' (SZ 
192. Heidegger's emphasis). In the Widerholung of the second Division, Heidegger 
restates this 'existential formula' as follows: 'being-way-ahead-of-oneself- already- in (a 
world) as being-alongside (innerworldly beings encountered)' (SZ 317). 
104 SZ 244. 
105 SZ 234. 
106 GA 20: 246. 
107 Cf. SZ 247,251,252, respectively. Read this way, the functional structures that demand 
that Heidegger treats of death are actually set in place several sections earlier in Bebig 
and Time than those explicitly devoted to the matter itself. In this regard, I begin to 
wonder whether it might not be instructive to return that analysis to the description 
afforded in the lecture course of 1925 History of the Concept of Time, where Heidegger 
states his preference for seeing the analysis of death as a purely 'transitional 
consideration' (GA 20: 242). Indeed, as is said later on in Being and Time, such 
considerations merely make 'the articulation of the totality of the structural wIzole et-cri 
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more rich ... ' (SZ 317. Heidegger's emphasis). On the difficulties that accrue from t1lis 
program of analysis, namely that it 'leaves authentic being-toward- death without ontic 
attestation, ' see Robert Bernasconi, 'Literary Attestation in Philosophy, ' Heidegger ill 
Question, op. cit., 76-98 (77). 
108 SZ 317. Heidegger's emphasis. 
109 SZ 250. Heidegger's emphasis. In the following analyses, I am indebted to the studies of 
Dastur, La mort, op. cit., 18,40-6; Jacques Derrida, Apories: Mourir - s'allendre aux 
"limites de la veritg" (Paris: Galilee, 1996), 48ff., Haar, Heidegger ei l'essence de l'honune, 
op. cit., 31; and Scott, The Question of Ethics, op. cit., 97-101. 
110 Cf. SZ 239-40. 
ill SZ 250. Heidegger's emphasis. 
112 See Derrida, Apories, op. cit., 114: 'If being-possible is the being proper to Dasein, then 
the existential analytic of Dasein's death ought to make this possibility its theme. The 
analytic of death is submitted, as an example, this ontological law which regulates the 
being of Dasein, and which has the name possibility. On the other hand, however, death 
is itself uttermost possibility. ' In the ensuing pages, Derrida deals at length with the 
notion of death as possibility (ibid., 113-16). 
113 Compare Haar, Heidegger et 1'essence de I'homme, op. cit., 31. 
114 GA 20: 437,440. See also Haar, Heidegger et ressence de I'homme, op. cit., 31-2. 
115 SZ 211. The 'phenomenological deconstruction of the cogito sum' (SZ 89) projected at this 
point in Being and Time was, of course, never published. 
116 GA 20: 438. On this remark, see the commentaries of Dastur, La mort, op. cit., 46-7, and 
Haar, Heidegger et 1'essence de I'honinze, op. cit., 30. 
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117 SZ 251. 
118 GA 9: 120. 
119 SZ 251. 
120 SZ 251. 
121 SZ 261. Heidegger's emphasis. The analogy with the position argued for by Dastur with 
respect to the relation that man entretient with sa propre mortalW is clear. 
122 Compare Maurice Blanchot's assertion that one cannot 'compter sur la mort, la v6tre, la 
mort universelle, pour fonder quoi que ce soit, pas mÖme la rýalit6 de cette mort se 
uneertaine et is irreelle qu'avee elle s'ývanouit ce qui la prononce'; L'Iýcriture du dAastre 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 143. 
123 SZ 262. 
124 Compare Henri Birault's detection in these lines of an 'invention' of 'another death or 
another certainty of death, ' one through which 'what is involved in actual death' comes to 
be disclosed. Birault elaborates: 'To die means in fact to be able to die. But this inabilitv, 
henceforth invested with an "ontological" or "transcendental" significance, now precedes 
the event or fact of death. Death is thus doubled. It alone affords the meaning or the 
truth, the comprehension or the capacity of death. Being-able-to-die does not prefigure 
the reality of death. It gives only the intelligence and the power of death. It bespeaks 
what is involved in actual death [ce qui est en jeu dans la mort effective]'; Heidegger et 
1'expirience de la pensee, op. cit., 39. Adds Birault in a phrase that reminds us of the 
position argued for by Dastur: 'La fatalit6 est empirique, la possibillt6 qui en proc&de ne 
1'est pas moins ... La mort n'est pas un ph6nom6ne vItal, 
la mort est un ph6nom&ne 
existential' (ibid. ). 
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125 SZ 262-3. Emphasis mine. 
126 In order to see how Endlichkeit functions as just such a name, it would be necessarv to 
show how, at least in terms of any explicit and thematic treatment, the term occupies a 
decidedly marginal position in the architechtonic of Being and Time where, of all places, 
one would have expected Heidegger to have made an extensive treatment. It is, the 
assumption that he does so that mars the otherwise excellent critique of Haar in 
Heidegger et 1'essence de I'homme, op. cit., 27-43. Indeed, not only does Haar assume 
'finitude' to be a synonym for death -'is not "my death", ' he asks, 'merely another word to 
designate the temporality of my finitude whose future horizon is indeterminateT (ibid., 
27-8) - he also assumes its correlation with mortality (ibid., 31), an even more fugitive 
term so far as Being and Time is concerned, where it makes only one appearance, and 
there merely in order to characterise the 'ontic interpretation' of care afforded by 
Seneca's Epistles (SZ 199). As the Preface to Haar's book demonstrates, however, this 
distinction is one of which he is profoundly aware; cf. Heidegger et 1'essence de 1'homme, 
op. cit., 20. The same cannot be said of Christopher Fynsk's feeble attempt to read 
'Heidegger's course of thinking' as one entirely constructed around a notion of finitude. 
Fynsk's account of Being and Time is breathtakingly lax in its governing assumptions, 
particularly so given the manner in which Fynsk undertakes to situate the work as a 
reflection on 'the finitude of metaphysical questioning, ' a term he misappropriates from 
the Kantbuch of 1929; cf. Fynsk, Heidegger: Thought and Historicity (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), esp. 16-17,28-54 (16). For a more productive employment of the 
same erroneous distinction, see David Wood, The Deconstruction of Time (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1989), 188-9. The only commentator to have explored the technical 
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sense given to the notion of finitude in Being and Time is Jean Grodin, La Tournant 
dans la pensee de Martin Heidegger (Paris: puf, 1987). 
127 SZ 329. Heidegger's emphasis. 
128 To the extent that Heidegger focuses much of his attention on the notion of TT6XLg, it is 
unsurprising that the majority of the literature devoted to his readings of the chorus 
have adopted a specifically political approach. In the following sections I am indebted to 
two excellent comparative studies. Jacques Taminaux's Le Thidtre des philosophes 
(Grenoble: Jer6me Millon, 1995), provides an excellent summary of both readings in the 
context of the author's ongoing genealogy of tragedy. Miguel de Beistegul's Heidegger 
and the Political, op. cit., 114-45, offers a sustained account of both readings, focussing 
on the shift from the lectures of 1935, 'which still suffered from onticity, ' to the 'more 
"ontological... interpretation of 1942. Formidable though his account may be, one ought to 
note nonetheless the infelicity of de Beistegui's assertion that 'the translation of the 
chorus from Antigone, which constitutes Heidegger's major source of interpretation, 
remains identical' (ibid., 141). Not so. The translation published in the 1953 edition of 
Introduction to Metaphysics is not the one used in 1935 but the one developed during the 
lectures of 1942. For Heidegger's original translation, see Martin Heidegger - Karl 
Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920-1963, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990), 158-60. In addition to the studies of Taminaux and 
de Beistegui, I have consulted with profit Will McNeill's excellent 'Porosity: Violence and 
the Question of Politics in Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics' in Graduate Facultv 
Philosophy Journal 14: 2-15: 1 (1991), 183-212, as well as the brief but perceptive 
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remarks of Haar in Heidegger et ressence de rhomme, op. cit., 208-12, and of Ward, 
Heidegger's Political ninking, op. cit., 184-93. 
129 EM 113. CE GA 53: 73. 
130 EM 133,156. Heidegger's emphasis. 
131 'Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch / über den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres 
ragend sich regt' (EM 112). 
132 EM 112. 
133 EM 119. Compare, however, the entirely reasonable objection of Michel Haar that 'the 
manifest content of the text is a simple enumeration of the activities of man'; Heidegger 
et 1'essence de 1'homme, op. cit., 212. 
134 EM 110. The phrase 'das zugehbrige' is a later addition. 
135 EM 114. The formulation is repeated a few pages later (EM 119). 
136 Cf. GA 53: 74. 
137 Haar, Heidegger et Pessence de I'homme, op. cit., 209. 
138 Will McNeill, 'Porostity, ' op. cit., 187. 
139 de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, op. cit., 141. 
140 'Ungeheuer ist viel. Doch nichts / Ungeheuerer, als der Mensch' (GA 5 3: 85). 
141 Tieles gewaltige giebts. Doch nichts / Ist gewaltiger, als der Mensch' (ibid. ). 
142 GA 53: 78. 
143 Paul FriedlAnder, '11OXXdt TC'1 8ELVdt, ' Hermes 69 (1934), 56-63. Since its publication, 
Friedkinder's essay has claimed a canonical place in the scholarly literature on the 
chorus. My thanks to James Gilbert-Walsh for having confirmed that a copy of this essay 
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was indeed available in the Universitdtsbibliotek in Freiburg during the time Heidegger 
was composing Introduction to Metaphysics. One can only be surprised that this es,, -,. i%- 
has received no attention in the literature on Heidegger, particularly so given the 
generous attention that has recently been paid to Friedldnder's various responses to 
Heidegger's essay 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth. ' On the complex history of these responses 
and their counter-responses, see Bernasconi, The Question of Language, op. cit., 17-23. 
144 Frieffinder, 'ITOXX& T& 8ELV&, ' 59. 
145 Ibid., 58. 
146 Ibid., 59; EM 121. In the translation actually used in the lecture course of 1935 
Heidegger follows Friedhinder's translation of Sophocles' reference to Hades as 'the 
singular hurdle [einziges Hindernisj, ' before modifying in 1942 to 'the singular onslaught 
[einzigen Andrang]. ' 
147 Friedldnder, ToW Ta 8ELVel, 'Op. cit., 59. 
148 Ibid.. 
149 EM 114. 
150 Ibid.. 
151 'Das Seinde im Ganzen ist ... das 
Überwaltigende'(EM 115). 
152 EM 115. At the risk of the occasionally cumbersome phrase, I will translate Gewall, 
Gewaltige, gewaltteitig, etc. as force, forceful, actively forceful, etc.. Such is to be preferred 
to the usual translation of power or violence. Compelling in this regard are the 
observations of Haar: 'Rendering Gewalt by violence gives the impression that the 
relation of being to man and man's response would be marked not by necessity but by 
coups de force, by violent convulsions'; Heidegger et 1'essence de Chomme, op. cit., 211. If I 
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do not follow Haar in his choice of power (puissance), it is because of the emphasis that 
Heidegger will place on the notion of Macht later on in his interpretation. 
153 
... 
kann es seine überwaltigende Macht an sich halten' (EM 115. Heidegger's emphasis). 
154 EM 115. 
155 The locutions are those of Boeder, 'The Distinction of Reason, ' op. cit., 103. 
156 EM 115. 
157 EM 123. 
158 EM 116. 
159 EM 123. 
160 EM 127. 
161 Respectively, 'Oberall hinausfahrend unterwegs erfahrungslos ohne Ausweg' and 
'Hochiiberragend die Stdtte, verlustig der Stdtte' (EM 113,116-7). The 1935 translation 
on both 'salient points' is identical to the one worked out in 1942. 
162 GA 56/57: 74. 
163 EM 117. 
164 GA 53: 123. 
165 EM 120. 
166 Haar, Heidegger et 1'essence de I'homme, op. cit., 211. 
167 GA 5: 40; BW 178. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The dicta of Fate: Benjamin and the Signs of Tragedy 
It is here that the attitude of the Greeks and the real 
tragideans [der eigentlichen Tragikerl toward the world 
and toward fate remains unbending. 1 
In a letter written to Hugo von Hofmanstahl in December 1925, Benjamin recalls the 
(great interest' with which he had 'some time ago' been reading Ernst Cassirer's 
investigations into 'conceptual forms in mythic thinking. 12 This reading, however, 
appears not to have left the young Benjamin unsatisfied and he is quick to air his 
suspicions as to the overall feasibility of these investigations, chiding Cassirer 
accordingly for attempting 'not merely to present mythic thought in concepts, i. e. 
Critically, but also to illuminate it in contrast with [durch den Kontrast gegens] what 
is conceptual. 13 
Although the focus of his dissatisfaction goes largely unexplored in this letter, 
the emphasis that Benjamin places on the notions of concept and contrast is perhaps 
enough to suggest that the principle difficulty here is less with the overall content of 
Cassirer's account, than with the manner in which this 'phenomenology of mythic 
consciousness' undertakes to orchestrate its concerns. Its method. So when Cassirer 
maintains, for instance, that mythic thinking crystallises around the concretion of 
( pure intuition, ' thereby allowing for the application of the categories of modality. 4 
Benjamin would presumably object that such categories can, in fact, have no purchase 
228 
in the realm of myth. Equally, given his long-standing hostility to the neo-Kantian 
project discussed in the opening chapters, one might well suspect that the reference 
here to the notion of Kritik is intended to draw attention to what Benjamin would 
doubtless see as an unauthorised extension of the relation that obtains between 
transcendental consciousness and the critique of pure reason to the real of a critique of 
culture. 
Need it be said that the situation being invoked here by Benjamin is broadlý 
similar to the one that will be surveyed by Heidegger in an ambiguous note to § 11 of 
Being and Time? Although quick to congratulate Cassirer on having made significant 
advances not merely in the field of ethnological research but also in the philosophical 
investigation of das mythische Dasein, Heidegger raises there a question as to whether 
the foundations upon which these advances are made have in fact been rendered 
sufficiently transparent. 15 The lines to which this note is appended indicate the 
substance of Heidegger's reserve on this point. Marking clearly the distinction 
between the ontic proximity of everydayness and the factical state of primitive 
existence (Alltdtlichkeit deckt sich nicht mit Primitivitdt), he allows nonetheless that 
the latter can have some positive significance, some factual merit: 'primitive 
phenomena, ' he suggests, 'are often far less concealed and far less complicated, ' 
concluding: 'Primitive Dasein often speaks out of a more originary absorption in 
phenomena. 16 The problem here, then, is not with the notion of the primitive per se 
(which has, as Heidegger remarks, 'its own specific everydayness'), but with the failure 
of ethnology - and Cassirer's ethnology in particular - to ask as to the mode of 
being to 
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which it is addressed. Ethnological science, he declares accordingly, 'already 
presupposes an adequate analytic of Dasein. 17 Whatever significance Cassirer's work 
may have as regards the future of ethnological research, therefore, its currencY is 
devalued somewhat once it is seen from the perspective of properly 'philosophical 
problematics. 18 At least as damaging to Cassirer's case, however, is Heidegger's 
evident disquiet on the question of whether 'the architechtonic and general systematic 
content' of the Critique of Pure Reason are at all capable of 'affording a possible design 
for such a task. ' A review essay, written and published in the year following Being and 
Time, formulates the question and the doubt more pointedly still. Following a 
summary exposition of Cassirer's text and its achievements as 'a guide to the positive 
sciences, ' Heidegger again registers his concerns as to its 'foundations and 
methodological principles, ' its 'proper philosophical content. '9 Quickly divining the 
underlying justification for Cassirer's view of myth as 'a creative principle of world 
formation'10 - essentially, Heidegger notes, 'an appeal to Kant' - he raises the question 
of whether the neukantisch interpretation upon which this appeal is made does in fact 
'get to the heart of the transcendental problematic as an ontological one in its essential 
possibilities. '11 Heidegger, needless to say, demurs, seeing in Cassirer's analysis a 
failure to engage in a sufficiently primordial manner with the realm of being toward 
which it is directed. 'The interpretation of the essence of myth as a possibility of 
human existence [menschlichen Daseins] remains, ' he concludes, 'random and 
directionless so long as it cannot be grounded in a radical ontology of Dasein in light of 
the problem of being in general. 112 
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For Heidegger as for Benjamin, therefore, it remains a moot point as to 
whether mythic thought does indeed lend itself to the sort of conceptual analysis being 
proposed by Cassirer. In each case, moreover, the difficulty is not with 'the rich 
ethnological and religious historical material that grounds Cassirer's interpretation of 
myth, '13 but with the underlying claim to have presented its object 'in concepts, i. e. 
Critically, ' and so to have illuminated it 'in contrast with what is conceptual. '14 
The remarks of the letter to von Hofmansthal are by no means Benjamin's first 
and last words regarding the examination of mythic consciousness undertaken by his 
illustrious tutor, who makes a rather more significant appearance, if not by name then 
certainly by inference, several years before this, in a series of remarks that punctuate 
the central section of the long Goethe essay of 1924.15 In a manner that enjoys close 
analogy with the contemporaneous reflections on the origins of knowledge made by 
Cassirer in the second part of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 16 Benjamin declares 
'the meaning of the relation of myth to truth' to be one 'fundamental to all knowledge 
[fiir alle Erkenntnis fundamentale]. 117 In sharp contrast to the influential account of 
Cassirer, however, who identifies the Bedeutung of the Verhdltnis as a process of 
substitution - for the category of truth, he says, myth substitutes that of 
indiscriminate presence18 - and of transition - all categories of knowledge, we are told, 
'have to pass through a mythic stage before receiving the titles and Insignia that give 
them their logical value'19 - Benjamin's own reflections lead him to identify this 
meaning as one of unequivocal exclusion. 
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'There is, ' he declare, 'no truth, for there is no unambiguity, and so not even 
error in myth [Es gibt keine Wahrheit, denn es gibt keine Eindeutigkeit, und also nicht 
einmal Irrtum im Mythos]. 120 Declaring the distinction to be absolute, Benjamin takes 
the hammer of critique to the ungainly pedestal of the literature, deriding as wholly 
jejune the groundless (unergriinglich) identification of myth and truth made by the 
Goethe commentaries of one Friedrich Gundolf. 21 The relation, he avers, rather ought 
to be thought as one of indifference (Indifferenz). In the structure of this indifference, a 
notion that Benjamin is quick to divest of any lingering sense of insouciance or 
passivity, characterising it instead as annihilating (vernichtenden), myth comes to be 
withdrawn from any claim to truth. So much so, in fact, that the structure annihilates 
altogether the possibility of there being anything like a truth of myth. Of myth, writes 
Benjamin, evoking a distinction already familiar from chapter two, there can only be 
knowledge (eine Erkenntnis); a knowledge, he implies parenthetically, that would be 
nothing other than knowledge of myth's essential indifference to truth. In this regard, 
he concludes, 
authentic art, authentic philosophy - as distinct from their inauthentic stage, 
the theurgic - begin [hebt ... an] 
in Greece with the departure of myth 
[Ausgang des Mythos], since neither one is any more nor any less based on [auf 
beruht] truth than the other. 22 
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In Benjamin's own projection for the essay, these lines come from a series of remarks 
entitled 'Myth and Truth. 123 The title and the remarks themselves suggest a verN, 
simple schema: myth comes to an end; then, after the end of myth and in opposition to 
it, something else begins, something called truth. One could presume Benjamin's text 
to fill in this schema by drawing out the particular nature of the opposition of 
authentic art and philosophy to their inauthentic counterparts, and by offering one or 
two considerations as to the character of the new beginning then to be made, of the art 
and philosophy that might shelter truth from the 'most disastrous mode of thinking 
which bewilderingly bends back into myth that which has itself begun to grow out of 
it. 924 
Yet it is important that one not detach such a schema from these remarks on 
'myth and truth, ' not employ it as a framework for reading Benjamin's text. But why 
not? Are not these lines unequivocal in their formulation of this schema? Such would, 
it seems, be the view that has governed the repeated references that have been made 
to these remarks. By Winfried Menninghaus, for instance, who proposes that one read 
'the opposition of reason and truth to myth' being constructed here by Benjamin as 
'dependent upon a vertical schema of evaluation, a schema, furthermore, that entails 
Ia clear hierarchy between the tWo. 125 Also by Rolf Tiedemann, who makes the 
suggestion that 'however much certain very ancient works of art still retain links with 
myth, they become works of art only to the extent that they constitute an opposition to 
the spirit of myth. '26 Also by Reiner Rochlitz, who observes that 'art and philosophy 
arise only in opposition to myth. '27 
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Undeniably, Benjamin holds that in order for art and philosophy to be 
authentic, eigentlich, they have to be grounded on truth. And holds also that it is this 
ground alone that distinguishes the from the art and philosophy that, grounded upon 
myth, he calls inauthentic, uneigentlich. It would be difficult to imagine a more 
classical statement of metaphysical opposition, of the opposition constitutive of 
metaphysics itself. As such, one can hardly avoid the suspicion that Benjamin's 
remarks here afford little more than one further expression of philosophy's founding 
and well-documented denigration of myth, of that denigration through which myth 
comes to be located and defined by way of a X6yo! 3 -a X6yo3 that defines itself even by 
way of a twisting free from the hold of myth - and so by way of a truth that would 
remain by definition closed to myth. The ensuing paragraphs of the essay, in which 
Benjamin relaunches his offensive against the attempts of Herr Gundolph to keep his 
'wriggling sophisms' suspended above 'the ground ... of X6-yog, ' certainly do little to 
dispel this impression, concluding, as they do, with the unequivocal declaration that 
'the question of truth can come to nothing in the face of every mythIc thlnking. '28 So 
far as this declaration is concerned, indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a 
position seemingly any more at odds with that of Heidegger who maintains, 
meanwhile, that it is in fact in myth that one finds a mode Of CiXTJOEýELII more 
appropriate than any apophantic X6-YO9 to the conflict of clearing and concealing that 
he identifies as the happening of truth. The 1942 lecture course Parmendes makes the 
point succinctly: 
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MWog is the Greek word for the word in which is said that which is to be said 
before all else. The essence of ýtbOog is itself determined on the basis of 
dXýPE 
La. 
It is ýtHog that reveals, discloses and allows to be seen, that is, reveal,, -,, 
discloses, and allows to be seen that which shows itself in advance of 
everything as the presencing in all "presence. " Only where the essence of the 
word is grounded in dX'OELCL, hence amongst the Greeks, TI only where the word is 
grounded in this way as great legend that supports all poetry and all thinking, 
hence amongst the Greeks, only where poetry and thinking ground the 
originary relation to the concealed, hence amongst the Greeks, only there is 
there that which bears the Greek name ýtWo3, namely "myth. 1129 
There would seem, then, to be little to choose between the schema under which the 
account of myth is advanced by Benjamin in his Goethedeutung and the 'spirit of 
modern rationalism' which Heidegger elsewhere takes to have infected the claims of 
'our modern historians of philosophy. ' With his failure to have grasped that 'ItDOo, 3 and 
X6-yo3 are not ... placed in opposition by philosophy as such' 
but 'become separated and 
opposed only at the point where neither ýtDOog nor X6-yo3 are able to hold to its original 
essence, ' Benjamin's demotion to the ranks of modern historian would seem to be 
assured. 30 
Yet what makes his grasp of matters rather more insightful than this sort of 
schema would suggest is a sense that the relation of myth to truth (one of 'annihilating 
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indifference, ' remember) is such as to render immediately problematic any 
straightforward comparison of or transition from one to the other. 
Recall once again: 'There is no truth ... and so not even error, in myth. ' That 
there is no place for truth with respect to myth does not, then, mean that myth would 
harbour the opposite of truth: Irrtum, error or untruth. As the Schellingian notion of 
indifference is presumably intended to suggest, the relation of myth to truth is such as 
to admit of no principle of unity or identity that would be able to effect an hierarchical 
ordering of the two, implying there by the continuity of an order of founding between 
them. The point is that the ostensibly historical reflections of Benjamin's essay on 
Goethe have philosophical significance. The assertion that authentic art and authentic 
philosophy begin with the departure or close of myth amounts also to the assertion 
that this departure marks the entrance or opening of that upon which the possibility 
of such authenticity rests. The Ausgang of myth presages the Anhebung of authentic 
art and authentic philosophy only to the extent that is presages also the Anhebung of 
truth itself. What comes thus to be placed in question is the assumption that the 
saying of myth, a saying 'prior' to and so also 'indifferent' to the saying of truth, could 
be set in opposition to the saying of truth as, for instance, the saying of untruth. The 
annihilating indifference of myth with respect to the determination of truth being 
advanced here by Benjamin means that there can be no basis upon which the two 
might come to be contrasted in this way. Any such basis or principle would be 
precluded, so the analysis implies, not simply by myth's indifference to truth, but also 
by the peculiar and correlative character of truth itself. In the passage from myth to 
236 
truth a decisive transformation - one coincident with what Benjamin names here a 
'departure' or 'closure' - has taken place. Between myth and truth there can be no 
common measure. 
Yet although this lack of measure indicates quite emphatically the insufficiency 
of an attempted transition from myth to truth, it also invites us to ponder the nature 
of the transformation. In order for this to take place, however, it would first have to be 
possible for this Ausgangspunkt to show itself. There would need to be some common 
ground, some point of coincidence, upon which myth and truth could be brought 
together in their indifference. And although in this context Benjamin gives no 
indication as to what such a point might look like or how it might come to show itself, 
a telling hint in this direction is made elsewhere, in the section of the Origin of the 
German Mourning Play entitled 'Tragedy and Legend': 
The decisive Greek confrontation with the daimonic world order [der 
griechische, die entscheidende Auseinandersetzung mit der dämonischen 
Weltordnung] gives tragedy its historico -philosophical signature. The tragic 
relates to the daimonic as does paradox to ambiguity. In all the paradoxes of 
tragedy ... ambiguity, the 
hallmark of the daimons, is dying away [ist ... im 
Absterben]. 31 
Tragedy has, then, the character of a confrontation. Regarded by Benjamin - as by 
Heidegger, for whom, recall, it is in tragedy that'the battle of the new gods against the 
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old is being fought [wird gekdMpft]132 - as the locus of a particularly strifely 
configuration of specifically Greek existence, tragedy is seen as a statement of 
historical intent, therefore, one characterised as a decisive confrontation with that 
stage of historical existence in which 'the essence is daimon, ' namely myth. 33 In this 
regard, tragedy comes to be written as the decisive response of the Greeks to the 
mythic order of the daimons, as a violent and transformative turning agaiiist mytl-i. 
Tragedy would be the site upon which Greek man confronts the prevailing mythic 
realm of the daimons, submitting its overwhelming ambiguities to the discontinuity of 
tragic paradox. Yet if tragedy does remain for Benjamin a kind of presentation - it is 
the expression of something, it gives something to be seen - he is nevertheless at pains 
to insist that what is properly decisive is to be found less in what it presents (das 
Dargestellte) than in the presentation itself (der Darstellung selbst). In light of the 
opening declaration of the Origin of the German Mourning Play discussed in chapter 
two, this insistence is perhaps not surprising'34 and enjoys at least some analogy with 
Heidegger's suggestion that tragedy does not refer to this battle (redet es nicht dber 
diesen Kamp/) but itself inaugurates and enacts the confrontation. 35 For the point here 
concerns how the Greek confrontation with myth is said, how tragedy exposes it or 
gives it to be seen. In presenting this confrontation, what tragedy exposes or gives to 
be seen is less a depiction of what took place in this confrontation than the 
confrontation itself in its historical happening. Tragedy is less the dramatic 
presentation of a confrontation that has already taken place than the 'hlstorlco_ 
philosophical' enactment and accomplishment of the confrontation itself. 
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These are the sorts of claims that I shall want to explore in this chapter by %vay 
of a close reading of those sections of the Origin of the German Mourning Play that 
deal most directly with tragedy. Before moving on to do so, it is important to note that 
however central such claims may be to Benjamin's case, a sensibly different picture 
emerges on consideration of the drafts and fragments from which his Trdgodienlehre is 
worked up. 
The epigraph to the Origin of the German Mourning Play is well-known: 
'Sketched out 1916. Composed 1925.136 Each of the surviving sketches helps clarify the 
basic distinction that will be operative in the later work, namely 'the fundamental 
antithesis of mourning to tragedy, 137 although often without the same taxonomic 
concerns. In the sketch entitled 'Mourning Play and Tragedy' dated 1917, for example, 
the historical dimension is not yet fully in place, Benjamin offering a brief disquisition 
on Shakespeare's tragisches M613,38 precisely the measure which, in 1925, will be 
evoked as the defining instance of the mourning play. Nevertheless, historical focus is 
not entirely lacking in this early sketch and a clear distinction is drawn between this 
largely technical measure and the one that dominates in 'the tragedy of the ancients, ' 
expressed, moreover, in terms that anticipate Heidegger's reading, as 'an ever more 
violent [gewaltigeres] eruption of tragic powers [Gewaltenl. 139 The opening lines of the 
same fragment suggest further points of contention as regards the later work. 
Characterising tragedy in terms of a construction of limits, Benjamin remarks: 'The 
very least that is to be expected is that the tragic indicates a boundary [ein Grenzel no 
less in the realm of art than in the field of history. 140 Translating these remarks 
back 
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into the concerns of the Origin of the German Mourning Play, the historical 
significance of tragedy can now be seen to lie in the fact that it indicates the point at 
which one historical field - that of myth - passes over into another - that of truth. 
This argument, however, does not appear in quite the same form In the Orl*91*11 
of the German Mourning Play itself; although far from calling the earlier assertions 
into question, Benjamin's formulations are now all the more assured, and the claims 
themselves altogether more emphatic. At least as important now as the historical 
Grenzen remarked by the preparatory study is tragedy's establishment of what - 
borrowing the phrase from Reiner Schiirmann -I shall want to call an epochal 
principle. 41 As the Ausgangspunkt at which one constellation of existence (amongst 
those called, according to the thread of Benjamin's epochal history: myth, tragedy, 
mourning play, modernity, ... ' etc. ) collapses 
into another, tragedy comes to be seen as 
inaugurating an altogether different framework for existence. As the principle of the 
prior constellation - here, that of myth and the theurgic - departs, tragedy comes to 
the fore as the most essential expression of the new constellation. Reading Benjamin 
in this way, I take it that in the 'decisive, Greek confrontation' with myth enacted and 
accomplished by Attic tragedy, a new epoch (Epoche) is posited (gesetzt). And if this 
epochal positing of tragedy can indeed be identified as the particular Ausgangspunht 
located in the essay on the Elective Affinities, it is because it has the historical sense 
(historischen 
... Sinne) of the end of myth 
(Ende des Mythos). Writing of the baroque 
mourning play, Benjamin observes accordingly that 
240 
with its conclusion, no epoch is posited in the way that, in both an historical 
and an individual sense, the death of the tragic hero so emphatically does-. This 
individual sense, which also has the historical sense of the end of myth, is 
marked with the phrase that tragic life is 'the most excluslvely present 
[diesseitige] of all lives. For this reason the limits of its life always melt into 
death ... For tragedy, death, the limit par excellence, is an ever immanent 
'42 actuality that is inextricably bound up with each of its occurrences. 
In fact, so completely is Benjamin's interpretation of tragedy linked to its 
establishment of an epochal principle, so total his assimilation of tragedy to 'the 
philosophy of history, ' that he does not refer, except very occasionally, and then only in 
a quite marginal or incidental way, to the tragedies of Aeschylus or Sophocles as 
examples or figurative translations of this principle; his concern is, rather, with 
tragedy "itself' as the essential articulation of that principle. 
How can this be? How is it that Benjamin grants such a decisive importance to 
tragedy in the genealogical unfolding of epochs? What is tragedy if it is such as to 
trace out the boundaries of an epoch? If tragedy could indeed be shown to mark the 
epochal turning from myth to truth, would this not also entail its being shown to mark 
the origin of truth itself9 And what is tragedy if it marks the origin of truth? 
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These questions begin to find an answer in the context of the meditation on the 
relation of tragedy to myth that opens the properly tragic sections of the Origiii of the 
German Mourning Play. 
In those sections tragedy is described by Benjamin not in terms of fabrication 
or invention - notions declared to be entirely incompatible with the notion of tragic art 
- but in terms of a tendentious transformation (Umformung) of legend (Sage). It is 
here, he declares, that 'the philosophical determination of tragedy has to begin. "" 
Through this transformation, the tragic poet turns myth in a new direction (neuen 
Wendung). Not, Benjamin is quick to add, in the anticipation or search for tragic 
situations. The properly tragic constellation of existence emerges not in but through 
this transformation. And even if, in the course of Benjamin's examination of Greek 
tragedy, this transformative ground tends to slip from view, it nonetheless remains 
the case that the whole of that examination is ordered by an inquiry into the epochal 
significance of this turning. Just why this is so is suggested by a remarks of a 
fragment from 1923, which clearly belongs to the germinal investigations of the Origin 
of the German Mourning Play. Referring there to Aristotle's account of tragedy as the 
PL[ITI(YL3 of an event, 44 Benjamin states unequivocally that it is legend that provides 
tragedy with its substance: 
This is why, in the [t([iqaLg of the fundamental and - if one can sav this - 
ceremonial event that is presented by the legend ..., with every individual 
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poetic configuration or variant on the fable, a moment of the most essential 
position-taking of every new poetry marks the material of the legend. 45 
Legend, the primordial history (Urgeschichte) of a people, is the most original saying of 
myth. It is the saying in which the mythic and pre-historical epoch of the existence of a 
people (die vorgeschichtliche Epoche ihres Daseins) finds its expression. But if 
Benjamin underlies that it is legend which provides the raw material of tragedy, he 
does no do so in order that tragedy be seen as a dramatisation of that material: 
whether as Umfortnung or as Ausgestaltung, as transformation or configuration, 
tragedy is only mistakenly understood as legend in dramatic form. Legend provides 
the 'new poetry' of tragedy with its raw materials only to the extent that the latter is 
an essential taking of position with respect to that saying. By taking an essential 
position, tragedy turns legend in a new direction, re-positions it in respect of its saying 
of the existence of a people. Such a position, Benjamin stresses, is not taken aimlessly. 
It has a tendency. Not, however, a tendency in the sense of tending toward something; 
the tendency harboured by the tragic turning away of legend could only be described 
as a tending away. But away from what, precisely? Away from the saying of myth in 
legend. 'Through every minor and yet unpredictably profound interpretation of the 
material of legend, ' Benjamin writes in the same fragment, 'tragedy brings about the 
destruction [Abbruch] of the mythic world order, and prophetically shakes it with 
inconspicuous words [unscheinbaren Wortenl. 146 
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It would be a mistake, therefore, to want to understand tragedy as 'authentic' 
art, in the sense determined in the essay on the Elective Affinities. It does not, in the 
terms of that essay, 'rest' on truth. No less mistaken, however, would be the attempt to 
restore tragedy to the level of the inauthentic. Grounded on myth (dem Mythos 
grundenden) only to the extent that it works to bring about its destruction, 47 tragedy 
ought rather to be seen as opening onto the epochal possibility of authenticity itself. It 
is tragedy that opens onto the possibility of an indifference to myth and of the saying 
of truth. Such is, in Benjamin's eyes, the conception of Greek tragedy at its height. 
It is certain, however, that this conception is one of tragedy alone? What 
guarantees that the epochal confrontation with myth can be confined to tragedy? Is 
tragedy the only site of this confrontation? Does tragedy alone describe unequivocally 
the epochal principle with respect to the departure of myth? Might not other voices 
need to be heard? Why not that of philosophy, for example? Might not philosophy also 
be said to posit an epoch from out of myth? 
Despite their speculative character, such questions seem to find an answer in 
another of the preparatory sketches of 1916: 
Socrates: this is the figure through which the old myths are annihilated 
[annihiliert] and remedied ... In the midst of the terrible struggle, the young 
philosophy seeks in Plato to assert itself. 
48 
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At least in these remarks, then, it would seem that philosophy, just as much as 
tragedy, can assume the epochal status of the end of myth. And yet, without ever 
mentioning tragedy by name, these remarks contrive also to reinscribe tragedy, to 
reimpose the framework of tragedy upon this other scene, appearing also to suggest 
that this struggle of philosophy has itself to be understood as a tragic one. Benjamin 
writes: 'Socrates: that is the sacrifice of philosophy to the gods of myth, who demand 
human sacrifice. 149 
What, then, of this reinscription of tragedy? Is there for Benjamin a tragic 
aspect to philosophy? An aspect from which philosophy itself would come to be 
determined as tragic? Is there a tragedy of philosophy? A tragedy, perhaps, in which 
philosophy would also be written as that decisive confrontation with the daimonic 
order of myth? In a way that recalls, but also extends and deepens the claims of 
Dastur discussed in the previous chapter, the claims according to which it is tragedy 
that prepare l'auenement de la philosophie'50 remember, might one not ask whether 
the first articulations of philosophy are not themselves tragic? 
Germane in this regard are the charges levelled by Nietzsche in The Birth of 
Tragedy against Euripides and the New Attic comedies of Menander and Philemon. So 
far as Nietzsche is concerned, it was at Euripides' hands that tragedy died its tragic 
death. It was Euripides who drove Dionysus from the stage and ensured that it was 
free to enjoy its Posthumous and senile old age. The corpse of tragedy, Nietzsche says, 
is badly embalmed in the New Attic comedies, decaying there into ever more 
degenerate imitations. 
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Yet Nietzsche also says that it was not Euripides who fought against tragedy. 
He also says that tragedy died its death not at the hands of Euripides but at the hands 
of the daimonic power, one neither Apollinian nor Dionysian, that spoke through him, 
the new-born daimon of Socrates. For Nietzsche, Socrates is the new Orpheus who 
rises to join Euripides in his struggle against Dionysus. Did he not, so went an old 
Athenian rumour, assist Euripides in the writing of his plays? This, Nietzsche 
declares, 'is the new opposition: the Dionysian and the Socratic, and the artwork of 
Greek tragedy was run aground on this. 151 
Much like Nietzsche, whose analyses are cited and assumed throughout the 
Origin of the German Mourning Play, Benjamin's concern in his interpretation of 
tragedy is as much with the manner of its death as with its origins and life. 'Here, ' he 
writes in the section entitled 'Tragic Death as Framework, ' 'it is a matter of its past 
[Vergangenheit]. 152 I have already called attention to the link to history operating in 
Benjamin's account of tragedy as a founding epochal principle. Now, however, the 
accent is entirely different, falling not on tragedy as a principle, but on the way in 
which that principle itself draws to a close. 
If, according to Benjamin, it is a matter of speaking about tragedy in the past 
tense, then this is because of the privileged position it enjoys as regards a particular 
turning point (Wendepunkt) in the history of Greek splrit (des Geschichte des 
griechischen Geistes selbst), namely the death of Socrates. 53 
The death of Socrates is narrated by Plato in the Phaedo. But this dialogue is 
not only concerned with the philosopher's death, and tells also of his turn away from 
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the errancy of his youthful inquiry into sensible nature and into beings (Td 6VTa), that 
is, away from theTrEPL ýVGEW9 ýGTopm of those who came before him. The dialogue tells 
also of Socrates turn to XO-YOL and to an examination of the truth of beings as a whole 
(TCOV O'VTWV TIJV aXflOELCLV). 54 The dialogue that tells of his death, that 'turning point in 
the history of Greek spirit itself, ' tells also, therefore, of Socrates' own turning within 
Greek spirit, of his turning against the prevailing Greek spirit of his age. 
And yet, it is not to this that Benjamin directs us. It is not Socrates' turning 
within Greek spirit that is decisive here. Instead, the decisive turning point is to be 
found at the end of Plato's account of Socrates' counter-turning LCFTOPCa. It is to be 
found in the philosopher's death. 
Why? Why is it on his death that Greek spirit turns? Benjamin is unequivocal: 
it does so because Socrates' death also marks the death of tragedy. 
Like Nietzsche before him, Benjamin sets Socrates in opposition to tragedy, 
finding in him the very basis for its destruction. In Plato, Benjamin says, Socrates' 
Gesprdche have become the epilogue of tragedy itself. They have become so because at 
every point Socrates - this 'figure' of Plato, according to one of the notes of 1916 
already cited, who marks the turning from the paradoxes of tragedy to the 
transparency of science - stands opposed to each of the elements of tragedy. This 
opposition ends with Socratism standing triumphant over the bleeding corpse of 
tragedy; it is Socrates alone who holds the satyric stage. 
At the very heart of this turning in Greek spirit, then, directing it and 
constituting it from within, the death of tragedy is bound together with that of 
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Socrates. This is a strange, almost monstrous coupling: the death of tragedy Is tied in 
spirit to that of its assassin, the two locked together in a fatal embrace from which 
neither can emerge alive. And this is why, ultimately, Socrates' death cannot be a 
tragic one. Certain, Benjamin concedes, it does in many respects appear to be tragic. 
But however strong such a resemblance may be, in his final conversation, which itself 
turns on the question of death, Socrates sets Greek spirit turning, sets in place the 
conditions by virtue of which his death cannot be a tragic one: 
How remote [the 'ideal' of Socrates' death] is from that of the tragic hero Plato 
could not have indicated more significantly than he did by letting immortality 
be the subject of his master's last conversation. If, in the Apology, the death of 
Socrates could still have appeared to be tragic [tragisch ... erscheinen kdnnen], 
then the Pythagorean mood of the Phaedo shows his death to be free of all 
tragic ties. 55 
And yet, in a crucial departure from Nietzsche, whose text he carefully follows and 
cites throughout this section, Benjamin refuses to see the death of tragedy as a tragic 
one. To Benjamin's mind, the death of tragedy is a far meaner affair than Nietzsche 
could have possibly imagined. Tragedy dies with Socrates because his death is a cruel 
parody of the tragedy itself. 'And here, as so often, the parody of a form shows its end. ' 
Once again, the analogy with the remarks of Dastur is far-reaching: 
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It is by no means irrelevant that philosophy, as a determined mode of thinking, 
is tied intimately, and in its very birth, to the event of a particular death, that 
of Socrates as recounted by Plato in the Phaedo. The invention of philosophy 
coincides thus with that of a discourse on death other than that proposed by 
mythology or theology, something that immediately implies a homology 
between death and philosophy, which would be the horizon of the whole 
Platonic discourse on death. 56 
What has to be taken into account accordingly, therefore, is not simply the opposition 
between Socratic science and tragic art, however destructively parodic such an 
opposition may be, but also the impossibility of simply submitting tragedy to the 
privilege of the philosophical question: T[ ýCFTL ... ; 
57The 
position here bears analogy, 
then, with the epochal difference of myth to truth. A philosophical account of tragedy, 
Benjamin implies, one that would contribute to the 'science' of 'pure aesthetics , 58 Will 
everywhere find itself checked by tragedy, everywhere run up against points beyond 
which the phenomenon itself necessarily resists the essential demands made by that 
question. 'The legends of Socrates, ' writes Benjamin, 'are an exhaustive secularisation 
of heroic legend by the betrayal of its daimonic paradoxes to understanding. ' 59 
Whereas tragedy was determined in terms of a transformative repositioning of legend, 
philosophy, on the other hand, is determined as an exhaustion and secularisation of 
the tragic redirection already underway, an exhaustion that rests upon a betrayal of 
what Benjamin takes to be the outstanding epochal mark of tragedy, namely paradox. 
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In the eyes of Socrates - his eye, Nietzsche will have said60 - tragedy cannot but 
appear irrational, a monstrous affront to the clear insight of the philosopher, marred 
throughout by paradox, And it is these that he will everywhere have betrayed. 
With his death, for example. With his own death which, in the Phaedo, he will 
ultimately rid of its terrors, submitting it to the language of philosophy - to that 
'dazzling unfolding of discourse and consciousness that characterises the Socratic 
Xoyog. ' But this, it ought to be said, is more than just an example. For according to 
Benjamin, it is only here, in the Phaedo, that the impossibility of a tragic Socrates is 
fully revealed ('... in the Apology, ' remember, 'the death of Socrates could still have 
appeared to be tragic According to Benjamin, it is only here, with the parodic 
death of Socrates, that tragedy actually dies. It is only here that Greek spirit turns. 
Why? Why here and nowhere else? Why not in the war waged on tragic art by Socratic 
science? 61 Why is the turning in Greek spirit only disclosed with the philosopher's 
death? Any answer to this question is conspicuously lacking from either of the 
passages in which Benjamin addresses himself to Socrates, and, in several places, he 
appears to have in fact forgotten his initial precision as regards the philosopher's 
death, finding the ancient turn from tragedy to science already engaged by Socratism 
itself. In lieu of any answer from Benjamin, then, let me suggest the following: It is 
with Socrates' death that the ancient turn from tragedy is fully disclosed because it is 
only here that the philosopher is able to turn on the extreme limit of tragedy itself. 
This is, of course, to say more about tragedy than about its death: it is to say that 
tragedy turns on death, that it is in tragic death alone that the properly tragic 
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dimension of tragedy is disclosed. And what, then, of tragic death? What of tragic 
death as the very ground of tragedy? 
ii 
'What tendency is hidden in the tragic? Why does the tragic hero die? 162 Recalling thus 
his remarks on the tendenzidse Umformung of tragic poetry, these are the questions 
with which Benjamin begins his reading of the historical signature of tragedy. 
He answers: Tragic poetry rests on (ruht au/) the idea of sacrifice. 63 It is in the 
sacrificial death of the tragic hero that the properly tragic dimension of such poetry is 
made clear. It is in sacrifice that tragedy comes to be gathered into its most extreme 
possibility (dusserste Mdglichkeit). Yet the gathering that is at issue here is not a 
gathering of each of the possibilities released by tragedy into an actuality; that is, not 
a gathering in the sense of a teleology. Benjamin declares: sacrifice shelters not a 
9 guaranteed finality' but its 'absence. 164 Indeed, were it not for the problematic 
insistence upon actuality, upon Wirklichkeit, Benjamin's citation from Lukacs would 
be an admirable expression of the point: 'For tragedy, death - the limit par excellence 
- is an ever immanent actuality that is inextricably bound up with each of its 
occurrences. 165 
One could, then, outline this schema in the following way: Sacrifice constitutes 
the end of tragedy only insofar as, from the outset, tragedy takes its lead from this end 
that shows itself as such, comes fully into force, only at the very end of the drama. It Is 
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not a matter of it having been sighted or seen in advance, for it will only come to be 
seen in retrospect. The point, then, is that sacrifice needs to be seen less as the 
dramatic terminus of the tragedy than as the very form under which it unfolds. The 
following passage makes the point succinctly: 
In terms of its object - the hero - tragic sacrifice is distinct from every other, 
being at once a first and a final sacrifice. A final sacrifice in the sense of the 
expiatory sacrifice to the gods who preside over an ancient right; a first 
sacrifice in the sense of the representative deed in which new contents [neue 
Inhalte] of the life of a people announce themselves ... Tragic death has this 
double meaning. 66 
The double meaning of tragic death is far from straightforward. The first meaning 
refers to sacrifice as an act of atonement to the gods who preside over an ancient 
order, as an expiatory gesture that meets the demands made by that order. The second 
refers to sacrifice as the act of standing-in-for, what Benjamin here calls der 
stell vert re tended Handlung, in which a new, as yet unborn community is gathered 
together and begins to take shape through the sacrificial object of the hero. 
Now in one sense this is certainly unproblematic. Sacrifice is the site upon 
which some object, here the hero, is offered to the gods as a stand-in or scapegoat for 
the community in order to secure the rights of this latter. It is the site of the crushing 
antinomy that binds together man and god. In another sense, however, it is profoundly 
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problematic. For Benjamin will not be content merely to allow these two meanings to 
sit comfortably alongside one another, and will want also to turn the second meaning 
back against the first. The death of the hero is oriented thus not only (nicht nlir) 
toward the first meaning of sacrifice outlined above, but above all (vorab) toward 
undermining it. If the sacrifice of the hero gathers the tragedy into the exhaustion of 
its possibilities, then it also points beyond these; not, however, in the sense of pointing 
toward other possibilities hitherto unremarked, but in the sense of a profound 
disruption which, by exhaustively gathering together such possibilities, also opens 
onto another space beyond them. Thus, in strict observance of the ancient statutes, 
tragic sacrifice points also to the establishment of new ones (alter Satzung 
willfahrend, neue stiftet). An expiatory sacrifice according to the letter (nach dem 
Buchstaben) of the ancient law, tragic death also tears the pages from that book in the 
spirit (im Geist) of the laws of the new community, consigning them - along with the 
hero - to ashes in the rites of the funeral pyre. 
The point here, then, is that tragic sacrifice is the site of a transformation 
(Verwandlung) from the order of the gods to that of the life of the community. But how 
is this transformation to be understood? In the context of a long and carefully 
composed semantic chain, the neue Inhalte of the community that are announced by 
the sacrifice indicate, no doubt, that it has to be understood as a transformation in 
support (Halt). 67 It is a transformation from an existence supported (halten) by the 
deadly obligations to the gods into one supported by the rules and measures of the new 
community. 
253 
But what of the hero? What is his position in all this? If it is his death that 
constitutes the site of the transformation of this Halt, what supports his existence? 
Benjamin's response is unequivocal: Nothing. Belonging neither to the decaying order 
of the ancient Olympians nor to that of the community in statu nascendi, the hero 
marks, rather, the fissure between the two, the point of the violent passing over from 
one to the other. Suspended between the two, his position as a sacrifice cannot be a 
response to the demand of an external law. His death, demanded neither by the 
cruelty of the gods nor by the community to which it give shape, is not imposed from 
without but, says Benjamin, takes place as something 'that is intimate, personal, and 
inherent to him. ' A self-sacrifice, then, in which the hero incalculably squanders 
himself, gives himself up to a self-imposed law: Would this not be a sacrifice in the 
most proper sense of the term? An absolute sacrifice? A sacrifice with no conceivable 
hope of return? In fact, the hero is seen here to be placed in a precarious position, the 
position of what one might venture to call a tragic autonomy. 68 In this imposition of 
autonomy, the hero resolutely takes up the tragedy of an existence (tragische Dasein) 
in which 'his life unfolds [rollt ... ab], indeed, from [aus] death, which 
is not its end 
[sein Ende] but its form [seine Form]. "' 
The schema being advanced here is, of course, identical to the one that we saw 
to structure the drama itself. Little wonder, then, that Benjamin insists that, 'in his 
spiritual -physica I existence, the hero is [istj the framework of the tragic system. 
'70 And 
little wonder, also, that it is to this determination above all - the determination of 
death not as the termination of a life byt, intrinsic to and operative throughout an 
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existence now revealed as tragic, as the sole form in which the existence of the hero 
can unfold, a form that comes fully into force only in and as his being positioned as 
sacrifice - that Benjamin's remarks here are addressed. 
The Origin of the German Mourning Play sketches this unfolding of tragic 
existence in terms of what Benjamin calls the pre-given framework (virgegebetien 
Rahmen) of the hero's life. With this gift - which, given in advance, guides the 
unfolding of the hero's existence - the question of fate is raised. Nowhere is 
Benjamin's interpretation of tragedy more accurately defined than by this question. 
For even if fate is not tragic a priori, as Benjamin stresses in more than one place, 
there is no tragic existence that does not unfold under its sign. And yet, the peculiar 
fate of this gift has so little to do with causality that it could only be understood in 
relation to freedom. It is, to be sure, the very opposite of freedom, but this opposition 
only takes place on a common ground of a joint dissociation from anything like a 
subjection of fate and freedom to causality. By articulating the site of tragedy by way 
of the link between fate and freedom, Benjamin does not say that tragic art is the 
presentation of freedom at its most extreme limit, its retrospective recognition and 
unconditional affirmation in the acceptance of tragic fate. He says, rather, that it is 
tragedy alone that allows us to think the most peculiar fate of all - the fatum of 
libertas. 71 
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III 
Tragic fate unfolds toward (rollt ... zu) death. This unfolding toward death, in which 
the properly tragic fatum is seen thus to turn on a reference to finitude, does not befall 
the tragic hero as if from elsewhere but comes, rather, from the precarious nature of 
his own position, namely, that of autonomy. Such is, therefore, the paradox of tragic 
fate: it is also tragic freedom. But what sort of freedom is this? It is the freedom for the 
hero to give himself that which is most properly his own. He gives himself that which, 
from the beginning, is his own. And yet, in giving himself to himself - the ordeal of 
autonomy - what the hero in fact gives is nothing less than that which is given in 
advance of him. This is the central paradox of tragic existence. It is the very structure 
of fate in an existence now disclosed as tragic that means that Benjamin is able to 
write of the hero not simply that his 'fate unfolds toward death, ' but that 'his life 
unfolds, indeed, from death, which is not its end but its form. ' 
Up until this point at least, Benjamin's account of fate appears in many ways to 
align itself along a very traditional axis, translating the principle of autonomy as 
presented by the critical philosophy, the 'circularity' of freedom and the moral law as 
described by Kant, 72 into a language of Schicksal taken from the conjunction and 
reconciliation of freedom and necessity projected by German Idealism. In this regard, 
recall that the fate of the tragic hero was broadly stated as follows: 'his life unfolds, 
indeed, from death, which is not its end but its form. ' With the next sentence, however, 
a quite different inflection is given to this account: 'tragic existence finds its task only 
because it is governed from within [in ihm selbst gesetzt sindl by the limits of linguistIc 
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and bodily life given to it from the beginning. '73 However familiar the autonomy that 
accompanies the tragic hero's embracing of the finitude exposed by his fate may be, 
the limit of language that is given alongside it is less so. It is difficult to divine exactl,,, 
what link there could be between fate and language. All the more so, indeed, when one 
sees that Benjamin will even want to understand fate precisely by way of just such a 
link. How? 
The answer, much like fate itself, turns on the question of necessitv 
(Notwendigkeit). The necessity built into the framework of the hero's existence is, says 
Benjamin, neither a magical nor a causal one. It is, rather, the speechless (sprachlose) 
necessity of defiance: 
It would melt away like the snow before the south wind under the breath of the 
word. But the only word that can breathe is unknown [aber effies ungekannte 
allein]. Heroic defiance contains this unknown word locked within itself 
Benjamin calls this silence ýPPL! 3, the hero's refusal to justify himself in the face of the 
gods. In this regard, it marks the outstanding site of that decisive Auseinandersetzung 
which, as was noted at the outset, gives the specifically historical character of tragedy. 
Outstanding not only because this silence elevates the hero of the tragedy above the 
central figures of other dramatic forms, but also because it constitutes the proper 
articulation of what is genuinely tragic (echter Tragik) in the drama. Still, it would be 
a mistake to think that tragic silence can be reduced to a failure or default of 
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language. Tragic silence, Benjamin insists, is not the negation of language. It is 
neither impossibility, i. e. the impossibility of speaking, nor possibility, i. e. the 
possibility of not speaking. Rather, it belongs essentially to language. It is, even, 
language in its most originary and proper sense, as Benjamin suggests in certain notes 
of 1916-17.75 For in order to keep silent, the hero must have something to say, 
something to communicate. 'Heroic defiance contains this unknown word locked 
within itself. ' The question that needs to be asked, then, is how the 'wordless sphere' of 
the hero is able to bear in this way the entire burden of the exposition. 76 
And yet, it is not as if the conjunction of language and fate can be a simple one, 
and a certain turning commences as soon as the question of language comes into play 
a turning into excess. In contrast to the austerity and irony of Socrates' wilful silence 
in the face of death, a silence that only reflects back onto that 'dazzling unfolding of 
discourse and consciousness which characterises the Socratic X6-ya3' - the philosopher, 
says Benjamin, is struck dumb only by falling silence (verstummt er wo er schweigt) - 
in contrast to this, then, the properly tragic hero pays with his life for the right to be 
silent. However, in the silence that accompanies and that alone affords an expression 
of his sacrificial death, the very meaning of the tragic conflict is inverted (denn seine 
Bedeutung schlagt um). What had initially appeared as the judgement of the gods 
upon the hero is now, through the hero's silence, changed into a trial of the gods 
themselves, a trial in which the hero himself appears as chief witness and, 'against the 
will of the Gods, displays "the demi-God's honour. 177Taking care not to cut short this 
analogy between the formal structure of the Athenian law courts and that of tragedy 
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itself, 78 Benjamin notes that it is the word that takes centre stage in both. Athenian 
law and tragic drama both turn around the Xoyog. What is of principle interest here, 
however, is not the predominantly linguistic character of their set exchanges but the 
point at which the word finds itself able to break free of such constraints, an excess 
that is in each case unanswerable: 
The important and characteristic feature of Athenian law [Recht] is the 
Dionysian outburst, namely, the fact that the drunken, ecstatic word is able to 
breach [durchbrechen] the regular encircling of the d-y(6p, that a higher justice 
can emerge more out of the persuasiveness of living discourse [lebendigen Redel 
than from the trial of conflicting groups struggling either by armed combat or 
by bounded forms of language [gebundenen Wortformen]. The ordeal is 
breached by the Xoyoý; in freedom [das Ordal wird durch den Xöyoýg in Freiheit 
durchbrocken] 
... Tragedy is grasped in this picture of the trial proceedings. 79 
A6-yoý;, then, does not refer here to the various X6-YOL - legal or dramatic, for example - 
of Attic Greece, but to this specific moment of excess in which the word leaps over the 
boundaries by which such XO-YOL are themselves defined. It is a matter of a word that is 
excessive, of a word that, by exceeding the limits that would otherwise circumscribe it, 
releases itself into freedom. This word is called ecstatic. But Dionysian? Presumahlý- 
this, from The Birth of Tragedy: 'And now let us think of how into this world built on 
shining and moderation and artificially dammed up, there sounded, in ever more 
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alluring and magical ways, the ecstatic tone of the Dionysian festival. '80 And yet. it is 
not as if Nietzsche did not also write that, 'under the magic of the Dionysian ... singing 
and dancing, man expresses himself as a member of a higher comniunity: he has 
forgotten how to walk and speak [das Sprechen verierntl. 181 It is not as if the ecstatic 
truth of the Dionysian word is not also a forgetting or an un-learning of language, as if 
the boundless tone of Dionysian ecstasy does not also flee the ground of language. The 
point is worth insisting upon because if Benjamin does call this proper to tragedy 
Dionysian, then he will also say that it is the gift of language itself, the word from 
whose echo coming generations learn their language (erlernen ihre Sprache). 82 
At this point, then, everything gives us to think that tragedy is in some way 
bound up with the origin of language. 83 It is certainly possible that this claim will 
come as no surprise. For if it is in tragedy that the destruction of myth as the ground 
of existence takes place, this destruction is also an opening onto another ground, one 
that is perhaps already captured by language, that is, by Xo-yo3. As has already been 
suggested, however, it is by no means certain that the remarks from the essay on the 
Elective Affinities or those from the Origin of the German Mourning Play can so easily 
be aligned along such an axis. Equally, it is not as if tragedy can be simply assimilated 
to that 'authentic' stage of art, in the sense of an art grounded on truth. If one is to 
follow the thesis according to which tragedy is the origin of language, then it will have 
to be in a way that does not force an immediate path from 06o, 3 to X6yo, 3. 
How is it, then, that language finds its origin in tragedy? Here is how Benjamin 
sketches this gift of language, describing the excess of the tragic word: 
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The further behind the tragic word leaves the situation - which can no longer 
be called tragic when it catches back up - the more surely has the hero escaped 
the ancient statutes to which, when at the end they overtake him, he flings 
only the mute shadow [den sturnmen Schatten] of his essence, flings his own 
self as a sacrifice, whilst his soul is sheltered [hinabergerettet] in the word of a 
distant community. In the countenance of the suffering hero the community 
learns reverent gratitude [lernt denn ehfarchtigen Dank] for the word with 
which his death endowed it [sie begabte], a word which, with every new 
direction in which the poet turns legend, lights up another place as a new gift 
[an anderer Stelle als erneuertes Geschenk aufleuchtete]. Far more than tragic 
pathos, tragic silence becomes the treasure [or shelter: Halt] of an experience of 
the sublime of linguistic expression. 84 
Language begins in the response of the community - its learning thanks or gratitude 
to what is given to it by the death of the hero, a death that is now to be thought 
ecstatically and not metaphysically. From out of this sacrifice, language happens. 85 
But what is it that is given by the hero's death? Assuredly not a life. What is given, 
rather, is the excessive power of the word itself, of the ecstatic word that sounds out 
beyond itself. Through this excessive power of the word - one that no longer belongs to 
the faultless imposition of the divine word that it brings to a close, and does not yet 
belong with those easily spoken Sitten (morals, customs, etc. ) that constitute the 
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communicable contents of the community onto which this death opens - the gift of 
another place or another position (anderer Stelle) is revealed. What place) What 
position? Recall again the initial context of Benjamin's meditation, that context in 
which tragedy was called an essential taking of position (wesentlicher Stellungnahme) 
with respect to the saying of the existence of a people in legend. The place or the 
position which, according to the passage being considered here, is given by the gift of 
language is that of a place or position other than the one grounded or supported by 
myth. 
It is in the silence of the hero, then, that everything is gathered. It is in tragic 
silence that the ecstatic movement from out of myth finds its outstanding expression. 
This schema, prepared for from the very beginning of Benjamin's remarks on tragedy 
in the Origin of the German Mourning Play, defines tragedy in terms of language. It is 
the very structure of the origin of language in an existence now disclosed as tragic. 
Out of the 'monstrous emptiness [ungeheurer Leere]' of the tragic hero, writes 
Benjamin, 'the distant, new commands of the gods sound out [tdnt ... wider] and from 
this echo [Echo] coming generations learn their language. 186 
IV 
Following these remarks Benjamin launches on a remarkable series of assertions, 
citing entirely unchanged a passage from his own essay of 1921, 'Fate and Character. ' 
The passage - which, both in the context of the essay and in the denuded 
form in 
which it is placed into the Habilitationsschrift, already circles around the concept of 
262 
fate - draws together the entire Trdgodienlehre advanced thus far in the course of a 
long description of precisely that confrontation with the daimonic marked at the 
outset. 
Let me try, then, as briefly as possible, to outline the principle context in which 
this confrontation is described. 
Although treating of concerns largely identical to those of the Origin of the 
German Mourning Play, the tone of this earlier examination of fate Is significantly 
different. Here, it is less a matter of fate per se than of how fate can be disclosed. So 
whereas according to a famous remark by Leibniz, fatum is itself originally dictum,, ', -, 
for Benjamin it is only in the reading of dicta that fate can be disclosed. As much as 
the clairvoyant or the gypsy woman, the central figures of Benjamin's essay, fate is a 
matter of reading. 88 But whereas the folds of Leibniz's tropology require there to be a 
specific dictum that can give itself as fated and so impose itself as fate, namely the 
decretum Dei, for Benjamin, as one might surmise from the foregoing remarks on 
language, the relation of fate to its dicta cannot be understood causally. If fate can 
never be grasped in itself but only through the traces or signs of its passing, then 
these are not actually fated to appear. Indeed, nowhere is the difficulty of reading fate 
made more acute than with the divine word. Not only does this word bind fate to a law 
of causality; it also points toward the 'error' by which fate finds itself locked into a 
religious context: 'to mention a typical case [Falfl, fate-imposed misfortune is looked 
upon as the response [Antwort] of God or the gods to a rellgious offence. '89 The error 
here lies not in the connection of fate to the divine word, but in its comprehension as a 
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fall. For guilt and misfortune do not merely provide the outstanding dicta of fate, they 
are also its only ones. One cannot, so Benjamin avers, be fated to innocence or to 
fortune, for example. Indeed, so little can fortune be thought of as a dictum of fate that 
Benjamin presents it instead as the hall-mark of divinity and so of a thorough-going 
removal from fate itself. Fortune, he writes, 'is what releases the fortunate man from 
the chains of the Fates and from the web of his own fate. Not for nothing does 
H61derlin call the blissful gods "fateless". '90 
Now once the sole dicta of fate are seen to be those of guilt and misfortune, 'for 
insofar as something is fate it is misfortune and guilt, ' then fate can no longer be 
thought in terms of the context of religion, 'no matter how much the misunderstood 
concept of guilt seems to refer to it. '91 The only balance capable of taking the measure 
of this fate, Benjamin calls right (Recht). Only on this balance can misfortune and 
guilt becomes measures of the person (Mal3en der Person). lt is in right alone that a 
fateful sort of existence (schicksalhafte Art des Daseins), one unreservedly described by 
such dicta, can come to be measured. 92The question that needs to be asked, therefore, 
is this: What is right? Benjamin calls it a 'remnant of the daimonic level of human 
existence in which rules of law determined not only the relationships of men, but also 
their relationships with the gods . 193 lt is due only to an 
historical confusion of right 
with justice that such statutes still continue to hold sway long after 'victory over the 
daimons. ' 
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But where is this victory? Where is it won? Where is it that the m,,, thic 
Rechtssatzungen of the daimons are first broken? Benjamin's answer is unequivocal, 
and it is, of course, tragedy. 
Here, now, is the central passage of the essay, the one cited at length in the 
Origin of the German Mourning Play: 
It was not in right but in tragedy that the head of the genius raises itself for 
the first time from out of the fog of guilt, for in tragedy daimonic fate comes to 
be broken [durchbrochen]. But not by the supercession of the pagan 
incalculable interconnection [Verkettung] of guilt and atonement by the purity 
of the man who has expiated his sins, who is reconciled with the pure God. 
Rather, in tragedy pagan man recognises himself [bessint sich] to be better 
than his God, but this knowledge leaves him without speech, it remains dumb. 
Without confessing itself, it secretly gathers its forces. There is no question of 
the "moral world order" being restored, but the moral man, still mute, still 
immature [noch stumm, noch unmiindig] - as such is he called the hero - 
elevates himself in the shaking of that agonised world. The paradox of the birth 
of the genius in moral speechlessness, moral infantility, is the sublime of 
tragedy. 94 
In connection with this passage, several points need to be considered. 
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The first point concerns the character of the realm from out of which the hero 
raises himself. Benjamin describes it here as daimonic (ddmonisch). 95 The passage 
indicates that the issue here is not that of theological demonism, but that of fate and 
its entanglements, of the mythic order of right that is breached in tragedy. The remark 
from the Origin of the German Mourning Play cited right at the outset of this chapter 
is even more expressive of this breech: 'The tragic relates to the daimonic as paradox 
to ambiguity. In all the paradoxes of tragedy ... ambiguity, the hallmark of the 
daimons, is dying away. 196 In terms of the essence of truth remarked at the very 
outset, paradox, like ambiguity, remains altogether inconceivable. And yet, unlike the 
ambiguity of the daimonic, which points nowhere - and this "nowhere" to which it 
points is indeed itself and its mythic entanglements - the paradox of tragedy points 
beyond itself, to its possible resolution - its answer, if you like - at the very least. One 
could say, orienting the result to the opening onto the epochal possibility of 
authenticity broached by tragedy: in tragedy, authenticity is already in play and, 
already, from the outset, in play with the properly tragic itself. 
The passage refers, second, to 'the moral man, still mute, still immature - as 
such is he called a hero. ' What man? The man characterised several sentences earlier 
as 'pagan man, ' the man who, in tragedy, becomes aware that he exceeds the measures 
laid down by the gods; but the man, also, who in the sentence that immediately follows 
this one, is called 'genius. ' What sets the epochal possibility of tragedy in motion is just 
this awareness on the part of the genius, an awareness which, Benjamin says. is 
articulated in his speechlessness. Other passages are still more direct. For example. 
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one from the same context, in which Benjamin states that 'the struggle against the 
daimonism of right is bound to the word of the genius. 197 In light of the foregoing 
remarks, moreover, it is difficult not to see this figure of the genius as that of the 
tragic hero. But there is another point that is essential for grasping the force of this 
schema. The tragic, Benjamin says here, sich ... erhob, raises himself. The poiiit is 
that the same term is used much earlier, in one of the fragments of 1916, in order to 
develop the account of the relation of tragedy to language 'in tragedy the eternal 
rigidity of the spoken word sich erhebt .... 198 In the hero's raising himself, Benjamin 
continues in the passage being considered here, 'daimonic fate comes to be broken 
[durchbrochen]. ' Again, an identical point can be made: it is precisely this formulation 
that is used in the Origin of the German Mourning Play to express the movement of 
the ecstatic word that 'is able to break through [durchbrechen] the d-yc6v ... The ordeal 
is broken [durchbrochen] by the X6-yog in freedom. '99 The point here, then, is one of an 
absolute convergence, one that everywhere borders on identity: the convergence of the 
hero with language with the opening onto freedom. 
Third point: 'The paradox of the birth of the genius in moral speechlessness, 
moral infantility, is the sublime of tragedy. ' The genius of tragedy is still mute (noch 
stumm), still immature (noch untniindig). He is, literally, still mouthless. In-fans, he 
does not speak. This silence is not something that befalls him. He is mute in statu 
nascendi. And yet, the point here is not simply that this figure is silent. Rather, to 
take as typical the Kantian formulation, whose principle moments Benjamin retains, 
it is that the genius, trading in inventio, can serve as a tutelary figure, one, that is, 
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whose achievements 'serve as a model not for imitation [Nachmachung] but for 
following [Nachahmung]. '100 The point would be that the tragic hero inaugurates a 
new model, one which, not bound by the rules of mythic fate, exceeds them in the 
direction of authenticity and truth. 
Final point: the passage begins and ends with reference to fate. Indeed, each of 
the foregoing points have been oriented toward the ways in which fate comes to be 
broken in the fated unfolding of the existence of the tragic hero. Here, Benjamin is 
once again not so very far from a position of Nietzsche's, a position most concisely 
expressed in a note of 1870-1, according to which 'the most universal form of tragic 
fate is the victorious defeat. "Ol A fragment of 1923 by Benjamin speaks in this regard 
of seighaften Tode, the victorious death of the tragic hero. 102 'In ancient tragedy, ' 
writes Benjamin quite late on in the Origin of the German Mourning Play, 'every order 
of fate denies itself [sich versagenden]. 1103 It is as if the unspoken word that 
accompanies the hero to his fatal end has, in some way, forced fate to testify against 
itself, speaking out against itself in a way that cannot but call it into question from 
within. 
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Colour of Experience, op. cit., 52-3. See also the latter's essay 'Benjamin. Heidegger. and 
the Destruction of Tradition, ' op. cit., esp. 9-12. 
37 Letter to Schoen of 30 March 1918 (Briefe 11: 443). 
38 Cf. GS 11 1: 135. Compare Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophie Walter BenjamIns, op. cIt-, 
96, who makes much of this putative difference. 
39 GS 11 1: 135. 
40 GS 11 1: 133. 
41 For Schiirmann's own definition, see Le Principe d'anarchie, op. cit., 42: '1 view an epoch 
as determined by the code that is each time unique - not a convention but ... an epochal 
law of regional application ... 
The accession of a code to the level of principle opens a field 
of intelligibility. It establishes a first, a reference. This code regulates the 
"establishment" of an epochal order in the sense of setting it in place ... The 
establishment of a principle is its institution at the beginning of an epoch for which it 
will serve as the ultimate point of reference and come thus to dominate it. ' 
42 GS 1 1: 314; Or 135. The ellipsis is Benjamin's own, the citation coming from Georg 
Lukäcs collection of 1911, Die Seele und die Formen. 
43 GS 1 1: 285; Or 106. It is important to note that, with respect to the Tendenz of this 
transformation, Benjamin speaks not of Muthos but of die Sage. He uses the term twice 
in this context. First, in a preparatory study of 1923, then in the Origin of the German 
Mourning Play itself. In part, the earlier use of the term belongs to the quotation from 
Adolf Graf von Schack with which Benjamin opens that study (GS 11 1: 246-7), just as the 
later use reflects the citation of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-M61lendorf (cf. 
GS I 1: 284-5. Or 
106). Whatever the provenance of the term, however, it still needs to be asked- does 
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Benjamin's "definition" of Sage as the primordial history or Urgeschichte of a people 
serve also to define his use of the term Muthos? Not at all. Admittedly, the folowing 
remark on the German Idealist interpretation of tragedy might, on the surface, appear to 
muddy the waters somewhat: 'Freedom in its interpretation [of tragedy in respect of 
history] will always fall short of the accuracy of the tendentious tragic renewal of myth' 
(GS 1 1: 299; Or 120). Such a remark aside, although even here matters are not, I do not 
think, so cut and dried, I want simply to draw attention to the fact that, for Benjamin, 
tragedy is quite obviously a matter of the transformation not of Muthos, as eL, cry single 
one of his commentators has stated, but of Sage as the primordial saying of inythic 
existence. Compare the emblematic remarks of Rochlitz: 'tragedy is founded upon myth'; 
Le D6senchantement de I'art, op. cit., 107. In this regard, at least, Benjamin's 
interpretation bears close analogy with the one advanced by Heidegger in 'The Origin of 
the Work of Art' where, recall, tragedy is described as 'what transforms the sayings of i 
people [verwandelt des Sagen des Völkesf (GA 5: 29; BW 169). Holger Schmidt makes the 
same point with respect to Heidegger, pointing out that 'the Heideggerian Sage is not to 
be translated by "fable" nor, more importantly, by "myth", ' suggesting, rather, that 'it 
translates the Greek word X6-yog'; 'Heidegger: L'Oeuvre d'art comme p6rp6tie de la 
pensee' in Eliane Escoubas (ed. ), Phýnomýnologie et esthgtique (La Versanne: enere 
marine, 1998), 61-77 (67). Although the remarks cited above from What is Thinhingý 
might negate Schmidt's observation, those from the lecture course that treats of 
Parmenides indicate that it is well taken. 
44 See Poetics 1449b 24-5: 'Tragedy is, then, the mimesis of elevated action [IItjIq(TL3 
lTpdeE(dýZ criTouba(aý; ]. ' Benjamin paraphrases: '... die Tragödie als 
die besonders geartete 
eines Geschehens erklärt'(GS 11 1: 248). 
45 GS Il 1: 248-9. 
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46 GS Il 1: 249. 
47 Compare the remarks of note 42, above. 
48 GS 11 1: 130. 
49 GS 11 1: 130.1 will come back to the notion of sacrifice in due course. 
50 Dastur, La mort, op. cit., 17 
51 Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie in Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli 
and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: Walter de Gruyter, Deutsche Tachenbuch, 1988) 1: 83-, 
translated by Walter Kaufmann as The Birth of Tragedy (New York: Random House, 
1967), 82. See also the lecture of 1 February 1880, 'Sokrates und die Tragbdie' (Werke 1: 
533-49, esp. 540-6), an early draft of §§11-15 of The Birth of Tragedy. It is worth 
recalling that without in any way calling into question the emphasis on Euripides, this 
lecture suggests quite explicitly that the movement that leads from Aeschylean tragedy 
to the death of tragic art is already underway in Sophocles: 'the wholly gradual decline 
begins with Sophocles, ' Nietzsche writes, 'until finally Euripides, with his conscious 
reaction against Aeschylean tragedy, brings about the end with impetuous haste' (Werke 
1: 549). Benjamin, who could not have known of this lecture at the time of writing the 
Origin of the German Mourning Play, Nietzsche's text not having been released for 
publication until 1927, the year after Benjamin had finished his Habilitationssch rift, 
makes precisely the same point, remarking that Antigone's illumination by 'an all too 
rational concept of duty' means that the death of Sophocles' heroine can now only appear 
(erscheinen) tragic (GS 1 1: 293; Or 114). 
52 GS 1 1: 292; Or 113. 
53 GS I 1: 292; Or 113. It is difficult not to think that Benjamin is drawing here on 
Kierkegaard's presentation of the ironic life-view of Socrates, 'a magnificent pause in th(- 
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course of history, ' as an equally ironic turning point in "world history, " a turning whose 
necessary outcome is the advent of modernity; The Concept of Irony, translated by 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 19b'ff.. 
The other point of reference is, of course, the Wendepunkt remarked by Nietzsche hiiii-self 
in The Birth of Tragedy: 'Socrates ... a turning point and whirlpool of so-called world 
history' (Werke 1: 100), a turning already announced at the very outset of the book in the 
Foreword to Richard Wagner (cf. Werke 1: 24). This does not mark an end to Benjamin's 
borrowings from Nietzsche - whose work, he notes at the outset of his remarks on 
tragedy, 'founds' his own researches - and one could doubtless read each of the sections 
of the Origin of the German Mourning Play that are concerned with tragedy as a 
dialogue with Nietzsche. In the following remarks, I am indebted to two excellent 
studies: Michel Haar, Nietzsche et la m6taphysique (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), esp. 221-7 1, 
and John Sallis, Crossings Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1991). 
54 Phaedo 99d-e. The edition consulted here is Euthyphyro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, 
Phaedrus, edited and translated by Harold North-Fowler (Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
55 GS 1 1: 293; Or 114. The reference to the 'ideal' of the dying Socrates is, of course, 
indebted to Nietzsche (cf Werke 1: 91). 
56 Dastur, La mort, op. cit., 20. 
57 John Sallis makes more or less the same point with respect to Nietzsche; see CrossIlIgs, 
op. cit., 82-3. 
58 The term comes frm the opening remarks of Benjamin's early essay on H61derlIn whei-e t 
refers explicitly to the traditional account of tragedy (GS 11 1: 105; SW 1: 1, S). 
277 
59 GS 1 1: 292; Or 113. 
60 The final reference to Nietzsche, again from The Birth of Tragedy: 'Let us think of the 
Cyclops eye of Socrates fixed on tragedy ... let us think of this eye to which was denied 
the pleasure of peering into the Dionysian abysses' (Werke 1: 92; The Birth of TragedY, op. 
cit., 89). It is again helpful to refer to the remarks of Reiner Schilrmann's Des 
Hegimonies brisees, op. cit., 602, in which attention is drawn to the possibility of 
translating this Socratic monopia onto the structure of tragedy itself. For SchUrmann, 
tragedy 'traces ... a path of sight [un parcours des yeux]. The hero sees the laws in 
conflict. Then - this is the moment of tragic denial - he blinds himself to one of them, 
keeping his gaze fixed on the other ... Then follows a catastrophe that opens his eyes: the 
moment of tragic truth ... From denial to recognition, the blinding is transmuted. 
Hubristic sightlessness [1a cecitj hubristiquel is changed into visionary blindness 
[aveuglement visionnaire]. ' 
61 GS 1 1: 297; Or 118. 
62 GS I 1: 285; Or 106. 
63 GS 1 1: 285; Or 106. Compare the remarks on 'authentic art' said in the essay on Goethe 
to 'rest upon truth [auf Wahrheit beruht]. ' There is, of course, nothing particularly novel 
about a turn to sacrifice with respect to tragedy, and Benjamin's account certainly calls 
to mind that tradition of questioning that has always sought to place the OWýXTI centre 
stage, a tradition evoked even by the word itself: what is tragedy if not the song of the 
goat, 6 TpdYO3, the animal of immemorial sacrifice? With regard to this tradition, one 
thinks most immediately of Hegel's article on natural law, in which ethical 
life is 
presented as the point at which the tragic comes to be articulated in absolute terms, 
but 
just as much of the invitation, spoken by an ancient Athenian, with which 
Nietzsche 
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brings The Birth of Tragedy to a close: ... Now follow me to the tragedy and sacrifice with 
me in the temple of both gods... (Werke 1: 156; The Birth of Tragedy 144). Relevant, also, 
would be H61derlin, who will not cease to insist upon Empedocles' position as 'ein Opfer 
seiner Zeit'; Werke und Briefe, op. cit., 578. More recently, Derrida has tried to show how 
'a radical thought of sacrifice' is operative in Heidegger's investiatlons 1nto tragedy 1n the 
Introduction to Metaphysics; cf. VOreille de Heidegger: Philopol6mologle (Geschlecht IV)' 
in Politiques de l'amitig (Paris: GahMe, 1994), 414-15. 
64 GS 1 1: 286; Or 107. 
65 GS 1 1: 314; Or 135. 
66 GS 1 1: 285; Or 106-7. 
67 Thus, in addition to the new contents (neue Inhalte) announced by the sacrifice (GS 1 1: 
285; Or 107), Benjamin refers also to the unarticulated content of the hero's achievement 
(der Gehalt der Heroenwerke) (GS 1 1: 287; Or 108), the coming word contained (erhdlt) by 
his defiance (GS 1 1: 229; Or 115), and the composure (Haltung) of Greek man in the face 
of fate (GS 1 3: 879). At each of the disjunctive moments that structure Benjamin's 
reading of tragedy, it is a matter of such support. 
68 The reference here is to Kant and, specifically, to the Groundlaying for the Metaphysics 
of Morals of 1785 in which the Critical philosopher describes philosophy, now placed in a 
precarious position (einen mil3lichen Standpunkt) as the guardian or self-supporter of its 
own laws (als Selbsthalterin ihrer Gesetze) (Ak IV: 425). Doubtless Benjamin is not 
thinking of Kant on this point, yet it is uncertain to my mind whether he can here 
sustain his insistence upon the 'independence of the tragic from the ethos [die 
Unabhdndigkeit des Tragischen vom Ethos]' (GS 1 1: 280; Or 102). The transformation 
marked by the hero, which might be expressed in the largely Hegelian term employed in 
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a later section of the Origin of the German Mourning Play, form religious community 
(religidser Gemeinschaft) to ethical community (sittlicher Gesellschaft) (GS 1 1: 300; Or 
121), seems to me to allow one to read tragedy not merely as the origin of the saying of 
truth, but equally as the origin of ethics. That Benjamin's central objection to the 
"ethical" interpretation of tragedy is to its imposition of a moral framework onto properly 
tragic action does not, to my mind, preclude the possibility of such a reading. Nor, 
moreover, does it preclude the possibility of a further engagement with the claims of 
Heidegger discussed in the previous chapter. 
69 GS I 1: 293; Or 1114. 
70 GS 1 1: 294; Or 115. Emphasis mine. 
71 Strangely enough, this is precisely the conclusion drawn by Philonenko in his account of 
the investigations undertaken by Cassirer discussed at the outset. Remarking the 'long 
process' that leads from mythic existence (what Cassirer terms the community of myth) 
to self-consciousness, 'from the human to man, from fatal existence to reasonable 
existence, ' Philonenko evokes the figure of tragedy as what'makes man a being who acts 
from himself and is responsible for his actions. ' On the basis of tragedy, he concludes, 'un 
nouveau monde est ne: celui de la libert6 et du savoir'; L'kcole de Marbourg, op. cit., 179. 
72 See, for example, the remarks of the Groundlaying Ak IV: 450ff. 
73 GS I 1: 293; Or 114. 
74 GS 1 1: 294; Or 115. 
75 Thus in a note of 1916: 'Not only does the tragic exist exclusively in the realm of 
dramatic human discourse [Redel; it is even the only form originarily suitable 
[urspriinglich eignet] to human discursive exchange. Which is to say that there is nothing 
tragic outside of discursive exchange between men and that there is no other 
form of 
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discursive exchange than the tragic' (GS 11 1: 137). Tragedy, Benjamin suggests in this 
note, is that form of language, namely discourse, in which language comes itself 
originally to be disclosed as such; that is, disclosed not as the site of some supposed 
original menaing of language that has come to be lost, but as 'the word as the pure 
carrier [reiner Trdger] of its meaning ... the pure word. ' Benjamin cals this pure 
appearance (reinen Erscheinung) of language tragic, adding: 'In tragedy, the word and 
the tragic arise simultaneously' (GS 11 1: 138). See also the remarks of note 83, below. 
76 GS 1 3: 839. 
77 GS 1 1: 288; Or 109. 
78 In point of fact, the analogy belongs not to Benjamin, but to Christian Florens Rang, with 
whom he conducted a lengthy correspondence during the gestation of the Origin of the 
German Mourning Play. Throughout, Benjamin relies heavily on Rang's knowledge of the 
historical origins of tragedy, noting at one point that 'for the question of Greek theatre I 
am and remain dependent upon you alone' (Briefe 11: 430). In response to Benjamin's 
inquiry of early January 1924 as to whether there may be 'any historical or merely 
factual connection between the dianoetic forms of Sophocles and Euripides and Attic 
legal proceedings' (ibid. ), Rang writes at length, drawing his friend's attention to the 
properly dialogic structure of the antique trial and noting that what is characteristic of 
Attic law is that 'the drunken, ecstatic word is allowed to break through the regular 
encircling of the agon' (GS 1 3: 894), a reply that Benjamin copied unchanged into the 
body of his work (cf. GS 1 1: 295; Or 116). Al the material is collected by the editors of the 
Gessamelte Schriften (GS 1 3: 887-95), and examined at length in Carrie L. Asman, 
'Theatre and Agon I Agon and Theatre: Walter Benjamin and Florens Christian Rang, ' 
Modern Language Notes 107 (1992), 606-624). The analogy between the verbal formality 
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of the dramatic conflict - most evident in the staged conflict of the Euripidean drama but 
present also, and used to slightly different effect, in Sophocles, Electra, for example, and 
the central exchange between Clytemnestra and Electra herself - to the set speeches of 
the Athenian courts is expressed by Benjamin as follows: 'Athletic contests, law and 
tragedy constitute the great agonal trilogy of Greek life ... and they are bound together 
under the sign of the contract' between the hero and the Gods (GS I 1: 294-5, Or 115). 
79 GS 1 1: 295; Or 116. 
80 Nietzsche, Werke 1: 40-1; The Birth of Tragedy, op. cit., 46. 
81 Ibid., 29-30; ibid., 37. 
82 GS 1 1: 293; Or 114. 
83 Inn the essay 'On Language as Such and on the Language of Men, ' another of the 
preliminary studies for the Origin of the German Mourning Play, Benjamin draws 
attention to what he calls the 'tragic relation that prevails between the languages of 
speaking man' (GS 11 1: 156; SW 1: 73). In light of this remark and the reading of the 
Origin of the German Mourning Play being undertaken here, one could legitimately 
inquire as to the relation of the gift of language disclosed by tragic fate, which, as I shall 
argue, directs Benjamin's reading of tragedy, and the origin of (the) language (of men) 
remarked in this fragment, an origin that comes about on the basis of the most peculiar 
fate of all: '... thou shalt surely die' (Genesis 2: 17). It seems to me that one could read 
these two texts together in such a way that would allow for a more expansive reading of 
the emergence of language from out of properly tragic guilt. 
84 GS 1 1: 288; Or 109. 
85 Again the proximity to Heidegger is marked. Not, however, with the lectures on 1934-5 
on Hblderlin, in which the sacrifice of death, as the giving of that which is most properly 
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my own, would be the founding gesture of an 'urspriingliche Gemeinschaft' (GA 39: 
72-3). Not with this, then, but with the remarks of the Afterword to 'ýý'hat Is 
Metaphysics? ' in which, recall, sacrifice is named as the concealed thanks (t, cr vorgorýgcrle 
Dank) of an essential thinking (das wesentliche Denken), a thinking that Heidegger 
refers to language itself, saying in a marginal note that this 'speechless power of 
thanking in sacrifice' is 'the preliminary leap of the human word [ist der Ur-spriing des 
menschlichen Wortej (GA 9: 310 and note). 
86 GS 1 1: 293; Or 114. 
87 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated by Leroy E. 
Loemker (Boston: Reidel, 1976), 122. For an account of this remark, see Peter Fenves, 
'Antonomasia: Leibniz and the Baroque, ' Modern Language Notes 106 (April 1990), 
432-52. 
88 Surprisingly, the implicit engagement with Kant that runs throughout 'Fate and 
Character' seems to have gone unnoticed in the huge literature on this essay. This 
engagement extends beyond the simple exchange of figures in which Benjainin indulges 
- here, the gypsy woman who appears in 'The Conflict of the Faculties' in order to denote 
the possibility of what Kant terms wahrsagende Geschichtserzdh lung, history a priori 
(AK VII: 79) - and embraces the entire analysis of fate. So, in his insistence that reading 
the dicta of fate is 'no easy matter, ' Benjamin implicitly aligns himself with the disquiet 
remarked by Kant at the outset of the Analytic of Concepts: along with the concept of 
fortune (also evoked in 'Fate and Character'), the concept of fate is, so Kant declares, one 
of those 'concepts that has been usurped' and that now 'circulate with almost universal 
indulgence, but which are from time to time challenged by the question quid juris., Since 
no one 'can adduce clear legal ground [Rechtsgrund] for the use of such terms. either 
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from reason or from experience, ' they occasion 'not a little embarassment' (Kr I'A 84-5; B 
117). Yet however questionable the concept of fate may be, it is not as if it could itself 
ever be usurped. Indeed, its very questionability provides the starting point not only for 
Benjamin's text but for the entire critical enterprise itself which, as we know, takes its 
leave from the 'peculiar fate [das besondere Schicksafl' that human reason is burdened 
by questions that it can neither dismiss nor answer (A vii). It is in response to such 
embarassment and confusion that Benjamin seeks to provide a 'genuine' concept of fate, 
one that 'takes in fate in tragedy as well as in the foresights of the fortune teller' (GS 11 1: 
176; SW 1: 204). Indeed, the ensuint assertion of Recht as the measure of fate begs the 
question of whether one could not say that Benjamin has therefore provided fate with the 
Rechtsgrund it was so desperately lacking in Kant. For a discussion of the concept of fate 
in Kant's text, see Peter Fenves, A Peculiar Fate, op. cit.. The best account of Benjamin's 
essay is that of Andrew Benjamin, 'Shoah, Remembrance, and the Abeyance of Fate: 
Walter Benjamin's "Fate and Character"' in Present Hope, op. cit., 56-74. See, in 
particular, his remarks concerning the 'tear in the continuity of fate' that constitutes 'the 
place'of tragedy (ibid., 63). 
89 GS II 1: 173; SW 1: 203. 
90 GS 11 1: 173; SW 1: 203. 
91 GS 11 1: 174; SW 1: 203. 
92 GS II 1: 178; SW 1: 207. 
93 GS 11 1: 174; SW 1: 203. Equally, in 'Toward a Critique of Violence' of the following year, 
where Benjamin will draw attention to the mythic - if not properly dalmonic - 
foundations of right (GS Il 1: 197; SW 1: 248-52). 
94 GS 11 1: 174-5; SW 1: 203. Cited GS 1 1: 288-9; Or 109-10. 
284 
95 Benjamin's most extensive remarks on the damonic are to be found in the first part of his 
essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities (GS 1 1: 146-54; SW 1: 314-20). 
96 GS 1 1: 288; Or 109. 
97 GS 1 1: 298; Or 118. 
98 GS 11 1: 140. 
99 GS I 1: 295; Or 1116. 
100 Kant, Critique of Judgement §47 (Ak V: 309). 
101 Nietzsche, Werke VIII: 192. 
102 GS 11 1: 267. 
103 GS 1 1: 312; Or 133. 
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CONCLUSION 
In one of the Bremen lectures of 1950, later published as 'The Turning, ' Heidegger 
addresses himself once again to the question most emphatically raised In the 'Letter 
on "Humanism", ' the question of ethics. As I have tried to show, this question can 
hardly be said to be absent from any part of Heidegger's thinking: from the Seia- 
kdnaen and its extension into a Sollen, a having to be, that, in the analyses of Beiiig 
and Time, was to have provided a way of thinking that through which Dasein attains 
what is most properly its own, to the meditation on dwelling that, continuing and 
extending the thoroughgoing identity of existence and dwelling established in Beutg 
and Iýme ("I am" means ... 
I dwell in, I abide in the presence of, ' remember), 
comprised the central concern of the 'Letter on "Humanism". ' This time, however, 
Heidegger's strategy appears rather different. The question of ethics is raised in its 
traditional form, Heidegger seeming to pose for himself the second of those questions 
with which Kant had sought in the Canon to provide a prospectus for the future 
development of the critical philosophy: Was sollen wir tun?, As one might expect, 
however, this question fincls no real answer in this essay, if by answer we understand 
a set of rules or directives that would guide such "doing, " Heidegger deferring this 
question in favour of another, 'more immediate and urgent' question: 
Wie mdssen wir 
denken? And yet, is this simply a deferral? Is Heidegger choosing merely to avoid the 
question? I think not. In directing himself away from the question of "doing" - which, 
in the language of the opening lines of the'Letter on "Humanism"' asks as to action or 
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do* only in terms of "the causing of an effect' and not iiI Ing in its more essential sense of 
'accomplishment" - Heidegger is doing rather more than simply avoiding the issue. 
Why? One answer, Heidegger's own, is that thinking itself is doing or actioii in the 
most proper sense of the term, 
taking a hand in ... if, by taking a hand in we mean to lend a hand to the 
essence, the coming to presence of being. And this means: to prepare ... for the 
coming to presence of being that dwells in the nudst of beings [bunitten des 
Seinden] into which being brings itself and its essence to words in language. 
The interpretation that I have proposed suggests that the Marburg lecture courses, 
and Being and Time in particular, can and should be submitted to a reading directed 
by the remarks of the'Letter on "Humanisnf'. ' If the centrepiece of Heldegger's entire 
enterprise is indeed that of 'laying bare [die Freilegung] the a priori that must be 
made visible if the question "what is man? " is to be discussed philosophically, ', then 
this will be the most faithful way of reading Heidegger. For what, as Heidegger 
himself asks in a lecture delivered in 1951 to the Darmstadt Symposium on Matt and 
0- 
Space, does it mean to be if not to dwell? 5 At the end of that lecture Heidegger offers 
another formulation: 'Mortals dwell insofar as they initiate their own etssence - their 
being capable of death as death - into the use and practice of this capacity. so that 
there may be a good death. ',, lu is only by dwelling properly that niaii beconies capable 
of death as death. In the words of one of Heidegger's most insightful commentawrs: 
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This is the soleTEXOý; of dwelling. No ars moriendi will gain anything from this 
thought. And certainly no "ethical science. " Yet Heidegger is obligated to attend 
to the ' itself. ' T1003 
Unless, of course, that ars be a tragic one. 
By contrast, Benjamin's thinking, although sharing the identical coordinates as 
that of Heidegger, cannot be said to be a tragic one. That much, at least on its own 
terms, is clear. Under the hypothesis of an epochal closure, 'tragedy' has had its day, 
namely as the era in which Greek man rises up against mythic fate and, breaking its 
daimonic rules, inaugurates a new fatum, the fatum of libertas. Under this hypothesis, 
tragedy emerges and dies away with and as the epochal close of myth, its grip 
loosened, its law irretrievably dissolved, dying away, finally, at the hands of the 
philosopher. And yet, might one not wonder whether it is at all possible to sustain the 
distinction that Benjamin demands? Whether one can, in other words, exclude tragedy 
. P-- - from philosophy only by passlng all too quickly over the trace of the tragic that would 
lie at its origin? The question would be, then, one of a certain excess, a certain echo of 
the tragic held in reserve from the very beginning, and so also of a certain echoing of 
this reserve which philosophy will not have been able to silence. In the course of 
exposing the turn from tragic art to Socratic science, Benjamin himself turns, from a 
language of tension and of excess to one of opposition and conflict, 
fi not out and out 
war: 'the conflict [den KampA which this rationalism had declared on art 18 
decided 
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against tragedy If, in the wake of tragedy's destruction of myth, it is this decision 
that reallSes the epochal possibility of authenticity broached by tragedy, what is one to 
make of the manner in which this remark continues: ... against tragedy with a 
superiority that in the end hurt the challenger more than the challenged. 1 )- -ýVhat of 
this wound? Has it healed? Might one not speak of philosophy and tragedy in the same 
terms in which Benjamin speaks of beauty and myth: beaut-,,,, he writes in a still 
unpublished note, 'presupposes the latent action of myth"? ' If according to Benjamin, 
it is philosophy that is left to hold the stage once the tragedy is over, might not some 
tragic word still echo through its satyric verse? If it is from the echoes that sound out 
from the'monstrous emptiness' of the tragic hero that'coming generations learn their 
language, ' might this word not be language itselP 
And might it not then be that, as Peter Szondi once remarked, 'the history of 
the philosophy of tragedy is not itself free from the tragic ? ", 
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Notes 
TK 40; QT 40. Cf. Kant,, KrV A 804-5; B 832-3. 
GA 9: 313. 
TK 40; QT 40. 
SZ 45. 
Cf. VA 147; BW 349. 
6 VA 152; BW 362. 
7 Boeder, 'Sterbhehe welchen TodenTop. cit., 45; Seditwits, op. cit., 167. 
8 GS I 1: 218; Or 128. 
9 Cited in Menninghaus, 'Science des seuils: La theorie du mythe chez Walter Benjamidmi 
Wismann (ed. ), Walter Benjamin et Parts, op. cit., 557. 
10 Peter Szondi, Schriften, ed. Jean Bollack et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 199 1) 1 
200. 
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